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PRS-TAC-87-049

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# ***JPRS Report***

# **Arms Control**

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## ARMS CONTROL

### CONTENTS

#### SDI, SPACE ARMS

U.S. Scientist Argues SDI is 'Unfeasible' (David Parnas Interview; Moscow IZVESTIYA, 3 Jun 87).....	1
USSR, U.S. Lawyers Back ABM Treaty (Moscow IZVESTIYA, 3 Jun 87).....	3
PRAVDA Analyzes Appeal of SDI to U.S. Public (I. Maleshenko; Moscow PRAVDA, 5 Jun 87).....	4
Official Calls Joint Space Weapons Cooperation 'Absurd' (Moscow TASS, 5 Jun 87).....	7
USSR: Third-Generation Nuclear Weapons for SDI Described (V. Chernyshev; Moscow TRUD, 11 Jun 87).....	8
PRAVDA on White House Symposium on SDI Policy (V. Gan; Moscow PRAVDA, 19 Jun 87).....	11

#### U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR, SPACE ARMS TALKS

TASS Interviews Ralph Earle on SALT, INF, ABM, SDI (Moscow TASS, 3 Jun 87).....	12
--	----

TASS Criticizes Reagan 29 June Speech (Moscow TASS, 29 June 87).....	15
Briefs	
TASS 26 June Report	16
SALT, START ISSUES	
TASS Commentator Criticizes Ikle Remarks on Compliance (Vladimir Chernyshev; Moscow TASS, 8 Jun 87).....	17
Soviet Media Mark Anniversary of Signing of SALT II (Moscow TASS, 17 Jun 87; Moscow Domestic Service, 17 Jun 87).....	19
TASS Military Writer, by Vladimir Bogachev	19
U.S. Failure To Ratify, by Aleksandr Zholkver	20
INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES	
DPA Cites USSR's Vorontsov Geneva Talks Progress (Hamburg DPA, 6 May 87).....	22
French Communist Paper Interviews USSR's Vorontsov (Yuliy Vorontsov Interview; Paris L'HUMANITE, 10 Jun 87).....	23
USSR's Obukhov Discusses Progress During Eighth Round (Vladimir Dmitriyev; Moscow Domestic Service, 27 Jun 87).....	27
USSR's Karpov Writes on Missiles in FRG Paper (Viktor Karpov; Hamburg DER SPIEGEL, 15 Jun 87).....	28
MAGYAR HIRLAP Interviews Karpov on Euromissiles (Viktor Karpov Interview; Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP, 27 Jun 87).....	30
PRAVDA on INF Treaty 'Headway,' 'Obstacles' (Moscow PRAVDA, 13 Jun 87; Moscow TASS, 19 Jun 87).....	33
'Headway Has Been Made'	33
Soviet Draft INF Protocol	33
Moscow Radio on 'Contradictory' White House Signals (Boris Andrianov; Moscow Domestic Service, 17 Jun 87)...	35
Moscow TV Talk Show on Reagan's Recent Speeches (Valentin Sergeyevich Zorin, Georgiy Arkadyevich Arbatov; Moscow Television Service, 18 Jun 87).....	37

Moscow Observer Sees Talks at 'Critical Point' (Nikolay Shishlin; Moscow Domestic Service, 19 Jun 87)...	44
PRAVDA Views U.S., Western Euromissile Policy (Yuriy Zhukov; Moscow PRAVDA, 25 Jun 87).....	45
Soviet Army Paper Views Rogers Criticism of Zero Option (Manki Ponomarev; Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 25 Jun 87)....	48
Moscow 'Top Priority' Views Military Doctrine, Missiles (Vladimir Pozner, Radomir Bogdanov, et al.; Moscow to North America, 26 Jun 87).....	50
Moscow Weekly 'International Observers Roundtable' (Viktor Nikolayevich Levin, Vitaliy Vladimirovich Zhurkin, et al.; Moscow Domestic Service, 28 Jun 87)....	57
TASS Reports White House Briefing on Converting Pershing-II's (Moscow TASS, 1 Jul 87).....	63
USSR: NATO Military Planning Session on INF, Deterrence (Moscow TASS, 26 May 87; Moscow APN DAILY REVIEW, 29 May 87).....	64
Weinberger Speech	64
'Erroneously Equates Security, Deterrence', by Enver Mamedov	64
Soviet Colonel: NATO Seeking 'Ways Around' Euromissile Accord (Yu. Soldatenko; Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 11 Jun 87).....	67
TASS on NATO Council Decision on INF, Deterrence (Vladimir Chernyshev; Moscow TASS, 12 Jun 87).....	69
PRAVDA Views U.S., NATO Line on Euromissiles (Yuriy Zhukov; Moscow PRAVDA, 21 Jun 87).....	71
PRAVDA: NATO Eurogroup Seeks 'Compensation' for Zero Option (Vladislav Drobkov; Moscow PRAVDA, 25 Jun 87).....	76
USSR: Continued Discussion of FRG Pershing-1A Issue (Moscow TASS, 11, 27 Jun 87; Moscow Television Service, 26, 28 Jun 87).....	78
Carlucci Rebutted, by Vladimir Bogachev	78
Obukhov Comments,	79
West Seeking 'Loophole', by Boris Kalyagin	80
Oakley Statement Hit	81

USSR on Potential Problems: FRG Pershings, Verification (Moscow TASS, 16 Jun 87).....	82
USSR: Further Comments on FRG Debates Over Possible Accord (Moscow PRAVDA, 18, 21 May 87; Moscow TASS, 18 May 87)..	84
Ruling Parties Divided, by Yuliy Yakhantov	84
Free Democratic Chairman Cited	85
'Keen Struggle', by Yevgeniy Grigoryev	85
TASS: Kohl Sees Good Chance for Missile Accord (Moscow TASS, 19 Jun 87).....	89
TASS Assails French Defense Secretary's Remarks on Arms Talks (Yuriy Lopatin; Moscow TASS, 2 Jun 87).....	90
French CP Leader Decries Nuclear Forces' Changed Role (Georges Marchais; Moscow PRAVDA, 23 Jun 87).....	92
TASS on Spanish Support for Zero Option (Moscow TASS, 30 May 87; Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 16 Jun 87).....	93
Gonzalez Backs Double-Zero	93
Defense Minister Cited	93
FRG Spokesman Comments on Missile Agreement (Hamburg DPA, 13 Jun 87).....	95
FRG Spokesman Comments on Pershing Issue (Hamburg DPA, 15 Jun 87).....	96
Senator Lugar Discusses Disarmament With FRG's Kohl (Hamburg DPA, 29 Jun 87).....	97
Belgian Prime Minister Martens Discusses Zero Solution (Wilfried Martens Interview; Bonn DIE WELT, 22 Jun 87)..	98
Spain's Defense Minister Views European Disarmament (Narciso Serra; Madrid YA, 14 Jun 87).....	100
USSR: East Europeans Speak on Soviet Proposals (Moscow PRAVDA, 23 Jun 87; Moscow IZVESTIYA, 19 Apr 87).....	101
CSSR's Bilak	101
SED Plenum	102
Bulgarian Commission Backs USSR	102

Bilak Addresses Brno Peace Rally Vasil Bilak; Prague RUDE PRAVO, 22 Jun 87).....	104
Romania: Press Conference at USSR Embassy on Arms Proposals (Bucharest SCINTEIA, 25 Apr 87).....	107
USSR: Japanese Factor in U.S. Nuclear Strategy Viewed (D. Belskiy; Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 30 May 87).....	108
TASS Criticizes Nakasone on U.S. Missile Deployment (Askold Biryukov; Moscow TASS, 23 Jun 87).....	111
PRC Envoy Calls for Removal of Asian Missiles (Beijing XINHUA, 25 Jun 87).....	113
People's Daily on 'Brighter Prospects' for INF Agreement (Zhang Liang; Beijing RENMIN RIBAO, 26 Jun 87).....	115
PRAVDA on 'Orchestrated Ballyhoo' Over SS-20's in Asia (Vsevolod Ovchinnikov; Moscow PRAVDA, 30 Jun 87).....	118
Briefs Bremen Mayor Talks With Honecker	119
CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS	
USSR: U.S. Cultivating 'Deadly' Viruses for Military Use (V. Markushin; Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 14 Jun 87).....	120

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U.S. SCIENTIST ARGUES SDI IS 'UNFEASIBLE'

PM090951 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 Jun 87 Morning Edition p 5

[Interview in Stockholm with Professor David Parnas by own correspondent A. Sychev: "David Parnas: SDI Is Expensive, Stupid, and Dangerous"--date unspecified]

[Text] Stockholm--You get the feeling that the subject of the "strategic defense initiative" does not just interest this man. It worries him and arouses his sincere concern.

...the biography of Professor David Parnas, the well known U.S. scientist, contains the following episode: In May 1985 he was invited to work on the creation [sozdaniye] of computers and programs for them within the SDI framework. But 2 months later he resigned and became an active opponent of the "strategic defense initiative." Why? This is the reply he gave me:

[Parnas] In announcing SDI, President Reagan called on scientists to save the world from the threat of nuclear weapons. The aim is admirable. But even then I had my doubts. My experience of working with computer-controlled weapons suggested that no system could meet the demands of SDI.

Well, for a start, creating [sozdat] computers to control the SDI system is impossible without long practical checks--that is, without waging a war in space. And that alone would mean suicide. The computers must work first time--and we cannot achieve that even in our everyday life at telephone exchanges, for instance. It would take months, if not years, of use to be sure of their reliability. Furthermore, ignorance of the characteristics of possible enemy targets and the uncontrollable number of options for "deceiving" the computers make SDI absolutely unpredictable and unfeasible.

I compared my conclusions with the opinions of other scientists and realized that they all agreed with me. "Arguing" in support of "star wars," they said that the program should be continued not because it will free us from fear of nuclear weapons, but because the funds allocated will promote the rapid development of computer equipment and science. Taking money intended for an "impenetrable shield" knowing all the while that it is impossible is a plain swindle to my mind.

After I resigned a leading figure in the SDI organization contacted me and said: "Listen, Davy, we might indeed be unable to carry out the President's idea. Why won't you just help us to spend the money?" "The money will be spent anyway," my friends told me, "so put it to good use. We can use it to solve other scientific problems. There's enough for everyone." "SDI will exhaust the Russians economically," was another argument I heard. However, this is not only expensive but stupid.

There is an anecdote in Washington about the reasons why we are refusing to abandon "star wars." It is because General Abrahamson, the leader of the SDI program, wants another star on his shoulder boards. The story is not nonsensical. Many people have a personal interest in SDI--profit, career, a prosperous future... Either these people are so blinded by their glittering prospects that they are no longer capable of vision or understanding, or they have something else on their mind. They see their job as being to wring money out of Congress. Whether the world will be more secure with the appearance of the new weapons does not, in my opinion, concern them very much.

SDI is unfeasible, the very idea is still dangerous. The USSR might respond to the production of "space shield" elements by building up its own nuclear potential. In reply the United States would be forced to paper over the cracks with an unreliable SDI and upgrade its arms. Thus "star wars" will lead to an acceleration of the nuclear arms race rather than to the elimination of nuclear weapons, as the President promised. The situation will become much more dangerous than it is now.

All scientists, my interlocutor said in conclusion, must recognize their professional and social responsibility, take stock of their actions and their consequences, not entrust decisionmaking to other people, not ignore ethical and moral norms and principles, and not dance to their clients' tune. It is as if the scientists engaged in the SDI have registered as "believers" in the ability to create a shield, thereby deceiving the public. We must convince people of the senselessness and destructiveness of this venture.

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CSO: 5200/1556



USSR, U.S. LAWYERS BACK ABM TREATY

PM041301 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 Jun 87 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Concern for the Future"]

[Text] Only by preserving the ABM Treaty will it be possible to reduce and then completely eliminate nuclear weapons. This was the conclusion reached by Soviet and American legal and technical experts from the two countries who discussed ways to avert the nuclear threat in Moscow on 25 May-2 June.

Particular attention was devoted to the problem of new technology. Its development, it was stressed at the meeting, must proceed within the limits of the ABM Treaty. The question of clearly defining the limits of activity permitted and prohibited by the treaty is another task in the solution of which representatives of the two countries' legal and scientific institutions are combining their efforts. It was agreed that they will continue studying this problem in their own countries to ensure that the development of new technology does not lead to the arms race being transferred into space.

The participants in the meeting, which was organized by the Association of Soviet Lawyers and the American Union of Lawyers for Nuclear Arms Control, intend to bring their recommendations to the attention of their countries' governments.

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CSO: 5200/1556

PRAVDA ANALYZES APPEAL OF SDI TO U.S. PUBLIC

PM101219 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 5 Jun 87 Second Edition p 4

[I. Maleshenko article: "'Star Wars': The Psychology of Self-deception"]

[Text] What do the realities of the nuclear-space age show? Above all that international security cannot be guaranteed by military means. To attempt to resolve the problems of security according to the old yardsticks, on the basis of a way of thinking and a way of acting molded over the centuries, is to deceive world public opinion. The Soviet Union's proposals aimed at reversing the arms race on earth and preventing it in space are a specific manifestation of this new thinking.

However, the U.S. Administration continues to proclaim its adherence to "nuclear deterrence" and is speeding up development of new types of weapons, including, virtually above all, those designed for placement in space.

Meanwhile millions of people throughout the world, including in the United States itself, see increasingly clearly what new obstacles SDI's implementation is capable of placing in the path of nuclear disarmament. This is forcing the U.S. Administration to make feverish efforts for the ideological and psychological indoctrination of the U.S. public.

SDI's initiators have managed to discover psychological mechanisms in the public mind which they can skillfully manipulate in order to mobilize quite considerable support within the country. And although many Americans understand the true underlying motive for the plans to militarize space and oppose their implementation, nonetheless the majority of U.S. inhabitants have fallen captive to traditional stereotypes and illusions.

The unrealizable but, so far as the "average American" is concerned, tempting promise to create an impenetrable "shield" over the country's territory has evoked the strongest response in the public mind. As President Reagan described this alluring prospect, SDI "in the future may enable us to create a missile-proof shield in space, a shield which will be able to protect us from nuclear missiles just like a roof protects a family from the rain." Many Americans are prepared to believe these promises. For two centuries of its history the United States was practically invulnerable in the military respect. And this

experience is firmly impressed on Americans' minds. It is this keen sense of lost military invulnerability that the administration is speculating on, evoking in the population an emotional surge of fear of the nuclear threat and a desire to get rid of it by any means.

Understanding the inevitability of global catastrophe in the event of a nuclear war, millions of U.S. citizens hold antinuclear positions and participate in the antiwar movement. Official Washington takes these public sentiments into account after its own fashion. To substantiate the SDI program it appealed simultaneously to both fear of nuclear catastrophe and nostalgia for the country's bygone military invulnerability. Thus the aim proclaimed by the President--"to render nuclear arms powerless and obsolete"--met with a certain response in the public mind, which suddenly saw the deceptive prospect of a "return" to the prenuclear age opening up before it.

But how illusory this sorry "prospect" is! It is obvious that the task of removing the nuclear threat can only really be achieved through collective efforts, by means of international cooperation. The Soviet initiatives have outlined a specific way to achieve this goal. But the Washington Administration continues to stubbornly cling to a program of ensuring U.S. security by military means and to the project of freeing Americans alone from the fear of war.

However, as regards securing support within the country, this step conceals a quite definite psychological calculation. The point is that even previously the U.S. attitude to the world outside often displayed a tendency to resolve international problems unilaterally, guided exclusively by its own interests. As U.S. military and political might has grown, this tendency has turned into an imperial confidence of its capacity to resolve any question on its own, ignoring the rest of the world.

The White House is endeavoring to use for its own purposes not only the impulses of national egoism, but also anti-Soviet stereotypes firmly embedded in the American public mind over the decades. According to the schemes of the "Star Wars" program's initiators, the offensive, intentionally distorted image of our country as an "empire of evil" is supposed to justify not only the desire to take refuge from it behind an impenetrable "shield" in space, but also to make the USSR vulnerable.

However, today the "Star Wars" program's initiators have been obliged to answer the question which is being asked by millions of people throughout the world: Why create a space "shield" when the Soviet proposals open up the prospect of eliminating all strategic offensive armaments in the near future? And once again the myth of the Soviet threat, the myth that "the Russians cannot be trusted, is dredged up. According to the official version, the United States supposedly needs SDI as "insurance" against possible "deception" on the part of the Soviet Union, which may supposedly "hide" some of the missiles to be eliminated, and strike against the "defenseless United States."

Furthermore, fabrications are shamelessly circulated about our country's mythical "violations" of its adopted treaty obligations, although it is precisely the Washington Administration which has broken out of the SALT II Treaty and is destabilizing the ABM Treaty. The fact that it is the Soviet Union which is demanding the strictest monitoring measures designed to give each side the guarantee that it will not fall into a trap is being hushed up. Here is a characteristic detail: While Washington used to constantly cite the question of monitoring measures as the main stumbling block to achieving Soviet-U.S. accords, this problem has now been back-burnered in the remarks of administration representatives. It has suddenly emerged that verification measures are no longer regarded as "insurance" in Washington--now the full-scale implementation of SDI is the "guarantee" of U.S. security.

The White House is strenuously "ideologizing" the problem of militarizing space, and declares that attitudes to it are the criterion of loyalty not only to the administration, but also to the United States as a whole. It is persistently contended that "real patriots" favor "Star Wars," while covert or overt "defeatists" who do not want U.S. power and prestige to increase oppose it. At the same time there are speculations on another stereotype--on their fellow citizens' faith in U.S. technical omnipotence.

Another point that should be taken into consideration is that, psychologically, people find "defensive" systems preferable to the "offensive" ones with which the nuclear threat is in fact associated in the American public mind. They remain unaware of the link which exists objectively between means of defense and attack. So some people think that it is possible to get rid of offensive armaments while continuing work to create the notorious "defensive shield."

The absurd idea that the SDI program is the "lever" which "forced the Russians to come to the negotiating table" is being drummed into Americans' minds. And if efforts are continued in this direction, then the United States will supposedly be able to really "put the squeeze on" the Soviet Union.

Certain U.S. politicians have realized the futility of the attempts to "defeat" the USSR in the offensive arms race. This has had a sobering effect on some of them and has forced them to realize the need to limit and reduce the accumulated nuclear arsenals. But some are simply unable to give up the illusion of achieving U.S. military superiority.

Of course, if need be the Soviet Union will be able to take effective counter-measures that do not copy the U.S. SDI, and will be able to repulse any attempts to violate military and strategic parity. However, in the conditions of another spiral of the arms race, even parity may cease to serve as a restraining [serzhivayushchiy] factor, which will lead to a further sharp deterioration in the international situation.

The Soviet Union consistently advocates another way out of the situation which has developed--embarking resolutely on totally destroying nuclear weapons themselves everywhere. Reykjavik showed that it is quite possible to achieve this.

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CSO: 5200/1556

OFFICIAL CALLS JOINT SPACE WEAPONS COOPERATION 'ABSURD'

LD051343 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1111 GMT 5 Jun 87

[Text] Moscow, 5 Jun (TASS)--While moving toward nuclear disarmament, the USSR considers it very important to preserve the stability of the military, including the nuclear, balance. The appearance of even some elements of SDI could dangerously alter this balance, said Aleksey Arbatov, chief of a department of the World Economics and International Relations Institute. In order to reduce the nuclear threat there is no need to create [sozdavat] new systems of weapons, he noted, speaking at a press conference held here today on the results of the international conference "the interlinking of bilateral and multilateral talks on disarmament."

David Emery, deputy director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, replying to questions from journalists, asserted that the development [razrabotka] of the SDI program would allegedly give the opportunity to increase stability in the world and to reduce the nuclear threat, and he called on the USSR to join in with U.S. research in the sphere of SDI.

In this connection Aleksey Arbatov pointed out that the USSR is ready for peaceful cooperation with the United States and other interested countries in mastering space in the economic, scientific and other spheres but that the joint creation [sozdavat] of new space weapons systems would be absurd.

Another Soviet participant in the meeting, Aleksandr Kislov, deputy director of the World Economics and International Relations Institute, noted that at one time U.S. President Ronald Reagan even said that the United States is prepared to share with the USSR its scientific achievements in the sphere of creating [sozdaniye] SDI. But these statements look manifestly unconvincing against the backdrop of the discriminatory measures which the United States is undertaking in the sphere of normal technical, scientific, trade and other exchanges, Aleksandr Kislov stressed.

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CSO: 5200/1556

USSR: THIRD-GENERATION NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR SDI DESCRIBED

PM221531 Moscow TRUD in Russian 11 Jun 87 p 3

[Article by Candidate of Technical Sciences Col V. Chernyshev: "Our Readers Ask: What Are Third Generation Nuclear Weapons?"]

[Text] East of San Francisco Bay, in a seemingly peaceful Californian valley fragrant with the scent of eucalyptus and dotted with vineyards, is the Lawrence Livermore radiation laboratory -- one of the three largest U.S. research centers engaged in the creation of nuclear armaments. It is only the barbed wire surrounding the site, THE WASHINGTON POST has written, that reminds visitors that the physicists, in jeans and open-hearted shirts, are conducting unconventional research and that a new -- "third" -- generation of nuclear weapons is emerging.

Why "third" generation? Because it was preceded by the atom bomb, made using fissionable materials (the "first" generation), and thermonuclear weapons (the "second" generation), which form the bulk of the present-day nuclear arsenals. Laboratory spokesmen state that "it will be possible to design dozens, perhaps even hundreds, of new types of weapons which will keep U.S. research organizations and the Nevada test range (where nuclear explosions are conducted) busy for several decades to come."

The existing nuclear arsenal, which, U.S. experts estimate, numbers 26,000 nuclear charges, not enough for the U.S. military-industrial complex. Nor is it satisfied by the fact that the 10-year program now being implemented in the country is to produce 20,000 nuclear warheads or that in the next 5 years alone the government plans to spend \$325 billion on nuclear arms production. In addition to everything it already has, official Washington is aiming to create even more sophisticated nuclear arms.

What is fundamentally different about "third generation" nuclear weapons? On detonation, existing nuclear weapons generate a blast wave (in the atmosphere), and emit light, heat, and penetrating radiation (mainly neutron and gamma rays). These are the explosion's so-called kill factors [porazhayushchiye factory]. In addition, a certain percentage of the energy is transformed into electromagnetic radiation. All these forms of energy are dispersed in all directions during the explosion.

"Third" generation weapons are to differ from existing weapons in that, first, in their various forms they will intensify one particular type of energy that is released, for example, electromagnetic or gamma radiation. Second, this energy is to be focused on a definite target. "The weapons we worked on in the past were completely indiscriminate in their action," a director of the Livermore laboratory explains. "The new technology ensures great discrimination." Incidentally, neutron weapons, in which the blast wave is reduced to a minimum and the fast neutron flux is considerably intensified, are a kind of transitional stage between "second" and "third" generation weapons.

Among the various types of "third" generation weapons, TIME wrote recently, "there is a bomb whose main destructive power consists of microwaves (electromagnetic radiation). Detonated in space, it will be able to disable the electronic equipment of the enemy's command centers." According to the magazine, a 10-megaton charge will turn unprotected electronic equipment on earth into "useless junk" with a radius of about 3,000 km.

Nuclear devices whose detonation produces a directed high-energy electromagnetic pulse are intended to disable radioelectronic, radio communication, computer, and other equipment and to "blind" the other side's system of providing early warning of a nuclear missile attack so as to ensure a surprise strike against it and to prevent or weaken a retaliatory strike against U.S. territory.

In addition, the United States is currently developing [razrabatyvatsya] other types of "third" generation nuclear weapons. They include, among others:

- Nuclear explosive devices which produce a directed stream containing a large quantity of destructive elements (for instance, a whole cloud of metal projectiles). Traveling at extremely high speeds, they can use their high kinetic energy to destroy various targets;

- Nuclear devices which generate directed beams of high-energy particles (electrons, protons, and neutral atoms);

- Nuclear-pumped x-ray lasers intended for use in the U.S. "Star Wars" (SDI) program.

Let us dwell in more detail on the x-ray lasers. The space battle station armed with x-ray lasers is conceived by its creators as a nuclear bomb with a yield of around 1,000 kilotons with dozens (U.S. specialists cite the figure 50) of laser cannon barrels [sterzhen-pushka] around it which direct the x-rays generated within them during a nuclear explosion onto the target. The station is like a kind of "hedgehog" whose "body" (the nuclear device) is surrounded by straight rods or "spines."

The x-ray laser was "activated" for the first time in an underground silo in the Nevada desert on 14 November 1980. The test was codenamed "Dauphin." Three months later AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY wrote: The x-ray lasers created on the basis of the successful "Dauphin" test are so small that a sufficient number could be taken into orbit in a single shuttle compartment. In 1983, the journal reported that during underground testing a yield equal to 400 terawatts was achieved from an x-ray laser. One terawatt ("teras" is the Greek for "monster") is the power that could be achieved from a solar reflector with a radius of 18 km. A mirror with a radius of 600 km could produce 1,000 terawatts (that exceeds the total power of all mechanisms of every type operating in the world). And Washington is trying to use those fantastic "monsters" to achieve its hegemonist aims by filling near-earth space with them and using them as space strike weapons!

The x-ray laser, *NEWSDAY* wrote on 25 December 1985, is the "heart" of the President's "Star Wars." E. Teller, known in the United States as the "father of the American H-bomb," described the x-ray laser as the "most innovative and productive of all the 'star wars' weapons."

All this clearly destroys the myth circulated by official Washington that SDI is "nonnuclear" in character and that the aim of the "Strategic Defense Initiative" is to make nuclear armaments "impotent and obsolete." In actual fact the United States is creating [sozdat] new nuclear armaments for SDI and, furthermore, is striving not only to retain its nuclear offensive forces but also to arm them with "third" generation nuclear weapons.

What is the purpose of all this work? Primarily to "make it possible" to wage nuclear war. "Third" generation nuclear weapons, *LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE* wrote in April 1985, will "ideally meet the requirements of the strategists who are now seeking a weapon suitable for waging a 'limited' nuclear war."

All these dreams are vain and illusory, though. In the opinion of those selfsame U.S. experts, *THE WASHINGTON POST* reported in June 1986, nuclear weapons will never be selective enough to make their use less disastrous for civilization than was the atom bomb built in 1945 or the hydrogen bomb invented in 1952. An extremely great danger is that "third" generation weapons may make nuclear war more likely, as U.S. leaders will be convinced that a "selective" offensive strike is feasible, the newspaper warned.

"There is no advantage to be gained from this weaponry but it will undoubtedly be presented to Congress as a miracle-worker," Costa Tsipis, the well known U.S. physicist and disarmament specialist, has stated. "A nuclear weapon is just a nuclear weapon."

These conclusions and warnings are noteworthy. What is being done now behind a cloak of secrecy in U.S. laboratories and at the nuclear test ranges poses a tremendous danger to mankind -- the danger of the destruction of civilization itself on our planet.

"All countries now face the question of how to avert the nuclear threat. But their answers vary," M.S. Gorbachev stated in his speech to a Romanian-Soviet friendship rally in Bucharest. "Security by means of deterrence, and primarily nuclear deterrence -- that is how the U.S. ruling circles and the leaders of a number of capitalist countries see the question. Our approach is fundamentally different -- it is security through progress toward a world without weapons or violence."

"We offer a realistic path to that: a program for the reduction and complete elimination of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction, the prevention of the extension of the arms race to space, and the ending of nuclear tests."

/9738

CSO: 5200/1556



PRAVDA ON WHITE HOUSE SYMPOSIUM ON SDI POLICY

PM181855 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 19 Jun 87 First Edition p 5

[Own correspondent V. Gan dispatch: "Contrary to Common Sense"]

[Text] Washington, 18 Jun -- The Reagan administration has reaffirmed the "inviolability" of its "Star Wars" program, even if the price is total breakdown of the arms control process and destabilization of all international security. Washington's line was set out at a symposium for representatives of the State Department, the Pentagon, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the U.S. intelligence services held at the White House today.

The symposium was officially held to discuss arms control problems. But in fact it took the form of an examination of how to prevent a solution of these problems. A "senior official" of the administration, speaking on condition that he remain anonymous, disclosed that President Reagan has rejected the USSR's proposal to hold talks on what tests of ABM technology are permitted under the provisions of the Soviet-U.S. treaty.

As repeatedly reported, the military-industrial complex and its lobbyists in the Pentagon are now mounting a campaign against the USSR-U.S. ABM Treaty. The treaty does not suit them, for it specifically prohibits the testing of space weapons and the placement of them in near-Earth orbit. However, people on the Potomac, entertaining illusions of securing strategic military superiority over the USSR, are demanding that the "obstacle" in the form of the ABM Treaty be eliminated and are pressing for its "broad interpretation" to carry out full-scale tests under the SDI program.

Secretary of State Shultz was told in Moscow in April that, in the interests of curbing the arms race, the USSR is prepared to agree to ABM research that is confined to the laboratory. The Soviet side proposed holding talks between specialists from the two states to agree on a list of devices which it would be prohibited to place in space in the course of these researches. In the USSR's opinion, that is the only way to find compromise solutions.

Today this sensible proposal has met with another "no" from Washington. According to the "senior official," Reagan has concluded that "we do not want to hold talks on that kind of basis." Why? Because, he declared, "the Soviets came up with the idea of them as a method of killing the SDI program." The spokesman continued to indicate that he "sees no reasons" why the Pentagon should be prohibited from making a "broad interpretation" of the ABM Treaty. "We do not believe that there should be any restrictions on the development [razrabotka] of the SDI system," he stressed. In general, the speaker continued, "as I see it, the basic problem with arms control is that everything indicates that it has hypnotized Americans and we seem to regard it as a panacea to all our problems." That is clearly and quit frankly put.

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR, SPACE ARMS TALKS

TASS INTERVIEWS RALPH EARLE ON SALT, INF, ABM, SDI

LD032133 Moscow TASS in English 1751 GMT 3 Jun 87

[Text] Moscow, 3 Jun (TASS)--Ralph Earle, the leader of the U.S. delegation at the SALT II talks in 1978-1980, director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in 1980-1981, has given an interview to a TASS correspondent here.

Following is the main theses of the interview:

Question: Ten years ago, with all our differences of political, ideological and economic nature, the Soviet Union and the United States had a certain community of goals at the talks on disarmament. This is what obviously made it possible to reach a number of important agreements on arms control. How can you explain changes in Soviet-U.S. relations, the changes which seriously complicated the conduct of the talks?

Answer: We had many disagreements during the SALT II talks, differences of approach to some or other problems. But we also had a common interest in getting an agreement. But my impression is that there is a change in the perception by the present U.S. Administration of what the strategic situation ought to be.

People say that Mr Reagan really wants to win. If he does, I am not sure what win means. He says that nuclear war is unthinkable. Mr Gorbachev, too, says it's unthinkable. But, I think, that there is an element in the United States that does not understand why in the nuclear world what the Soviet Union wants is parity, or stability.

There is in the same element a deep-seated mistrust of the Soviet Union. There is a strong feeling that we cannot and should not do business with the Soviet Union.

Question: Of late people in our country question the reliability of the United States as a negotiating partner. Washington has derailed four signed bilateral treaties on arms control, and frustrated a series of talks. Could you cite a single gesture of goodwill by the present administration in the field of disarmament over the past six years?

Answer: A few weeks ago the United States took one such step. It was agreed to have centers in the capitals of the two countries for the reception of notifications of missile launches. This is a very small step but a step in the right direction, and the possibility, perhaps, even probability of an INF agreement. It has not happened and, as we say in America, don't hold your breath because it may be a long time before we get it.

You are asking me to really read Mr Reagan's mind. That's a little hard to do. I met in Moscow with Soviet scientists Dr Velikhov, Dr Arbatov, Dr Sagdeyev and Dr Sagan. We concluded that there was a common threat and that we have got to work together. I think that's really something that the current administration does not fully understand.

I talked to one of your officials--I don't think it will be appropriate for me to name him. He said there was an impression that in Reykjavik Mr Reagan really wanted to make progress but that it was his advisers that did not. I don't know. I do not know Mr Reagan, I've never met the man.

People say Mr Reagan wants to go down in history as a peace-maker. Some people think it's in his own interest to get an agreement to take off some of the pressure over the Iran-Contra problem.

Question: President Reagan, possibly, does not really want nuclear war. However, one gathers the impression that he quite often is prepared to balance on the brink of a nuclear abyss to attain his political aims.

Answer: Military solutions are really outmoded. I am sure Mr Reagan does not want war but maybe he believes in them, by pasturing [as received] in the Persian Gulf right now. It's to me a military act without a policy. I think what we really need is not a diplomat or negotiator, but psychiatrist.

Question: Specialists described the ABM treaty as an exemplary agreement on arms control, for it limits not only the existing anti-missile arms but also ABM systems which can be developed in the future. What do you think about the treaty?

Answer: I am not an enthusiast of SDI and I think that the ABM treaty was just fine. However, financially, economically, strategically, the SDI has already acquired a life of its own. Even if Senator Biden became president tomorrow, the Congress would continue to appropriate, not so much as now, but it will continue to appropriate.

Question: Specialists are of the opinion that if only one percent of missiles launched break through to targets, that would be a disaster. What, in your view, is the task of SDI if reliable defense against offensive missiles is impossible? One gathers the impression that Washington hopes to bleed the Soviet Union in the arms race economically.

Answer: I don't think ABM can stop even 50 percent of missiles launched.

Possibly some in the United States do really expect to bankrupt the Soviet Union.

It's ballooning [as received] that SDI would bankrupt the Soviet Union. But it may bankrupt ourselves. I think the Soviet Union approaches the issue more wisely than the United States.

SDI cannot work, will not work and should not work.

I understand that some of the people in the Soviet Union say SDI would not work so forget it.

Question: If there are such people, there are few of them in this country. The SDI may also have the 'Frankenstein effect': the monster may kill its creator. [single quotation marks as received]

Answer: Maybe, this desire of Mr Reagan to go down in history as a peace-maker will bring fruit.

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CSO: 5200/1554

## U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR, SPACE ARMS TALKS

### TASS CRITICIZES REAGAN 29 JUNE SPEECH

LD292056 Moscow TASS in English 2023 GMT 29 Jun 87

[Text] Washington June 29 TASS -- Speaking on Monday before the activists of the Republican Party, President Reagan admitted that it was for realism in Soviet-U.S. relations. [sentence as received] This realism was the first step not toward controlling the growth of the number of arms but in bringing about real and verifiable restruictions in the number of weapons. Reagan expressed the hope that the Soviet-U.S. talks on eliminating medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe could soon be successfully completed.

However, he demanded at the same time that the Congress satisfy completely and unconditionally the administration's request for defense appropriations. As is known, the White House requested for these purposes 312 billion dollars in the fiscal 1988. The administration needs these billions to build up nuclear armaments, including the first-strike MX and Trident-2 missiles, cruise missiles, and to develop new Midgetman missiles, stealth bombers and space weapons systems.

Dismissing the attempts by the Congress to cut down defense appropriations for the fiscal 1988, Reagan said: "Some in Congress want to cut defense spending...I won't let them."

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CSO: 5200/1554

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR, SPACE ARMS TALKS

BRIEFS

TASS 26 JUNE REPORT--Geneva, 26 Jun--Last week within the framework of the Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear space weapons meetings continued on all three problems on the agenda: medium-range missiles and space and strategic offensive weapons. [TASS report: "Talks in Geneva"] [Text] [Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 27 Jun 87 Second Edition p 5 PM] /9738

CSO: 5200/1554

## SALT, START ISSUES

### TASS COMMENTATOR CRITICIZES IKLE REMARKS ON COMPLIANCE

LD081608 Moscow TASS in English 1355 GMT 8 Jun 87

[Text] Moscow, 8 Jun (TASS)--By TASS military writer Vladimir Chernyshev:

U.S. Under Secretary of Defense Fred Ikle decided to try his hand at a new trade: he published an article in the observer column of the NEW YORK TIMES, asserting that the USSR had violated more than once arms control arrangements concluded with the U.S. True, it is unclear what trade Mr Ikle claims: of an observer or a conjurer. No offense meant for representatives of those respected professions, but the deputy chief of the Pentagon clearly has not succeeded in any of them.

As a matter of fact, there are no grounds for the conclusions Mr Ikle proclaims. He should be reminded of real facts. First, the U.S. national means of verification never pointed to any violations of international agreements by the Soviet Union. Second, back in 1985, the U.S. representative in the Soviet-American standing consultative commission on the verification of compliance of the sides with the agreements concluded confirmed in the Congress that the USSR unswervingly complies with all the obligations assumed. Third, the U.S. Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff arrived last year at the same conclusion on the basis of the evaluation of U.S. intelligence information. In a report on the military status of the U.S. submitted to the congress the committee stated outright that the USSR fully complies with its obligations.

Matters are different as regards the U.S. There is no need to enumerate all the facts of Washington's violation of the obligations signed at the summit level. Suffice it to recall how the present U.S. Administration trampled under foot the SALT I interim agreement and the SALT II Treaty, how it tries to destroy the ABM Treaty. But then the new "observer" is excellently aware of these and other facts, since he predicted such developments and took an active part in decision-making. It was Ikle who said openly some time back that the United States intends to adhere to international treaties on arms limitation as long as they do not interfere with the implementation of the U.S. military programs.

Another question arises: Why is it that Ikle's article with trite "accusations" against the USSR appeared precisely now?

The answer is contained in the article itself: basing on his "accusations" the author tries to call in question the expediency of concluding a Soviet-U.S. agreement on intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe. This method is clearly nothing new. Whenever the prospect for a positive break through in Soviet-American relations opens, certain people in Washington, clearly fulfilling the order from some quarters, either stage provocations or make accusations against the USSR. Their aim is to freeze or disrupt a dialogue between the two countries.

But such figures find it ever more difficult to fulfill their task, to mislead the public. And is it not the results of a confidential research by USIA which draws the conclusion that most Western Europeans have a greater confidence in the Soviet Union than in the U.S. in the matters of arms limitation and observance of the obligations under treaties that so alarmed the Pentagon and compelled Mr Ikle to assume the duties of an "observer"?

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CSO: 5200/1555



## SALT, START ISSUES

### SOVIET MEDIA MARK ANNIVERSARY OF SIGNING OF SALT II

TASS Military Writer

LD171249 Moscow TASS in English 1223 GMT 17 Jun 87

[Text] Moscow June 17 TASS -- By TASS military writer Vladimir Bogachev:

The Soviet-American treaty on the limitation of strategic arms, SALT-2, was signed in Vienna on June 18, 1979.

World public opinion welcomed the event with immense satisfaction, regarding the agreement as an effective barrier preventing the world from sliding towards a disastrous war.

Arms-control experts emphasized that SALT-2 was a result of sensible compromise displayed by both sides, taking into account the legitimate security interests of both countries and guaranteeing predictability in Soviet-American relations.

The SALT-2 treaty limited the aggregate number of inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBM), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) and long-range bombers.

Restrictions were imposed on the number of strategic missiles with multiple independently-targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV) and bombers armed with cruise missiles.

SALT-2 prohibited increasing the number of nuclear warheads on the existing MIRV missiles, precluded the deployment of some types of especially dangerous missiles and provided for other measures that substantially reduced the risk of an all-out nuclear war.

Contrary to assertions by American advocates of the arms race, SALT-2 provided for essential cuts in nuclear-weapon systems. The Soviet Union, for instance, on the ratification of the treaty, would have to reduce the number of its strategic delivery vehicles by ten per cent.

The ratification of the SALT-2 treaty was thwarted by the United States under invented pretexts that had nothing whatsoever to do with arms control.

Ronald Reagan, taking up the White House job in January 1981, called the treaty vicious in its very essence.

The President emphasized that his administration did not consider itself bound by the SALT-2 commitments.

U.S. Defence Secretary Caspar Weinberger described the treaty as a sham agreement on arms control.

The Reagan administration's strongly negative attitude to SALT-2 is largely because the treaty set effective barriers in the way of the quantitative buildup and qualitative improvement of strategic arms and thus hindered the implementation of plans to attain military superiority for the U.S., adopted at the Republican Party Congress in 1980.

Later, however, in May 1982, the White House, not daring to challenge openly world public opinion, announced its intention not to undertake any steps that would undermine the treaty.

The U.S. subsequent actions showed, however, that Washington's declaration was insincere from the very beginning.

U.S. Undersecretary of Defence Fred Ikle let the cat out of the bag by saying that the United States was going to abide by international agreements on arms control as long as they did not hinder the implementation of American military programmes.

When in 1986 the U.S. was confronted with the dilemma of whether to continue compliance with SALT-2 or make operational the 131st bomber armed with cruise missiles in an apparent violation of the treaty, Washington immediately proclaimed the agreement to be "dead."

The Soviet Union is not seeking military superiority. It has no grounds to abandon the agreements based on the principle of equality and equal security.

The USSR has always strictly observed all provisions of the SALT-2 treaty. The Soviet side believes that the treaty could play a positive part today for strengthening stability in the world.

The 1979 treaty, an important landmark on the way towards the limitation and reduction of arms, has demonstrated that, despite all the ideological, political and economic differences, the USSR and the U.S. can and should press for progress along the road of peace and stability.

#### U.S. Failure To Ratify

LD171812 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 17 Jun 87

[Aleksandr Zholkver commentary]

[Text] Tomorrow is the 8th anniversary of the signing of the Soviet-U.S. treaty on the limitation of strategic weapons, the so-called SALT II treaty. Here is Aleksandr Zholkver, our political observer:

[Zholkver] I was lucky enough to be in the ceremonial hall of Vienna's Hofburg Palace when the SALT II treaty was signed. All those present realized they were witnessing a truly historic event. For the first time the two nuclear powers came to an agreement not just on the limiting of their strategic arsenals but also on their subsequent reduction. In this regard, in the Soviet-U.S. communique signed in Vienna, at issue was mutual striving for the conclusion of the treaty on banning nuclear tests, on eliminating chemical weapons, on reducing conventional weapons in Central Europe, as well as mutual commitment not to develop [sozdavat] or test the means for launching nuclear or any other kind of weapons of mass destruction in the earth's orbit. Mutual intention was being stressed to further promote the relaxation of international tension and to promote the development of peaceful and mutually advantageous relations between states.

Why were these objectives not attained? Why was it that the SALT II treaty was neither ratified by the United States, nor even presented to the U.S. Senate for ratification? I remember that some of the reasons were named by my U.S. journalist colleagues still in Vienna. At issue was the fact that already then, in the summer of 1979, major U.S. concerns actively began preparing to produce new weapons: the strategic MX missiles and the medium-range Pershing-2, Ohio class nuclear submarines, and the B-1 strategic bombers. Considerable sums were spent on scientific and research work on these armaments. Record profits were expected, and the military concerns did not want to lose such an advantageous business. Other reasons became known somewhat later, when reports were leaked to the press that President Carter, whose signature is at the bottom of the SALT II treaty, also signed a secret directive No 59 which sets out the doctrine of limited nuclear war. Thus, the U.S. military and industrial complex wrecked the SALT II treaty without allowing it even to come into force. Furthermore, the present Washington administration has, on the whole, renounced this treaty, having openly violated its most important clause.

As for our country, it still, as it did in the seventies, actively stands for curbing the arms race and for disarmament, first and foremost the nuclear one. The persistence and, at the same time, the flexibility of the Soviet stance led to the situation where the contours of the Soviet-U.S. agreement on the elimination of nuclear missiles in Europe are now taking shape. The struggle for disarmament continues.

/9738

CSO: 5200/1555

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

DPA CITES USSR'S VORONTSOV GENEVA TALKS PROGRESS

LD061833 Hamburg DPA in German 1729 GMT 6 May 87

[Text] Bonn (DPA)--According to Yuliy Vorontsov, chief Soviet negotiator in Geneva, the longer-range INF missiles are the Soviet Union's main goal in the search for zero options.

On the day before the Bundestag debate on the medium-range issue, Vorontsov said that the aspect of verification in an agreement on these missiles with a range of over 1,000 km is still to be negotiated, but could be ready by October at the latest. He also said that if during this stage the zero option for shorter-range INF missiles with a range of between 500 and 1,000 km--the subject of such intense controversy in Bonn--were attained, "then that would please us," but it is by no means a condition. Vorontsov made it clear that Moscow expects to be able to reach agreement later with the other superpower, the United States.

Earlier, Vorontsov briefed Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher and Horst Teltschik, the chancellor's adviser, on the state of the Geneva negotiations.

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## INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

### FRENCH COMMUNIST PAPER INTERVIEWS USSR'S VORONTSOV

PM161416 Paris L'HUMANITE in French 10 Jun 87 p 9

[Interview with Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister Yuliy Vorontsov by Bernard Frederick -- date and place not given]

[Text] [Frederick] Mrs Thatcher, George Shultz, and Jacques Chirac have made successive visits to Moscow. The Soviet leadership has put forward specific proposals, especially on disarmament in Europe. But things seem to be marking time. What is your feeling?

[Vorontsov] With the Americans in private, and semi-publicly with Mrs Thatcher and Mr Chirac, we discussed the need to examine security and disarmament problems in a serious way -- a new way. We are often asked why they need to be examined in a new way. Why now? Why could this not have been done 10 years ago?

We think the answer is clear: 10 years ago everybody in the world thought that the more nuclear weapons there were, the more secure the world would be. In the course of these 10 years, nobody can say exactly when or how, we crossed an invisible line beyond which the world's security is increasingly threatened by the increase in nuclear weapons. The Americans estimate that there are now 60,000 warheads of all kinds in the world, from the smallest weighing 0.5 megaton to the biggest. Fine. Let us agree on this figure. The Americans are producing some 2,000 warheads per year. We are producing slightly fewer. But, let us say our production is of the same order. It is easy to calculate that, in 5 to 10 years time, the total number of nuclear warheads will be 100,000. What is the point? What are we going to do with them? We will be tripping over warheads.... An accidental explosion will become increasingly likely. The risk of nuclear war will increase considerably and this in turn will reduce security.

This is, therefore, a pressing matter. It is high time that we halted this race. We are taking another factor into account. This is a factor which the West, especially France, could have taken into account but have failed to do so. We have done so: It is Chernobyl.

People in Europe were very frightened by the fact that the radioactivity discharged after the accident at the power station spread beyond the Chernobyl region. The power station is near Kiev, but there was panic in Sweden, Britain, the FRG, Spain, France, and Italy.... At the time people in Rome dumped fruit and vegetables which were thought to be contaminated outside the doors of our embassy. We think that that was an extreme reaction. The level of radioactivity was not dangerous, at least not for those countries. But the Chernobyl radioactive leak is equivalent to one third of the power of the smallest explosion -- 1 kiloton, perhaps less.

Europe trembled over the radioactive fallout from an explosion of 1 kiloton or less, and there are 60,000 much more powerful warheads in the world. For instance, the explosion of one Pershing missile is equivalent to around 600 Chernobyl leaks.

The arms race phenomenon therefore deserves to be examined openly today. That is why we are urging the Western countries to adopt a new attitude. If we are told that a Europe without nuclear weapons is impossible, we reply: Think about it. We must not just repeat what was said in the fifties. Things have changed. We must think about the present time and the prospects for the coming years.

This explains the reasons for our proposals on the medium-range and shorter-range missiles in Europe. Look: We are prepared to destroy more warheads than the West. The Pershing-2 missiles have a single warhead and the SS-20 missiles have three. If the agreement on which we are working in Geneva is accepted, the West will have to destroy 400 nuclear warheads and we will have to destroy 1,200. We do not regret this. We do not think that we will be at a disadvantage. Everybody will gain from this.

[Frederick] In January 1986, Mikhail Gorbachev put forward a draft plan for the total destruction of all nuclear weapons by the year 2000. You then made new proposals. How is all this linked? Do the latest proposals replace the plan for complete destruction?

[Vorontsov] Our general line is the statement of 15 January. If the West was prepared to accept that plan, we would much more readily discuss the total destruction of nuclear weapons by the 1st day of the year 2000. But this is not the case. The United States and its allies are not prepared to destroy all nuclear weapons.

How can we live without nuclear weapons, ask people in your countries. We reply that the nuclear bomb appeared in 1945 and that before that mankind lived without that weapon. We are then told that nuclear weapons have guaranteed peace by deterring us from attacking the West. But there is a more simple, clearer, and more accurate explanation for this: Perhaps we have never had and do not have any intention of attacking the West.

The reason why there has been no war is that we did not want to wage war. But we can cite numerous aggressions by the West: Vietnam, the Middle East, the Malvinas.... I repeat that nuclear weapons do not frighten us. We do not want to attack anybody. An agreement on the Euromissiles would be very important for Europe and for the whole of mankind, because it would be a real revolution in human consciousness. It would prove that it is possible to destroy nuclear weapons, that we have the means of doing so, and that it is possible to live peacefully.

We think that an agreement on the Euromissiles will be step toward an agreement on strategic weapons and toward a 50 percent reduction in those weapons for instance, as Mikhail Gorbachev proposed.

[Frederick] The theory of deterrence may have worked in your favor. Has not the USSR escaped attack from imperialism because it had nuclear weapons?

[Vorontsov] Just suppose there were no longer any nuclear weapons in our country or the United States; we would be capable of repelling any aggressor by conventional means. We did not identify with the bomb. There are some politicians in the West who could be described as half-man, half-bomb. This is not true in our country.

[Frederick] And yet, what the West says is that peace is more comprehensively maintained by nuclear weapons, by the balance of nuclear forces.

[Vorontsov] Listen. All the calculations show that if we suffered a nuclear attack and did not respond we would still all die at the same time, or more or less the same time. You would possibly die a little later than us, as long as it took for the cloud to reach you. Remember Chernobyl. It is important to understand that if there was a conventional war in Europe and the Americans launched their Pershing missiles against us, we would die but so would Western Europe, without there being any need for us to retaliate. As I said before, we are learning from Chernobyl, but the West is not.

[Frederick] In your view what role can public opinion now play? When problems have reached this stage and meetings have reached this level, what can the man in the street do, what weight does his opinion have?

[Vorontsov] The man in the street and public opinion can do a great deal. In the Western countries, for instance, several ways of responding to our proposals have been examined. There has been a suggestion that a new U.S. missile should be deployed in Europe to replace the one which we were proposing to dismantle. Well, many European governments said to the Americans: no, definitely not. This is because public opinion in their countries prevents them from raising the question of a new missile. Public opinion is playing a major role. We must abandon old ways of thinking, approach things in a new way, and assess the danger.

[Frederick] In this connection, world opinion responded positively to the Soviet moratorium on nuclear tests. It was worried by the resumption of your tests. Was that moratorium a failure?

[Vorontsov] We placed great hopes in the moratorium and through that there was strong international pressure on the Americans. Unfortunately, that was not the case. Perhaps this is because the nuclear tests are carried out a long way from Europe, far from our continent's population. France, for example, tests its weapons in the Pacific, a long way from Paris. Moreover, these tests are conducted underground and it is generally thought that there is no fallout. There is, therefore, a degree of tolerance for these tests.

Our proposal was applauded but not enough pressure was exerted on the Western countries which are pursuing their tests. It was rather like this story from World War I: Some Italian soldiers were reluctant to leave the trenches and launch an attack. A patriotic young captain then climbed out of the trench, unsheathed his sword, and cried: "Forward for Italy." The soldiers clapped: "Bravo captain...." They applauded us from the bottom of the trench too.

We resumed our nuclear tests, stating that we were prepared to halt them as soon as the Americans stopped theirs. We are waiting for this position to be supported. There must be strong international pressure. That is way we greatly appreciate the declaration of the six countries which launched the New Delhi appeal. Six countries is a good start, but we will need 50 or 60. We will then say to them, fine, we will stop. We still hope to be able to stop the arms race in this way.

[Frederick] How does Moscow view France's official position on the disarmament question?

[Vorontsov] The Soviet leadership has the impression that we have failed to find a common language with the French on this question. The predominant factor in the official French attitude is the desire to maintain the French nuclear arsenal and safeguard it from any attempt to touch it. But we are not touching that arsenal. We have no proposal for doing this. We are now saying that we Soviets and Americans have the largest number of nuclear weapons and that it is up to us to take the first step, not a country like France. What we want from Paris is understanding of the need for this process. The French arsenal is not at stake but France must realize that the process of reduction, not to say destruction of nuclear weapons in Europe must be supported. But France does not want to discuss this in a constructive way because it does not want anybody to touch its nuclear force. This is why there are no constructive talks on this issue. I repeat that what we want to obtain from France is support in the preliminary talks with the Americans but it is dissociating itself from this question: We hope that France will not oppose the dismantling of the Euromissiles.

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CSO: 5200/1558



## INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

### USSR'S OBUKHOV DISCUSSES PROGRESS DURING EIGHTH ROUND

LD272133 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1730 GMT 27 Jun 87

[Correspondent Vladimir Dmitriyev reports from Geneva]

[Text] The eighth round of the Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space weapons has been working here for 2 months. At the latest round the USSR delegation proposed a draft treaty on the liquidation of Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe. I am asking Ambassador Obukhov, deputy head of the Soviet delegation, to speak about how the talks are going and what has been achieved in the eighth round:

[Begin Obukhov recording] In the sphere of medium-range missiles a certain degree of progress has been achieved. Work is underway on the harmonization of the wording in the joint draft treaty which envisages the liquidation of Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe. The progress on the treaty which would signify an historically important step along the path toward freeing Europe from nuclear threat has been made possible by major initiatives undertaken by the Soviet side. As a result, the prospect of achieving an agreement as soon as this fall has opened up. From the U.S. side, however, positions are being put forward concerning some aspects of the problem of medium-range missiles which are hampering progress.

One must say that lately, in connection with the NATO reply to our proposal on operational and tactical missiles -- the question of these missiles is also supposed to be resolved within the context of the accord on medium-range missiles -- new difficulties are springing up. Specifically, the United States, while seemingly agreeing to the liquidation of Soviet and U.S. operational and tactical missiles in Europe, would like at the same time to keep its warheads on 72 Pershing-1A missiles belonging to the FRG. It turns out that the USSR is to get no operational and tactical missiles in Europe, whereas no zero option is envisaged for the United States, obviously. This, I repeat, is hampering progress and is threatening to thwart the planned schedule for concluding work on the draft treaty. Good will and specific and constructive steps by Washington are required in reply to our far-reaching proposals. [end recording]

/9738

CSO: 5200/1558

## INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR'S KARPOV WRITES ON MISSILES IN FRG PAPER

DW151230 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 15 Jun 87 pp 19-20

[Article by Viktor Karpov, former Soviet chief delegate to the Geneva disarmament negotiations and head of the USSR Arms Control and Disarmament Directorate: "To Whom Do the Warheads Belong?"]

[Text] What is our idea of a possible solution for medium-range missiles in Europe on the basis of the results reached in Soviet-U.S. talks?

In Europe, the United States would have to scrap the Pershing-2 and the cruise missiles, and the Soviet Union the SS-20 missiles. That would mean that neither Soviet nor U.S. missiles of that class would be left in Europe. At the same time, neither Soviet SS-12 and SS-23 missiles, nor U.S. Pershing-1A and Pershing-1B missiles, which belong to the same class and have a range of 500-1,000 km, would be allowed to remain in Europe. Of course, in that case not just the missiles themselves, but also the pertinent warheads, would have to be removed.

Consequently there must be no U.S. or Soviet warheads for medium-range missiles and operational-tactical missiles in Europe. That also applies to U.S. warheads that have been stockpiled for the Bundeswehr's Pershing-1A missiles.

A U.S. draft treaty on medium-range missiles also recognized the fact that those warheads are intended for operational-tactical missiles and must therefore be destroyed. The acceptance of the Soviet proposal on the removal from Europe of medium-range and operational-tactical missiles and their warheads would close any loopholes by which the treaty could be breached.

The U.S. side has supported Federal Chancellor Kohl's 4 June government statement, saying that weapons belonging to third countries should not be subject of the negotiations. Those who try to understand that will see that the United States' and the Federal Government's viewpoint is paradoxical.

Let us assume that the nuclear warheads for the West German Pershing-1A missiles are "weapons of a third country," as the United States thinks. Then we have to assume that they do not belong to the United States. But to whom do they belong? It is clear that they cannot belong to the Federal Republic.

Under Article 2 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Federal Republic has undertaken the obligation not to take over directly or indirectly nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosives from anyone, or accept supervision of such weapons or explosives.

The problem is this: The warheads for West German Pershing-1A missiles must remain in the possession of the United States -- not placed under FRG supervision -- for the United States to observe the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Or has the United States ceded supervision of those warheads to the Federal Republic, thereby violating its obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty?

However, if the United States remains the owner of the aforementioned warheads and continues to supervise them, it is totally impossible to consider them "weapons of a third country." They must be considered U.S. warheads for operational-tactical missiles and therefore would be destroyed.

Any other solution in which U.S. nuclear warheads for West German operational-tactical missiles would remain in Europe, would provide an opportunity to elude the Soviet-U.S. agreement and would make it meaningless.

If we granted the United States the right to deploy warheads for West German operational-tactical missiles today on a quasi-legitimate basis, it might want to do the same in Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey, or other NATO countries tomorrow. It would give those countries Pershing-1A or Pershing-1B missiles and in addition would deploy U.S. nuclear warheads

In theory, we can also conceive of a situation where Soviet allies -- the GDR or CSSR in the Warsaw Pact, for example -- would ask the Soviet Union to leave operational-tactical SS-12 missiles on its territory, hand them over to their armies, and deploy Soviet nuclear warheads for them. Other allies could make a similar request of the USSR regarding the SS-12 or SS-23 missiles.

It should be clear that such developments within NATO and the Warsaw Pact would by no means be in accordance with the objective of removing the entire complex of medium-range missiles and operational-tactical missiles from Europe.

In the Geneva negotiations, the Soviet and U.S. delegation have formulated the first variant of the joint draft treaty on removing medium-range missiles from Europe. Thus the basis of an agreement acceptable to both sides has been created that must be taken seriously.

However, the U.S. position still contains elements preventing that. They include, for example, the proposal to change the Pershing-2 medium-range missiles into operational-tactical missiles or to permit the deployment of land-based cruise missiles on ships, not scrapping them.

The proposal to be permitted to leave part of the U.S. nuclear warheads for operational-tactical missiles in Europe can only be assessed as indicating that the U.S. side is not really ready to work seriously for a mutually acceptable agreement on the double zero solution on the European continent.

The assertions that such a solution is being pursued will only sound convincing if the U.S. position in the negotiations in substance is not in such flagrant contradiction to its policy statements.

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CSO: 5200/1558

## INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

### MAGYAR HIRLAP INTERVIEWS KARPOV ON EUROMISSILES

AU301349 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 27 Jun 87 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Viktor Karpov, head of the Problems of Arms Limitation and Disarmament Directorate of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, by Moscow correspondent Gerenc Szaniszlo: "Interview with Viktor Karpov -- A Missile Agreement Should Have Guarantees" -- at the Soviet Foreign Ministry complex in Smolensk Square in Moscow; date not given]

[Text] The Soviet-U.S. disarmament talks in Geneva are again the center of attention. This is particularly due to the fact that the two big powers' positions on the issue of disarmament and eliminating the so-called Euromissiles have come closer to each other. Not so long ago, the Soviet delegation in Geneva was still headed by Viktor Karpov. The internationally recognized and experienced disarmament expert is now head of the Soviet Foreign Ministry's Problems of Arms Limitation and Disarmament Directorate. He received MAGYAR HIRLAP's Moscow correspondent in his study at the Foreign Ministry complex in Smolensk Square in Moscow and answered his questions.

[Szaniszlo] Prior to each round of negotiations in Geneva, the delegation leaders greet each other and the doors are closed. Then, one can learn only about success or failure. You headed the Soviet delegation for a long time. If it is not a secret, would you tell us about the closed-door negotiations?

[Karpov] Each type of negotiation has its own characteristics. The Geneva negotiations -- the ones you are interested in -- are characterized by their complexity, which is the result of the nature of the subject matter. Issues that affect the security of both big powers and which are vitally important for both sides are under discussion in Geneva. In addition, neither the Soviet Union nor the United States can disregard the interests of their allies.

At the negotiating table, the two sides are conducting a thorough and detailed analysis of certain problems that sometimes do not even attract the attention of the outside world, but which affect important elements of the strategic balance of power that exists between the two big powers. In these cases, outstanding experts are needed who are well aware of the structure of armaments, the trends of the arms race, and the possible consequences of it.

Due to their particular situation, the Soviet-U.S. negotiations in Geneva are confidential. We cannot disclose the technical details expressed at the negotiating table without damaging our country's defense capability and security. However, these are not secret talks: our position can be learned from various declarations and from the press.

Concretely about the negotiations: there are sessions in which both delegations participate in full. At these sessions, the two sides present their fundamental positions and opinions. It is a different matter if they are already working on a draft agreement: in such cases, the two sides compare opinions on certain details. Currently, for example, intensive work is going on to formulate a joint draft agreement on Euromissiles.

[Szniszlo] Since we are already about this -- not so long ago, the news spread in the world press that a preliminary draft document on Euromissiles had been prepared. Little can be heard, however, about the content of this document....

[Karpov] We could call this document "a joint one" only with the best of intentions. The agreements of principle achieved in Reykjavik served as a basis for this document. However, there are still numerous points to be clarified because of the differing opinion of the two sides. It is in fact a comprehensive document that reflects two points of view. This is perhaps why it has not received much attention in the world press.

The final agreement depends on whether the U.S. side will change its position on certain issues or not. I would point out the three most important of these issues:

1. Paradoxical as it is, while voicing the need to dismantle the missiles with a range of 500-1,000 km, Washington wants to retain its Pershing 1A missiles, which fall into this category. And Washington wants to achieve this in such a way that -- since, according to an earlier agreement, these missiles are the property of the FRG -- its U.S.-owned warheads would be quickly handed over to the Bonn government on the basis of a new agreement.

The nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty strictly prohibits any country from handing over nuclear arms to another country and any country from accepting them. Both the United States and the FRG signed this agreement. In spite of this, Washington would like the Pershing 1A missiles to be left out of consideration in Geneva because they are in the possession of "a third country," and the agreement applies only to the Soviet and U.S. arms.

2. We take a different view on how to gradually reduce the number of missiles. It is no secret that the Soviet Union has more warheads in Europe than the United States. We proposed to start reducing them simultaneously but -- because this is the just way -- we will dismantle our missiles more rapidly in order to gradually offset the existing disproportion. The Americans want us to go ahead and unilaterally start reducing our numbers, and they would join in "sometime along the way."

3. As is well known, in the spirit of the principled agreement in Reykjavik, 100 warheads on each side would remain on the intermediate-range nuclear missiles deployed in the Asian territories of the Soviet Union and on U.S. territory. However, it is far from a matter of indifference to us where the United States deploys these types of missiles. From Alaska, for example, they would directly threaten certain areas in the Soviet Union. What we would like is for our area to fall outside the range of these missiles just as the United States is outside the range of our missiles of a similar type.

[Szaniszlo] Let me ask you: What is it that, in your opinion, should definitely be included in an agreement on Euromissiles?

[Karpov] Both sides would be allowed to retain 100 warheads each on their medium-range missiles: the Soviet Union on its Asian territories and the United States on its own territory. Of course, the Soviet Union will be ready to reduce its armaments in Asia to this level only if both sides dismantle all their medium-range missiles stationed in Europe.

Washington is sticking to its demand to eliminate tactical-strategic missiles. Well, this can be no obstacle and we do not oppose the double zero option in Europe either. But no warhead should remain on European territory -- and I mean here the already mentioned Pershing 1A missiles, too.

And finally, an agreement should contain guarantees that there will not be later substitutes for the dismantled and destroyed missiles. It will be necessary, for example, to supervise the armament factories that have manufactured these kind of arms up to now.

[Szaniszlo] Both the Soviet Union and the United States (ever since Shultz' visit to Moscow) keep saying that concrete results should emerge at a possible summit. What would you accept as concrete results?

[Karpov] In the course of his Moscow visit in April, Shultz had the opportunity to learn our position: We are striving for an agreement in three key issues, namely, strengthening the ABM agreements, which would practically hinder the militarization of space; reducing strategic arms by 50 percent on both sides; and beginning negotiations on halting nuclear tests. The agreement on Euromissiles would be an addition to all this.

[Szaniszlo] Finally, allow me to ask you another question not directly related to this subject: What does "perestroyka" mean here, in the Foreign Ministry? How do you, as a leading diplomat, feel the changes?

[Karpov] The Problems of Arms Limitation and Disarmament Directorate, which I head, has come into being virtually as a result of this perestroyka, established last May. We felt the need for such a directorate before because the problem of disarmament is no longer simply a theoretical task but also a practical one and part of our everyday life.

The directorate employs 60 people. In the course of our work, we cooperate closely with the relevant departments of the CPSU Central Committee and the Ministry of Defense. The perestroyka and the increased publicity forces us not only to formulate our opinions on certain issues but also to present them adequately to the public.

[Szaniszlo] Thank you for the interview.

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CSO: 5200/1558

## INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

PRAVDA ON INF TREATY 'HEADWAY,' 'OBSTACLES'

### 'Headway Has Been Made'

PM131629 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 13 Jun 87 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report: "At the Geneva Talks"]

[Text] Geneva, 12 Jun -- At the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space weapons work has continued during the past week within the framework of the medium-range missiles group on agreeing on the formulations of a joint draft treaty text.  
[paragraph continues]

A certain amount of headway has been made. However, swift progress is being hampered by unconstructive elements which still persist in the U.S. position. These include, for instance, demands regarding the possibility of modifying rather than eliminating U.S. medium-range missiles in West Europe by converting them into other weapons, and also demands concerning the nonsimultaneous implementation of medium-range missile reductions as a result of which, in accordance with the U.S. approach, only the USSR would, over a long period, be making real reductions under the treaty.

It is obvious that in the interests of progress at the talks these and other similar obstacles must be removed.

Negotiations in the two other spheres of the talks are also continuing.

### Soviet Draft INF Protocol

LD191928 Moscow TASS in English 1858 GMT 19 Jun 87

[Text] Geneva June 19 TASS -- Discussions along all three directions of the talks on nuclear and space arms -- medium-range missiles, space and strategic offensive arms -- were continued here during the past week.

In the group on medium-range missiles the Soviet delegation submitted a draft protocol on the procedures of dismantling or scrapping missiles. The American side presented its considerations on the question of theatre missiles.

Head of a department of the Soviet General Staff Colonel General Nikolay Chervov, who is staying here, and deputy head of the Soviet delegation, roving ambassador Aleksey Obukhov had meetings with the head of the United States delegation Max Kampelman and Ambassadors Maynard Glittman and Ronald Lehman. During the conversations special attention was given to questions of thrashing out a joint draft treaty on medium-range missiles.

The Soviet side again stressed the need of removing the obstacles created by the position taken by the United States on a number of questions.

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CSO: 5200/1545



## INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

MOSCOW RADIO ON 'CONTRADICTION' WHITE HOUSE SIGNALS

LD172218 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1647 GMT 17 Jun 87

[From the "International Diary" program presented by Boris Andrianov]

[Text] [Andrianov] According to reports from the United States, much comment has been evoked there by President Reagan's last speech on the outcome of the meeting of the capitalist seven in Venice, specifically, the part of his statement in which he talks about the possibility of reaching an agreement with the Soviet Union on mutual reduction of medium-range missiles. Our correspondent in Washington, Vladimir Dunayev, shares his impressions on the same topic:

[Dunayev] It would seem that the last pretexts for delaying a response have evaporated -- the U.S. allies explained this both in Venice and at the meeting of ministers of foreign affairs in Iceland: They do not oppose a Soviet-U.S. agreement on medium-range missiles in Europe. The President even spoke of the historical opportunity opened up in this context. True, in the very same speech the President insisted upon increasing military appropriations and complained of the inadequate concern of Congress for the military might of the United States. These are not compatible aims -- disarmament and the arms race.

I fear that the President's speech, the text of his speech, reflected reality: There are two teams operating in parallel in the White House. That is how it was before, but before the ultra-right group, a group knowing no obstacles, a dangerous and adventurist group, rejecting accord with our country, unvaryingly prevailed. After Irangate the situation changed considerably: The adventurist team, which had formerly reliably guarded the President's authority, lost several leaders. Then the formerly pretty weak second team, once Irangate flared up and the veneer of Presidential prestige started to melt away before our eyes, was joined by new and influential figures, a new Presidential chief of staff and a new national security adviser. These two groups, two teams, are issuing contradictory, if not opposite, signals, also registered in the President's speech. As an observer of Washington ways, I am troubled more by actions than by the speech, that is, the actions of an old, yet still powerful group, including not only those members of his cabinet most close to the President, such as Weinberger, but also the middle rank of virtually every department and all the secret services.

I listened to and watched the President on television and could not divert myself from the idea that, looking ahead to our accords, the more real they become, probably, the more cunning and inevitable will be the attempts to put a mine under them, to wreck agreements, a meeting, detente. Remember how the U.S. secret services managed to poison relations between our countries prior to Reykjavik. The provocation regarding the Soviet diplomat Zakharov was arranged in New York, calculated, not without grounds,

to produce an escalation of estrangement. A more recent example: From January through to April, the United States was being told about the perfidy of Russian women who seduced U.S. Marines, the very same ones guarding the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. One Indian sergeant was arrested here and then, in a couple of months, a black corporal in the Marines was arrested, and then, as a special treat, another warrant officer, also from the Marines was arrested. All three admitted, all three recognized that yes, they were recruited; yes, they opened up the doors of the U.S. Embassy to Soviet agents at the request of their paramours, turned off the alarm system, and allowed them into the cypher room.

What happened then? They replaced the ambassador in Moscow and all the Marines guarding the embassy. This all but wrecked Shultz' visit to Moscow, yet 2 days ago the U.S. authorities reported that they have not been punished. What happened? Nothing. Nobody recruited the Indian sergeant, nobody seduced the black corporal, nobody got into the embassy, the cypher room has kept its innocence, the military tribunal has been cancelled, but what about the confessions? It follows that the Marines had received an order from above to get results, and used unlawful methods of investigation. This has now come to light; these Marines themselves and their lawyers are talking about this. Then the corporal, who renounced the confession that was beaten out of him, was promised a pardon if he spoke about the Indian sergeant at the tribunal. But the corporal refused, the provocation crashed -- in 6 months.

You know, 2 years of experience living and working in the United States gives me grounds to predict that however much the positions of our governments might come together, say, on the abolition of Euromissiles or on other matters, however close we might be to accord, there is always a real threat -- even a likely threat -- of disruptions, scandals and provocations. This will not necessarily hit the target, but I am sure they will try to do so.

/9738

CSO: 5200/1545

## INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

### MOSCOW TV TALK SHOW ON REAGAN'S RECENT SPEECHES

OW180943 Moscow Television Service in Russian 0630 GMT 18 Jun 87

["Studio 9" program presented by professor Valentin Sergeyevich Zorin, Soviet television and radio political observer, with Academician Georgiy Arkadyevich Arbatov, director of the USSR Academy of Sciences United States of America and Canada Institute, and Valentin Mikhaylovich Falin, chairman of the board of the NOVOSTI PRESS AGENCY]

[Excerpts] [Zorin] Hello, comrades. A number of recent events has made it expedient to meet and hold talks in Studio 9 to discuss these problems without delay. We are speaking about a whole series of speeches and announcements at news conferences made by responsible western leaders, above all, the President of the United States.

We have decided to dedicate our discussion to this, and Academician Georgiy Arkadyevich Arbatov, director of the United States of America and Canada Institute, and Valentin Mikhaylovich Falin, chairman of the board of the NOVOSTI PRESS AGENCY, will participate.

The speeches to which I refer were made somewhat unexpectedly, because a certain situation was developing and certain moods in the world were becoming apparent. Expectations arose that agreement may be reached, particularly at the important talks in Geneva. As expectations such as these became widespread, suddenly one after another speeches of this type were made -- particularly the U.S. President's speech in Berlin at the end of last week, which perhaps was in the old spirit and tone of the cold war. It was effusive, verbose, and, therefore, hardly worth repeating. But to briefly summarize, it says the Soviet Union cannot be trusted; the Soviet Union has yet to prove its goodwill; those processes the President condescendingly admits are taking place in the Soviet Union still require confirmation as to their seriousness. As I have said, the whole tone of this speech, the President's next speech, and the ones that preceded the Berlin speech, lead us to the questions: What has caused this? How can this be explained -- what is taking place? Georgiy Arkadyevich, how would you answer these questions?

[Arbatov] I think those who follow U.S. politics will find nothing unexpected in this. It is a well-trodden, well-rehearsed path. Something good is happening -- something is moving toward good -- then straight away something bad has to be done. This is what happened on the eve of Reykjavik, after Reykjavik, after Geneva, on the eve of Shultz's visit to Moscow, and shortly after his departure from Moscow.

Perhaps we should be speaking about why is it being perceived in this way. The administration is left with very little time to rule. This applies to Reagan as well. That is the reason for all these political machinations, so to speak. They are raising questions, and people are beginning to think: Will something be achieved -- what does the Administration really want? I think this is a very apt question, to which there is simply no clear answer. The administration is in such a state -- and has been for some time -- it is hard to determine what it wants. Certainly, there are divisions there -- divisions sometimes affecting one and the same person. For example, what does Reagan want? It is hard for me to answer this question. There is certainly much written about this: He wishes to enter history as a good President; he would like to leave behind him certain agreements; summits to be remembered and so forth.

On the other hand, he wants to achieve this at someone else's expense. Not only does he want this to be at someone else's expense, but he also wants to retain his point of view. This constantly comes through.

If we were to take these speeches, then, what do we find interesting in them? On the one hand, we see the old Reagan -- who consistently makes his presence felt from time to time -- and, on the other hand, we see another situation: He is attempting explain the new changes in terms of successes of the old policy. Complete nonsense like: It is precisely because the United States carried out this policy and was so intransigent, and so forth, that supposedly something was achieved.

I think there is another very big question in all of this. I have already spoken about this. Among the many differences between us and the Americans is the difference that we do not need the Americans as an enemy. In fact, we would prefer to have them as partners, although we can certainly survive without this. On the other hand, much of the U.S. existence is based on the existence of an external enemy. Only if there is an empire of evil can they regard themselves as an empire of good. I quite deliberately began not with the obvious -- military business or billions in profits by military monopolies -- but with a domestic political premise. They see themselves as fish out of water when the mood suddenly begins to change -- and they begin to change. In the United States they begin to change.

This is particularly noticeable in Europe. All the recent public opinion polls confirm this. I even think that to a significant degree Reagan's speech is an attempt to respond to these changing moods in Europe -- to answer in an old way, in a very coarse way -- candidly. If this did not apply to political activities, I would even say in a boorish way. This, then, is the package of questions. To this you can add plain blackmail, blackmail by an American cowboy who, threatening and waving his hands and staging a show of strength near the Berlin wall, wants to squeeze out another concession.

[Zorin] Valentin Mikaylovich, your opinion.

[Falin] I think that in part Georgiy Arkadyevich said what I wanted to say. The main thing is, Reagan has not reconciled himself with the other Reagan -- the old Reagan, who took all that is negative from the past, cannot part with the past, even though reality demands this parting and demands it quickly. These never-ending indecisions, attempts to explain the pressing changes not in terms of parties which, having made concessions to each other, are approaching certain reasonable agreements...

[Arbatov, interrupts] And are becoming more intelligent.

[Falin] Yes -- but in terms whereby supposedly America under Reagan has achieved such a state of might that the United States is beginning to reap the fruit of its militaristic efforts. This attempt to reconcile the irreconcilable -- to pass its detrimental, backward-looking philosophy off as a recipe for solving topical problems today and in the future; to do good without forsaking evil -- found its direct and most obvious expression in the President's most recent speeches.

[Zorin] Georgiy Arkadyevich, you have spoken about the differences in Washington, which also affect Reagan, who is contradicting himself. You have recently been in Washington, and had the opportunity to observe this for yourself. Perhaps you would be willing to share some of the direct impressions you formed as a result of this trip?

[Zorin] Georgiy Arkadyevich, I would like to ask you a question. Two events took place during the same week. I had the opportunity to observe one of them at close range. This was the Venice conference of leaders of the seven major states, which adopted a decision relating to the Geneva talks, after which Secretary of State Shultz said that, as a matter of fact, the path toward solving the problem of intermediate-range and limited-range missiles has been cleared. That was at the beginning of the week.

At the end of the same week we have Reagan's speech in Berlin, which we are talking about. How can this be reconciled? What is this, political duplicity or something else? Can we trust such partners in the talks?

[Arbatov] Well, I do not exclude the possibility that there were differences in the opinions and moods of Reagan's speechwriter and Shultz, who gave us an interview. There can be some nuances and differences here. But we see this trend in the United States all the time. Recently we have constantly seen it in their policy. It is interesting, as a matter of fact, that as we draw increasingly closer to some result, the result slips away. It cannot be caught, like a shadow.

I think we have not yet heard the absolute last word on this. At the moment it is probably very hard to say what this will be, but it is interesting that Shultz, speaking about the path being cleared, also must have known about the provisos being expressed. Now what happens is that various new demands are constantly being made. Very well then, there could be something supplementary, there could be something necessary we could think about -- about how to treat it. But the impression now taking shape is that this is a definite diplomatic maneuver to prevent the conclusion of an agreement -- an agreement against which there are no longer any arguments.

The Soviet Union has done this, that, and the other. It has prepared something. They hoped that the allies would frustrate things, but the allies did not frustrate anything, so now it would appear there was nothing -- yet they find something else.

[Falin] There is something. Now Mr Todehoefer, the not-unknown West German politician from the right wing of the Christian Democratic Union party, believes the Soviet Union has not yet made sufficient proposals; it has not yet taken sufficient steps to meet the West's position and more must be demanded of it. To substantiate this I will cite him.

Just the other day he told DPA: [Falin picks up paper and begins to read] It is now the Soviet Union's turn to express gratitude for the great advance in trust extended by the West Europeans -- [Falin looks up from page] that is, the agreement of the West Europeans, and he has the FRG Government in mind, to the double-zero option...

[Arbatov, interrupts] With the proviso that they will not have zero. The Pershings will remain.

[Falin] [resumes reading from paper]... to express gratitude and proceed to an immediate and basically unilateral reduction of the Warsaw Pact's superiority in conventional arms. [Falin puts paper down]

First of all, the Warsaw Pact does not have any superiority in conventional arms. Todehoefer simply cannot count. Secondly, there is what you have added: The West Germans have by no means decided yet that the zero option will in fact be a double option. They want 72 Pershing 1A missiles, with 72 U.S. nuclear warheads, to remain in West Germany. They even resort to the argument that supposedly these are third-party weapons, forgetting that if this was the case, we would see the phenomenon of a double violation of adopted obligations. By West Germany, which signed the nonproliferation treaty and undertook not to have nuclear weapons, and by the United States, which, having signed the same treaty in 1968...

[Arbatov, interrupts] Undertook not to transfer them to anyone.

[Falin] Undertook not to transfer such weapons to anyone.

[Arbatov] You see, I think in principle, when one thinks about it, we have been living in these conditions for several months. The Soviet Union took a courageous step on 28 February when it removed intermediate-range missiles from the package and opened the way to the first and seemingly easiest agreement. Now, why such difficulties all the time? Why is it that as difficulties are overcome new difficulties appear? I am getting the impression there are fairly influential people in Washington who have sufficient power to sabotage even the President's will, if perchance he expresses it, and particularly if he is so inert in this regard, to avoid an agreement not for some military consideration but simply out of principle.

After all, we are talking about a very small part of the nuclear arsenal. So why be afraid? Why be afraid there will be an agreement, which will then be punctured like some balloon? It appears to be possible not only to increase nuclear weapons, but to reduce them as well, even to get rid of them, to toss off the ship as ballast -- a dangerous and unnecessary ballast -- entire types and classes of nuclear weapons.

Although this is not such a big thing in itself, why be panic-stricken? This would be only a modest step, but it would be a step toward normalizing the situation and the political climate, and this is what they do not want.

[Zorin] Georgiy Arkadyevich, I would like you to comment on another part of Reagan's Berlin speech, and I will cite it. He said we should remember the main things: The East and West do not trust one another not because we are armed; we are armed because we do not trust one another. Our differences are not related to arms but to the question of freedom. You see how eloquently he put it.

[Arbatov] Reagan understands freedom very much in his own way. I am sure most people in the West, and even the United States, would not agree with his understanding of freedom as expressed in his speech. This is a Social Darwinian freedom, so to speak, the freedom of the strong. It is his right not to have any obstacles. He should have the opportunity to do everything he wants. Everything. The United Nations is an obstacle -- to hell with the United Nations; no need to pay dues; pressure can be applied to everyone who works at the United Nations; and an attempt can be made to introduce your own rules there. The ILO -- drop out of it if you do not like it. UNESCO is a problem -- leave it. The International Court of Justice adopts a decision contrary to U.S. wishes -- say we do not recognize the International Court, international law, and so forth.

This is freedom, Reagan-style. It is particularly dangerous and irreconcilable with life, with general human global community in this century in which the world has become so fragile, so interdependent, and vulnerable.

You know that historically it is certainly impossible to deny that sometime in the past, people began creating weapons because of a lack of trust. But this has the same relation to the present situation, to the present weapons, to the state of the militarized world as does the relationship between the first wooden wheel to a jet plane. Because today, if we are to take Soviet-U.S. relations, I would not be afraid to say the main reason for the lack of trust is the arms race which in turn gives birth to more mistrust. Today, at least since we sold Alaska, we have no territorial problems with the United States. We did sell it rather cheaply, but now it is a little late to talk about it. In terms of ideological problems, I would say that historically they hardly ever were a cause for a serious war. It is another matter altogether that this has been used as an excuse. Economically, it is more likely the United States would enter a trade or other wars with its closest allies than with us.

What remains? The main thing remaining is that which began the cold war. For example, I am recalling all the events and I am absolutely convinced the main impetus -- although other motives did exist -- was the U.S. use of nuclear weapons against Japan.

We correctly determined at that time -- this was proved to be correct and further secret material revealed this to be the case -- this was not the last shot of World War II, but the first shot of something quite new -- the cold, or perhaps, the hot -- war about which the hotheads were thinking at the time. Later memoirs did show this was to teach the Russians to play ball according to the new rules. I am practically quoting former U.S. Defense Secretary Stimson.

What Reagan is saying is simply political vulgarity. Political vulgarity. Because today the most important measure of confidence which one could think up, and the most important contribution to the cause of true freedom, would be the end of the arms race.

[Falin] I think the answer to the same question is provided by some of the statements, in particular by the French minister of defense, [who stated very] recently that the socialist countries are threatening the West with their proposals on disarmament.

[Arbatov] Yes, they are afraid of that. You see, we are living in an interesting period. We are not accepting the U.S.' no for an answer. On the other hand, they are unwilling to take our yes for an answer. They are particularly afraid when we agree to some previous proposals. Take the zero option as an example. Reagan in his speech attempted to say it was an old U.S. decision and now the Russians have accepted it. But the interesting thing is that when discussions started, it became clear that the Americans put forward this proposal feeling certain the Russians would not agree to it. After we did agree, so many problems surfaced that from the end of February on they still have not found a way to solve them. It then turns out they do not want the zero option after all. They want something greater than zero for themselves.

[Zorin] I would like you to comment on one more part. But it is necessary for our viewers to know about what we are commenting on and what we are challenging. That is why I will each time use quotes from Reagan's speech. Here is one more statement from the Berlin speech: We have heard much from Moscow about the new policy of openness [glasnost]. The Soviet Union will prove this if the Soviet leader will come to Berlin and open the Brandenburg Gates. Valentin Mikhaylovich.

[Falin] I think that Reagan is not only imposing political rules of the game on the other countries and the Soviet Union, but he also wants the political figures and leaders of the states to think precisely the same way as he does. But the Soviet leaders do not come into the house of someone else to either close or open gates. Soviet leaders know and respect international laws, know and respect the sovereign interests of other countries...

[Zorin, interrupts] Unlike the U.S. President.

[Falin, continues]...unlike the U.S. President and do not intend to tamper here with those high principles which make peace more dependable and stable and relations between all states and peoples more friendly.

[Zorin] To conclude our talk, I would like to put the following question to you, Georgiy Arkadyevich: do you not consider that the U.S. President, with the aid of such speeches as the ones we discussed today, is preparing grounds for retreating from the positions which both sides have reached, particularly during the recent visit to Moscow of the U.S. secretary of state?

[Arbatov] This is an interesting question, not an easy one to answer. I feel the current President; perhaps because of the things I spoke about, his initial basic premises, and later because of the fierce clash of these premises with the realities of life; realized what he wished for was unattainable. As for new forms, he is hampered by the old burdens, lack of desire to change; the old way of thinking is well embedded in this old man. I think it is characteristic of him that he does not wish to take on any commitments. When he does get the feeling he did indeed take on certain commitments, he immediately tries to back off. This is what happened in Geneva, if you remember. Immediately after Geneva, a series of actions were taken which were meant to undermine this. This is the crux of the trauma of the talks in Reykjavik. When it appeared all was within sight, he gathered his papers and left.

[Falin, interrupts] After Reykjavik he began to say...



[Arbatov interrupts] After Reykjavik the false Reykjavik began; that is, an interpretation was given to all of this so as to confuse everyone. In relation to this, this is what I think: There is another aspect present here. A very bad political move which, in my opinion, is today truly in the way of confidence building. One side is trying hard, acting, is behaving very honestly. Nobody can reproach us in anything. All he says are abstractions: his understanding of freedom, our understanding of freedom; the division of the continent, and some other things. All this has no relation to real issues. But why is this being done? There is always the desire to show that no matter what we do, the ball is nevertheless in our court. It seems we must do something else, something more. This, I feel, is dangerous in the behavior of the Americans and especially, I repeat what I spoke of previously, nothing in this is new, nothing in this should surprise, but it does force us to think very seriously because this is taking place at a time when the sands of time are inexorably running out and less time is left for the present administration. Herein lies the gravity of the moment, and it is very important this gravity be fully understood. If there is no other way, then the necessary pressure should be applied by the public. This understanding does exist in Europe and among the U.S. public. There is an awareness that such games cannot be played indefinitely. It is simply becoming too dangerous.

[Falin] I do not know what this bears witness to, because to imagine exactly what the President means by making such speeches is quite difficult. Later development will make this clear. In any case, such announcements are not conducive to the convergence of positions toward the end goal. Most importantly, they do not build confidence in the United States as a partner. If there is always this kind of indecision, always this kind of to and fro, then...

[Arbatov interrupts] There is an erosion of grounds for a real dialogue.

[Zorin] I think, colleagues, that what you have spoken about today at this table reflects the mood of the Soviet public which cannot remain indifferent to such statements which the U.S. President has been making lately. They cannot and will not, and this is what we have been talking about.

It remains for me to thank you for participating in the talk, to thank our television viewers for their attention. Until we meet again in Studio 9, thank you.

/9738

CSO: 5200/1545

## INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

### MOSCOW OBSERVER SEES TALKS AT 'CRITICAL POINT'

LD192131 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1800 GMT 19 Jun 87

[Commentary By political observer Nikolay Shishlin]

[Text] The dialogue between the USSR and the United States is a difficult but necessary one. Here is the latest news commentary. Political Observer Nikolay Shishlin is at the microphone!

[Shishlin] I think that we have now reached a critical point in the development of Soviet-U.S. dialogue devoted to the key issue of the present day: The problem of limiting and curtailing the arms race. As you know, there is a fair amount of both optimism and pessimism over the fate of the Geneva talks involving our own and U.S. representatives. The optimism is connected with the fact that, of course, thanks to the enterprising position of the Soviet Union, very fine prospects have been created for drawing up a major agreement concerning the fate of Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe, and also concerning operational and tactical weapons on the European continent.

However, as I have been saying, although there is a fair amount of optimism, there is room for pessimism too, inasmuch as it seems to me that the U.S. position at the present time is by no means as simple and by no means as open as it first seems. After all, it is absolutely not fortuitous that there has been precisely at this critical moment the speech by Reagan, the U.S. President, in West Berlin -- a speech that was melodramatic and that in no way facilitates a deepening of mutual understanding between the Soviet Union and the United States. For all the rhetoric contained in the President's speech it was nevertheless a political gesture that was fairly calculated to achieve none other than some slowing up of the Soviet-U.S. dialogue.

But it is not just a matter of this. The United States, it seems, is choosing tactics whereby it would like to put the Soviet Union in a situation where it runs short of thinking time, and to depict everything as though the drawing up of this agreement now depends wholly on the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, the United States is attempting to reinforce its own position on the matters that have not been settled. This is despite the fact that progress and the very fate of a sensible compromise depend, of course, on moving to meet each other halfway.

Therefore, at present time, in speaking about the critical nature of the present moment, we should clearly see that very much now depends precisely on the readiness of the United States to adhere to reason and goodwill, and on the readiness of the United States to realize that to miss the present moment would be a very great loss for the United States itself, for the fate of international security and for the whole cause of improving the world political climate.

## INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

### PRAVDA VIEWS U.S., WESTERN EUROMISSILE POLICY

PM251521 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 25 Jun 87 Second Edition p 4

[Own political observer Yuriy Zhukov article: "What Is Lacking Is a Realistic Policy"]

[Text] Time flies. And the U.S. press does not tire of repeating that unless the talks on nuclear and space arms between the U.S. and the Soviet delegation in Geneva are crowned with success in the current year, the possibility of the conclusion of any agreement in the near future will evaporate. Everything will be overshadowed by preparations for the presidential elections. And as to what happens after the elections, no one can tell now.

Moscow takes the talks in Geneva very seriously and is fully aware of the specific features of U.S. political life. For this very reason, the Soviet side has taken one serious step after another in order to pave the way toward disarmament. Universal attention is now focused on preparations for the conclusion of an agreement on the elimination of medium-range and operational and tactical missiles in Europe. A whole series of Soviet proposals, put forward in an effort to meet our partners half-way, has turned the possibility of the conclusion of such an agreement without further delay into an entirely realistic proposition. All that is required is the necessary political will.

However, our partners are becoming more and more nervous the more realistic the prospect of the achievement of an accord becomes, and are feverishly seeking ever new pretexts in order to, by hook or by crook, postpone, if not thwart altogether, the adoption of a decision. In this connection I would like to permit myself a lengthy quote from an article published in the West German STERN magazine under the title "The Cold War Knights' Fear of Disarmament" (the magazine is by no means pro-Soviet or procommunist, which makes its judgement all the more interesting):

"This is all the NATO political and military leaders needed! The Russians are coming, but not with arms and soldiers, but with more and more new proposals. [paragraph continues]

To begin with, Mikhail Gorbachev stunned the Western alliance with a proposal to remove medium-range nuclear missiles (with a range of more than 1,000 km, i.e. the SS-20 and Pershing-2 missiles) from Europe and to destroy most of them — the zero option. Now he even intends to reduce the missiles with a range from 500 to 1,000 km (the double-zero option).

"The Soviet leader takes disarmament very seriously. And suddenly all the opponents of this idea in Brussels and Bonn (the author of the article for some reason fails to mention Washington! -- Yu. Zh.) who like to hold forth about arms control in their Sunday speeches but who in actual fact would like things to remain as they are, have sung out with one voice. (U.S.) General Rogers, NATO supreme allied commander, Europe, has declared: 'Giving up nuclear weapons will make Europe defenseless in the face of the Warsaw Pact's conventional armed forces.' Volker Ruehe, deputy chairman of the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union parliamentary party, warns in unison with the 'dyed-in-the-wool yesterday's men' Alfred Dregger and Defense Minister Manfred Woerner: 'Unless the triple (?) superiority of the East in conventional arms is eliminated, the achievement of further accords on zero options in other spheres is not in the FRG's interests'..."

The fact that disarmament talks which have been going on for years and even decades have failed to produce any results has long been causing concern among the widest public circles. However, until quite recently very many peace-minded, but politically not very well-informed people in the West were prone to blame both sides for the failure of the talks, especially since anti-Soviet propaganda painted the Soviet Union as the arch-enemy.

Now all that has changed: The irrepressible initiative of the Soviet leaders, who have been putting forward more and more specific proposals for ending the arms race, especially the nuclear and space arms race -- but also the conventional arms race -- has radically changed the international climate. People everywhere welcome and support the Soviet proposals. At the same time, they inevitably compare the active and creative policy of the Soviet Union and the fraternal socialist countries with the stance of the United States and NATO, whose answer to all these proposals is either a "no," or additional demands, or propaganda hedging.

Addressing the World Congress of Women the day before yesterday, M.S. Gorbachev convincingly demonstrated how the United States and its allies are putting up one obstacle after another in the path of disarmament while at the same time trying to persuade the USSR to back up its words with actions.

However, the times when Western leaders were effortlessly able to manipulate public opinion are gone. Even a newspaper like THE NEW YORK TIMES deemed it necessary to declare on 17 June that "Western leaders are as a rule afraid to admit that they rely on nuclear weapons. They are afraid that the public will not understand them. They are afraid that Moscow will draw the West into talks about the creation of nuclear-free zones and continents and that it may prove impossible to cope with political pressure in Western Europe and with demands for the creation of a nuclear-free continent. Therefore, they are marking time in questions of arms control although this merely serves to increase Moscow's prestige in the struggle to win public opinion."

Indeed, they are obviously marking time, putting forward one new demand after another.

All of a sudden, FRG Chancellor Kohl demands that we eliminate all our operational and tactical missiles and at the same time agree to leaving 72 U.S. nuclear warheads for Bundeswehr Pershing-1A missiles intact.

Next, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director Adelman demands, in breach of the accord reached in Reykjavik, that we not only destroy our medium-range missiles in Europe but also the 100 warheads which were to remain in Asia.

Then, Japanese Premier Nakasone suddenly insists that the United States site medium-range missiles with 100 nuclear warheads targeted on the Soviet Far East in Alaska.

And finally Brzezinski, President Carter's former assistant, drags out demands that the elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe be made conditional on the elimination of all the Soviet tanks which are allegedly preparing to invade the West..

And so on and so forth. And they always try to rebuke us for intransigence, for not wanting to meet them half-way. As recently as 22 June, Kampelman, the head of the U.S. delegation, dared to claim that the Soviet side is 'impeding (!) progress at the talks by raising the question of the warheads and the Pershing-1A missiles which belong to the FRG.' That caps it all, as the saying goes!

Naturally, the reader will ask: What do all these gentlemen have in mind? Do they seriously believe it is possible to build a policy on demands so absurd that even a child can see it? It is my view that neither Rogers, nor Adelman, not even President Reagan himself believe this. But it is important for them to give the impression of seeking solutions in order to reassure public opinion which is alarmed at the sight of an agreement that seemed so close yesterday receding further and further into the distance.

According to an report of 20 June, "a ranking U.S. spokesman," who wishes to remain anonymous, as always, has said that "because of the controversy over Soviet missiles (incidentally, why only Soviet missiles? -- Yu. Zh.) the treaty on medium-range nuclear forces may not be finalized and concluded until next year."

You cannot but be amazed at the irresponsibility with which leading representatives of this great power approach the most burning problem of the present time on whose solution the survival of mankind, and hence their own survival, depends.

Talking to journalists on 21 June, the Soviet leader said: "In questions of detente and curbing the arms race we are prepared to cooperate with all forces. However, we sense that what is lacking in the West is a realistic policy. All people there are worried about is saving face. Yet what is needed are specific steps along the path of improving the international atmosphere, along the path toward a nuclear-free world, a world without violence, along the path of cooperation."

It is not yet too late to complete the work on the preparation of the Geneva agreement. This can and must be done on the basis of mutual cooperation and a shared interest in achieving accords. This is precisely how a realistic policy is built. And the sooner the gap created by the absence of such a policy in Washington and other NATO capitals is filled, the better. Our partners should be no less interested in this than we are.

/9738

CSO: 5200/1558

## INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

### SOVIET ARMY PAPER VIEWS ROGERS CRITICISM OF ZERO OPTION

PM301603 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Jun 87 p 4

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Observer Manki Ponomarev article under the rubric "International Observer Answers Reader": "What the Masters Think..."; first three paragraphs are KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] From Lieutenant Colonel G. Fedoseyev's letter to the editorial office:

"It is well known that during the Reykjavik meeting, the U.S. President agreed to the Soviet proposal on eliminating medium-range missiles in Europe. The Soviet proposals envisaging the withdrawal from Europe and elimination of Soviet and U.S. medium-range and operational and tactical missiles were later welcomed at the recent NATO Council session. Yet now U.S. General B. Rogers, so KRASNAYA ZVEZDA recently wrote, is angry and declaring that the talks currently under way in Geneva on this subject do not suit him at all. It looks like the President says one thing and his generals say something completely different. How can this be?"

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Observer Manki Ponomarev replies to reader Lt Col G. Fedoseyev.

Yes, this is indeed the case, Comrade Fedoseyev. I can cite as many examples as you like showing that the President and other high-ranking figures in the Washington administration state one thing, whilst the executives say -- and sometimes do -- the total opposite. You have drawn attention to the report published in our newspaper on the interview with B. Rogers in London's THE TIMES. But here is another fresh fact. How many times has the head of the White House spoken out to the effect that the fate of future agreements with the Soviet Union on disarmament problems depends on acceptance of U.S. verification proposals. But when the USSR declared that it was as interested as the United States in strict verification of the observance of the elaborated agreements, up to and including on-site inspections, people took fright across the ocean. As THE WASHINGTON POST wrote recently, staffers of the so-called U.S. intelligence community, including the CIA, NSA, and FBI, categorically opposed such inspections, which will allegedly substantially damage U.S. security.

There are many reasons for this discrepancy, to put it mildly, between the statements and actions of the representatives of the highest echelons of power and in the United States and other Western countries, and officials of a lower, but still quite responsible, level, and they are very diverse.

Perhaps the first is the hypocrisy of the administration itself. Proceeding from short-term tactical considerations, President Reagan is not averse to depicting himself as a "peacemaker," even as an opponent of nuclear weapons. But at the same time he has put forward a program for modernizing and building up U.S. strategic offensive forces, has proclaimed the "Strategic Defense Initiative" aimed at transferring the arms race to space and obtaining military superiority over the USSR, and has wrecked the accord nearly achieved at Reykjavik on fundamental questions of disarmament which perturb all mankind, or has ventured to attack the USSR in the spirit of the "cold war," as he did recently in West Berlin. This hypocrisy is clear not only to us. It is also perceived by U.S. figures of various ranks. And those of them who occupy "hawkish" positions often allow themselves to say out loud what the President has only hinted at.

The absence of unity of word and deed among Western countries' politicians is the second reason for the apparent discrepancy between the statements of figures on different rungs of the hierarchical ladder. There is an obvious abundance of words, but few concrete steps forward in response to the Soviet proposals. Leading figures over there are worried about losing in the eyes of public opinion. And they are not particularly concerned about turning the world away from confrontation, from tension, and from the arms race toward the path of organizing and improving international relations. Those who, like Rogers, pay less attention to public opinion see no necessity to conceal their true thoughts and actions.

Finally the third reason certain U.S. figures, including in the military, are venturing to publicly abandon the official position is fear. It is fear that the new political thinking, the new philosophy on which the large-scale Soviet peace initiatives are based, will forge ahead and become part of life, will be established as the document

factor in relations between states, and will lead to a normalization of the situation in the world arena. This fear of the future -- a future without wars -- prompts figures such as Rogers to make speeches and give interviews expressing a viewpoint seemingly different from that to which official Washington adheres.

Incidentally, about Rogers. He is playing on the fact that he is a military and political figure on the NATO stage not the U.S. stage and, as NATO supreme allied commander Europe, is not accountable to the U.S. President. This is, of course, true. But Rogers is still a U.S. general and commander of the U.S. forces on the European Continent, and thus is very directly subordinate to his supreme commander in chief and head of state. But the fact he ventures to make statements like the one during the TIMES interview by no means indicates that Rogers is unfamiliar with the demands of discipline. It is simply that there is an even higher authority above him -- the reactionary militarist circles that ultimately determine all U.S. policy and all the actions of U.S. figures of various ranks. The President himself is subordinate to these circles. It is no coincidence that a White House official spokesman, commenting on Rogers' interview, declared that President Reagan is "not angry" with the general.

From all that has been said, Comrade Fedoseyev, you can only reach one conclusion. Officials like General Rogers sometimes do indeed appear to speak independently and freely. But they are merely saying what their masters prefer to think.

/9738

CSO: 5200/1558

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

MOSCOW 'TOP PRIORITY' VIEWS MILITARY DOCTRINE, MISSILES

LD281407 Moscow in English to North America 2300 GMT 26 Jun 87

["Top Priority" program presented by Vladimir Pozner with panelists Radomir Bogdanov and Sergey Plekhanov of the United States and Canada Studies Institute]

[Text] [Pozner] How do you do, ladies and gentlemen. This is Vladimir Pozner presenting Top Priority. With me on the panel as usual, Dr Radomir Bogdanov and Sergey Plekhanov of Moscow's United States and Canada Studies Institute. Several things have occurred this week and one is, of course, the press conference where the Soviet side presented the new Soviet doctrine, (?let us say that) the new military doctrine that has been supported now and put forward by the Warsaw Pact nations. That's on the one hand, and on the other hand of course, the plenary session of the Soviet Union Communist Party Central Committee. The new aspect of the military doctrine concerns sufficient defense. The Soviet military doctrine was always a defensive one, but there's a new concept of sufficient defense. And what I'd like you to look at today is to what, what is the new idea based on, what is it related to? Does it have something to do with the economy that is being discussed at the plenary session? Does it have to do simply with a new way of seeing things? Please, who would like to take that?

[Bogdanov] Vladimir, it's a very interesting question, not only for our American listeners but for us, too. Let me state that maybe for the first time in the Soviet history we have made so clear what the Soviet military doctrine is. But I would like to add one thing. It's not only the Soviet military doctrine, it is Warsaw Pact Treaty.

[Pozner] Exactly.

[Bogdanov] Warsaw Treaty doctrine which is really unusual one. [as heard] Now let me say something else, you know, for so many years and decades the Soviet military doctrine was a focus of different speculation in the West: what it is, how it is secret. And people in the West were claiming even at the responsible quarters, but they, they don't know what the Soviet military doctrine is, it's such a big secret maybe the biggest secret of the Soviet state, you know. And they have always been basing their judgment on the Soviet military doctrine on one book written in the sixties by late Marshal Sokolovskiy and some other people which is called "Military -- Soviet Military Strategy" by the way, not a doctrine but strategy, makes it, there is a difference.

[Pozner] Yes, in fact...



[Bogdanov] Now, and they were claiming always that if you judge by this book, you know, the Soviet military doctrine is an offensive...

[Pozner] Aggressive...

[Bogdanov] Aggressive, (?offensive)...

[Pozner] Yes, I've heard that said. In fact they've quoted Sokolovskiy many times to that effect.

[Bogdanov] Now, yes. Now you have a document which is, which is maybe three, four, or many other times more authoritative, more important than that book which belongs to the past, by the way. What is the principal difference between the doctrine, between conventional, usual doctrine, military doctrine and that one? Any doctrine, military doctrine, including American doctrine, French doctrine, German doctrine, whatever it is, always has as first priority, how to win the war, you know, how to win the war. The doctrine offered by Warsaw Treaty, by the Soviet Union, it's absolutely different, maybe for the first time in the, in the history. It's not how, about how to win the war, but how to prevent the war. And if you take the principle, you know, point of the doctrine, and come down to the technicalities of that, you will very easily see if you are not to win but to prevent the war, it's defensive, it's defensive. You cannot prevent the war by winning the war.

[Pozner] All right. Could you, could you, briefly, Dr Plekhanov, could you tell us what is sufficient defense, as differing from defense in general? This seems to be an important qualification.

[Plekhanov] That's right. I think that there is an innovation not only in response to, in relations to admitting that you can't win a nuclear war, in the new Soviet military doctrine...

[Pozner] It's not Soviet, as we said, it's the Warsaw Treaty Organization, yes.

[Plekhanov] Right. But another thing, using force or building up force to prevent a war, because some people think that, well you know, to prevent a war you must be as strong, so strong as no one would dare to offend you. And that was our traditional approach. But...

[Pozner] That is, the more weapons we have, the safer we are.

[Plekhanov] The more weapons we have, the safer we are. And here the concept of reasonable sufficiency, of sufficient defense, there are various terms for it, becomes very important, because if we recognize, and we do recognize, that security can be achieved only on the basis of regard for the security of the other side...

[Pozner] Mutual security.

[Plekhanov] Mutual security, common security as well. Then you must think how the other side will view your preparations for absolutely defensive actions. But if you don't think about the concerns and the fears on the other side, so not only your intentions must be defensive, but your strategy, your preparations, military preparations, your military policy must be defensive in nature. The essence of the new security doctrine of the Warsaw Treaty is to restructure the military policies of both sides, and that can only be done on mutual basis in such a manner...

[Bogdanov] I'm sorry, Sergey, not only restructuring the military policy, but restructuring the forces.

[Plekhanov] The armed forces, yes.

[Pozner] Pardon me, let me jump in here, let me jump in for one minute. Let us take conventional forces. Now there is a disbalance if you look at the NATO and the Warsaw forces there is a disbalance. Some have more of one thing, some have more of the other. One way...

[Bogdanov] What we call, what we call a rough parity.

[Pozner] Rough parity (?as such). Now one way of looking at it would be to establish proper defense, would be for all sides to build up the equal level that they have today. If we have more tanks, then the West should have more tanks, as many as us. If they have more battle, er, planes, let us say, then we should have more planes and build up to their level. That's one way of looking at it.

[Plekhanov] That's the NATO (?looking).

[Pozner] All right. The other way is to go down. If we have more tanks than they do, we should have fewer tanks. If they have more planes than we do, they should have fewer planes. Would you say that is our, the view of the sufficiency of defense?

[Bogdanov] Yes, that's the view of the sufficiency of defense. But there is another very important point, you know. You don't, you not only eliminate the disparities by, by building down, if you like...

[Pozner] Yes, I like that a lot.

[Bogdanov] Yeah, but you leave only weapons systems with conventional with defensive...

[Pozner] Capabilities.

[Bogdanov] Capabilities. You just withdraw from the zone, combat zones, you know, offensive weapons. Weapons of the first strike, if you like, of surprise attack.

[Pozner] I see. All right. OK. Now, let's go back to the question that I began with. What, this change, this change in attitude towards military doctrine, how do you explain it? Is it because our economy cannot deal with military production? Is it for some other reason? What are your guesses?

[Plekhanov] Well, I think that there are several reasons, and economic reasons are there too. I wouldn't blow them out to all proportions. But they are important. We would like to spend a lot less on defense than we are. And I think that the same attitude exists in the Americans judging the, by public opinion polls, and in many other countries. Really, we have mountains of weapons we could safely do without. But there is another very important thing: In a nuclear age, radical means must be found in order to reduce levels of armaments; otherwise within maybe 10 or 15 or 20 years we will be gone, maybe even earlier -- some miscalculation has happened, and that's all. So, our doctrine, our new doctrine reflects recognition of that reality.

[Pozner] Would you say it's a combination of economic factors and political realism?

[Plekhanov] Yes, political realism and also a part of the other side of political realism, recognition that this is one world. It...

[Bogdanov] It is not only political realism, it's a realistic assessment of the situation. Don't you feel a difference between...

[Pozner] Well, I'm certainly not going to argue (?against) linguistic...

[Bogdanov] But it's not only linguistic, it's factual, you know. I just would like to...

[Pozner] I agree with you. I agree.

[Plekhanov] Recognizing the political reality that with all the existing differences in this world, ideological, economic, social, it is one world, and it will either survive as one world or it will perish as one world. And this must be, this fact must not be simply given lip service to in big speeches, it must be recognized in the changes in our military...

[Pozner] Incidentally I believe that General Secretary Gorbachev alluded to that fact when he addressed the World Congress of Women in Moscow this week as well, did he not, the importance of that whole idea.

[Plekhanov] Oh yes, yes, yes. Nonviolent, interdependent world. This is the reality which we must address.

[Pozner] Incidentally, I was listening to one of the women, one of the delegates, I think she comes from West Germany or from Sweden, talking about why she was here and what women were trying to do, and she phrased a really beautiful thought. She said, our husbands keep telling us, you know, why are you going and leaving the family, and what we say is, well in the past men left their homes to go to war, now women leave their homes to secure peace. I thought that was beautiful... Well, all right, now let's get back to that press conference I was talking about where this, the military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact was announced. General Chervov made a statement to the effect that in so far as intermediate range missiles in Europe, and shorter-range missiles was concerned there seemed to be some problems. I bring this up because when I was in the States recently, the way the U.S. media was handling this was that it had all now been agreed to, everything was fine, and that a summit was a forgone conclusion in October and November, all problems had been solved, everything was hunky-dory, as they say, and this seems to be somewhat contradicted by what General Chervov said, because he said: (A), Number one, according to what we hear now, the Soviets are supposed to destroy all of their missiles, whereas the Americans are not supposed to destroy anything, and number two, the Americans are saying that they will take the nuclear warheads on their Pershing missiles, Pershing-2's and put them on the West German Pershing-1A missiles, which would be a total contradiction of the spirit and the letter of agreements, first of all you cannot transfer nuclear weapons to another nation, and what's more, it flies in the face of the agreements that are now being talked about. So I'd like to ask you, what is this all about, what is your opinion?

[Bogdanov] You know, first of all, that rosy picture does not reflect the reality...

[Pozner] You mean the fact that everything is agreed upon and...

[Bogdanov] Yeah, yeah. This picture is not as rosy as...

[Pozner] Some would have us believe?

[Bogdanov] Yeah. You know, after all it is very much in the favor of this administration if the picture is rosy...

[Pozner] You mean Mr Reagan needs it?

[Bogdanov] I believe, that's my personal view...

[Pozner] The Republican Party needs it?

[Bogdanov] Which the Republican Party before the elections, they need it just to, you know, to present themselves as the peacemakers and things like that. But if you look at the table, the Geneva table, you will see that parties face a lot of difficulties, and the main difficulty is there, and the usual difficulty that the American side is trying again to gain somehow one buck more than the Soviet side, you know, in another word, to get the military superiority, even perceived, you know, not real perceived military superiority. And there is another side of this story, that's again my personal view. You have a very, very clear fact of internal fight within this administration, and the fight is not yet over. You have different factions in the administration. One faction is for, the other one is very much against any deals, deal, with any deal with the Soviet Union. And when you look at all these dirty things you know, lying on the table preventing the parties to strike an agreement, you will very clearly see that one faction is fighting deadly to prevent any agreement. The other side is not a strong one, or strong one, maybe they would never be strong enough to strike a deal, that's my very pessimistic view... [as heard]

[Pozner] You are pessimistic?

[Bogdanov] Yes, I'm still pessimistic. When I'm looking at all that, I'm still pessimistic.

[Pozner] So you, do you actually believe that we will not reach an agreement on the intermediate-range missiles in Europe, are you of that opinion?

[Bogdanov] We have very, very short time to reach this agreement, and I would like to make a link between the American domestic situation approaching the presidential campaign which will change the whole picture, which will make the parties, you know, to behave differently. That's what worries me. Time is very short, time is running out. And sometimes I have a suspicion that the party which is against a deal is just dragging the time, bringing all that issue of INF into the presidential campaign, then that will be (?would) come, may be impossible. That's my view.

[Pozner] Dr Plekhanov, how do you feel about this, are you as pessimistic as your colleague here, because I repeat in the United States the general sentiment seems to be that, oh yes, we're going to have this summit and everything's going to be fine. So, clearly there are some problems. But do you feel that in reality we may not even have a summit and that the intermediate missiles will not be solved and the zero option will not, the zero-zero option in fact, will not be achieved?

[Plekhanov] I think it could go either way because the administration, I agree with these analyses of factional fights within the Reagan administration. Look, the administration for six years has been moving the United States in a different direction, not in the direction of good arms control agreements with the Soviet Union but in the direction of the...

[Pozner] The opposite. Yes.

[Plekhanov] Gaining the upper hand, gaining the military superiority, building up weapons and so on. And it's like a car which you've been driving in a certain, on a certain road, and then you remember that oh, my God, I've got...

[Pozner] There's a cliff at the end of the road...

[Plekhanov] I've got to make a turn...

[Bogdanov] But you have different drivers. You have very different drivers.

[Plekhanov] Right, and then you start, you know, you don't really know that time is very short and the cliff is nearby, and you're trying to make that turn, and it's an open question whether you will fall off the cliff or make the turn, and I think that's roughly the situation now.

[Pozner] Well, that's, that comes I think, comes a surprise to many of our listeners who I think have become quite optimistic. Before we sign off, I would like you to look at just one aspect of this because I'm sure our listeners are not aware. What is wrong with the idea of transferring American nuclear warheads to West German missiles?

[Bogdanov] It's an ominous idea I wouldn't even like to talk about that, I'm sorry.

[Pozner] Well, I'd like you to talk about it only because I'm afraid that many of our listeners in the United States are simply not aware. So that would be it's simply infringing on existing international agreements.

[Plekhanov] That's right. The current situation is that the Bundeswehr, the West German Army, has control of the missiles, Pershing-1A tactical missiles, which are armed with nuclear warheads, but the nuclear warheads are under the control of the United States. So that has been the situation and it's a very sensitive thing, you know, putting the nuclear weapons in the hands of the Bundeswehr has always been a very sensitive question, and a lot of Europeans, not just in the East or in the West, do not feel comfortable with that idea. And for the Americans to change that situation now when they begin to talk about arms control and removing nuclear weapons from Europe, would be an unheard of thing.

[Pozner] Well, it certainly doesn't feel comfortable to me either, but let's hope that political realism does succeed in untying this knot. I will say that I still believe that we will reach an agreement on intermediate-range missiles.

[Bogdanov] We wish you were right.

[Pozner] All right, we will see, time will show, and on that, on my optimistic note, if you'll permit, I'd like to end this edition of Top Priority. Tune in with us a week from today at the same time, we'll be back with more.

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CSO: 5200/1558

## INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

### MOSCOW WEEKLY 'INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS ROUNDTABLE'

LD281650 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1130 GMT 28 Jun 87

["International Observers Roundtable" program with All-Union radion commentator Viktor Nikolayevich Levin; Vitaliy Vladimirovich Zhurkin, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences and deputy director of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of the USA and Canada; and political observer Nikolay Vladimirovich Shishlin]

[Excerpts] [Levin] Hello, esteemed comrades. We'll begin our conversation with the CPSU Central Committee Plenum.

I think, that emerged from the Central Committee Plenum and its decisions is that Soviet affairs were regarded at the Central Committee Plenum both as Soviet affairs and as part of international affairs. In other words, this vision of new roads of development for the Soviet Union contains a view of the world as an interconnected and interdependent thing: a world that in certain respects is a single whole. And it's rather significant that the report by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev contains a very direct and definite statement of the need for the Soviet Union to participate in the international division of labor. Thus, without any reservations or, well, petty barriers, you might say, the Soviet Union actually does indeed participate in the international division of labor.

[Shishlin] Sorry to interrupt, Viktor Nikolayevich, but the development of international relations always leaves something to be desired. [laughter]

[Levin] I fully accept that correction, so I'll put it more simply: a number of elements have appeared to cause extra anxiety. What I have in mind is the way things are going at the Soviet-U.S. talks in Geneva on drafting an agreement to eliminate medium-range missiles and operational and tactical missiles, and the events that are unfolding in the Persian Gulf. We might begin, perhaps, by analyzing the situation, as it appears today, at the Soviet-U.S. talks in Geneva.

A few days ago Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev in his greetings to the World Women's Congress referred to the fact that the West very often says that words are one thing, and deeds another; and he compared the Soviet Union's words and deeds. With the Soviet Union, it's concrete actions. The West has more words than deeds, but I should say that in Geneva they are now beginning to do something, but these are actions with a minus sign, negative actions.

[Zhurkin] Well, yes, such negative actions are occurring, but in general, the United States always has been — and remains — an extremely difficult partner at those talks. And if we get way from the multitude of details — although we can talk about them, certainly a lot is being written about them — then the central question, Viktor Nikolayevich, is still the question of whether we'll succeed in concluding this agreement with the United States. Here the United States, the U.S. leadership, the Reagan administration, keeps shying away: they step forward, then sideways, then back, as happened just recently during Reagan's speech in West Berlin; and at the talks themselves they regularly throw in some additional details which make the progress of the talks more difficult. And in general it does seem to me that we still have no answer to that question. And the reason evidently is that on the one hand we — it must not be forgotten that, whether we conclude an agreement with the Reagan administration or not, it always has been, is, and will remain a rightwing conservative administration with clear and obvious anti-Soviet tendencies [sentence as heard]. And it's not because they like us or love us that they've agreed to negotiate, but because they're squeezed in a tight circle of political realities, by the fact that they haven't got the money for the arms race — for 2 years now they haven't been able to increase their military budget — and by the growing resistance at home to Reagan's policy. Well, indeed, if we're talking about the serious national interest of the United States, an agreement is to the advantage of the United States. It's equally advantageous to us as well.

[Levin] To the whole world.

[Zhurkin] To the whole world. Perhaps the administration is hoping to scrape together some domestic political advantages for itself now that the U.S. elections are imminent. And these diverse factors are all the time pushing it now to the right, now to the left, now forward, now back.

Well, you may say, how can we do business with such an administration? The Soviet Union has no elections coming up. That administration today represents the United States, and will go on doing so for the next 1 and 1/2 years. To a certain extent, of course, we have time on our side, because the Reagan administration has only 1 and 1/2 years to go. In January, 1989, that administration will come to an end. Well, in working to conclude that agreement, the Soviet Union has a chance to look ahead and carry to a certain limit — the maximum, so to speak — the system of compromises and accords, and proceed on the basis that we'll be able to pick up where we left off with the next administration: that in a couple of years the whole thing will begin anew. But naturally, in such an acute and dynamic international situation, a responsible great power cannot afford to lose 2 years. And that's why our country is working so hard for that accord, though, as I say, time is on our side and not on the side of the Reagan administration. The talks are in difficulties. It is indeed a paradox that the U.S. press and U.S. politicians are always saying that the United States is about to enter its so-called political year — its election year, that in fact it's already creeping up, so let's conclude or speed up the talks, while at the same time they're all the time throwing in various details. Now they propose forms that are totally unacceptable to us: reduction, say, of the number of medium-range missiles; now they talk about instead of destroying these U.S. missiles, transferring them to ships — cruise missiles — or somehow modernizing them and turning them into shorter-range Pershing-2 missiles. This is a complete sham because we know perfectly well that they could be reconverted with the greatest of ease. Well, and so on and so forth. And I think that despite the fact that the main issues have been settled, that the main accord exists, that we have agreement on the double zero: zero medium-range missiles in Europe and zero operational and tactical missiles, nonetheless these frills and fringes that the Americans have been attaching to the accords over the past 1 and 1/2 months do, I think, give grounds for concern.



[Shishlin] I'd like to say a word or two in connection with this. In U.S. publications I've come across the information, citing Rowney, the President's special representative for arms limitation -- his evaluation of the state of play in Geneva is that there is a 130-page document on the table.

[Levin] Yes.

[Shishlin] Well, it may be a joint document, but not a single page has been agreed. What you've just said strikes me as very true, I agree absolutely: that the main accords really have been achieved. Therefore it would be wrong to say that in that 130-page document not one passage has been finalized, that there's not a single passage that can be considered a common text. But there are indeed a great many reservations and encumbrances still getting in the way of drawing up a unified document. And here, of course, the time is evidently coming when the Soviet-U.S. dialogue should be included -- or rather, transferred -- to a higher level than Geneva; say, to the foreign minister level; and it looks as if that need actually will lead to a meeting between the Soviet foreign minister, Comrade Shevardnadze, and U.S. Secretary of State Shultz.

In other words the way the Geneva talks are going does arouse a certain vigilance at the present time.

A month ago it was possible to be a little optimistic about prospects of working out a compromise, but now there's slightly less optimism because a certain time limit is making itself felt, and because of the slow pace that the U.S. attitude has imparted, in effect, to the progress of the Geneva dialogue.

[Zhurkin] You know, it seems to me there's even an element of tragedy, politically, in the whole situation. The main elements of a real major disarmament agreement really have been agreed on, and this ought really to lead to the destruction of a large number of very effective weapons of nuclear combat on both sides. And then into this element, this system of trivia -- which probably aren't such trivia at all, since these are attempts to gain, now in one place, now in another, unilateral concessions from the Soviet Union, and the Soviet position is clear: The Soviet Union makes compromises, makes far-reaching compromises, but will never make one-sided concessions. [sentence as heard] And in this situation, I think matters are indeed very worrying.

[Levin] I get the impression, you know, that the very principle of the double zero is being undermined. Listeners already know -- we've talked a lot about this, and there have been quite a few reports about it in the press -- that West Germany is persistently trying to retain in its possession the Pershing-1A missiles, while the United States is undertaking an obligation, or rather, confirming its obligation, to supply nuclear warheads for them and saying this is not the subject of the talks, though the U.S. position is devoid of all logic. The other day I even read the thesis that these are not the weapons of the great powers, because the launching facilities for the Pershing-1A's are in the hands of the Federal Republic of Germany, but they are not the weapons of third countries either, because the nuclear warheads are in the possession of the United States.

[Zhurkin] I suppose they belong to the Martians, then.

[Levin] That's precisely the point. A paradoxical situation is arising. And side by side with that, the issues surrounding the modernization of the Pershing-1A missiles are, quite simply, being inflated. And incidentally, Vitaliy Vladimirovich, you mentioned the plans to convert Pershing-2 missiles into shorter-range missiles. Already there are plans to give this missile a new name, Pershing-1B, and to offer it as a substitute for those Pershing-1A's. The Bundeswehr currently has 72 missiles, and these 72 missiles will be kept. Kohl says: No, we shall insist categorically that the U.S. warheads for these missiles should be kept, that they should be on hand, so to speak. The Americans themselves say this -- also a completely incomprehensible thesis -- we are talking, they claim, about zero for medium-range missiles and operational and tactical missiles, by which we understand missiles with a range from 500 to 1,000 kilometers; but Pershing-1A, they say, is a missile of a completely different class, and there can be no discussion of it. Pardon me, but its range comes precisely between 500 and 1,000....

[Zhurkin, interrupting] Seven hundred, 700 kilometers, 700 to 750 kilometers....

[Levin, interrupting] And that is a very, very alarming feature. By the way, Chancellor Kohl stated again in the last few days that the degree of trust in the Soviet leadership will depend to a significant extent on the Kremlin's response to the U.S. proposal on the two zero options, into which Kohl himself tried to insert a number of additional elements aggravating this accord and impeding it.

[Zhurkin] Viktor Nikolayevich, in Chancellor Kohl's place, if I may be allowed, I should be more worried about what trust would be placed in me on the part of the Soviet Union.

[Levin] It seems from the position which the FRG occupies on this issue. By the way, the Social Democrats, in particular SPD Chairman Vogel, has said correctly, I believe, that Bonn's stubborn position on the matter of the attempt to keep these Pershing-1A missiles raises the question of whether Bonn is seeking to possess nuclear arms. And this question, by the way, is very pertinent, wholly pertinent.

[Shishlin] Yes, but all the same, Viktor Nikolayevich, I think -- so that his might be clearer to our listeners -- all the same, after all manner of hesitation, doubts and clashes of various points of view, the West European position has settled down in general, to a certain degree, on a recognition of the necessity of going for double zero.

[Zhurkin] Definitely, definitely.

[Levin] Quite right. But what's going to be the second zero if the FRG is going to have 72 missiles possessing U.S. nuclear warheads?

[Shishlin] But, you know, this is an issue which is currently the subject of negotiations; and I think that it is correct here to talk, of course, of the unacceptability, the absurdity, of the West Germans' position. But it is not the only problem standing in the way of working out a compromise. You know that the Soviet Union has gone quite a long way to ensure that a sensible compromise could be worked out: We closed our eyes to the existence of nuclear-armed missiles in both Great Britain and France, and decided to talk to the United States about Soviet missiles and U.S. missiles; and we do not want to talk about West German Pershing-1A missiles, but we want to talk, and are talking, about the U.S. nuclear warheads on those missiles. That's the problem here.

[Levin] Well now, there is another motive which is appearing in the West now. I think that it merits attention because of the fact that it explains their delaying tactics. In this connection, if you like, the British newspaper THE TIMES has expressed itself the most frankly. It has written that what happens after the conclusion of a treaty on medium-range [promezhutochnoy dalnosti] nuclear forces will demonstrate whether the United States and its allies are sufficiently strong and vigilant to withstand Gorbachev's next siege. This is a very interesting point. Everybody understands full well that we -- by which I mean the whole of mankind -- are now on the threshold of an extremely important decision: We are talking about the elimination of a whole class of nuclear arms, and there has not been anything like it before; it is an unprecedented step, a step which can bring with it and definitely must bring with it new decisions, even bolder and more far-reaching ones. And yet the impression is forming that in the West -- I don't want to say everybody -- but many people are not prepared for this. It is a very serious element, and it is this which explains the delaying tactics which we are coming up against in Geneva.

[Zhurkin] The situation is complicated, and the situation might resolve itself negatively, but, all the same, there are real, serious grounds for counting on a positive solution and seeking to achieve it.

[Shishlin] Of course. Vitaliy Vladimirovich, I don't know how you will assess these situations, but I feel that in general, all the same, inflation of tension in international relations is not now occurring; the influence of the Soviet initiatives over the last 2 years is having an effect.

[Zhurkin] Moreover, Nikolay Vladimirovich: Of course, we all want the situation to be better, and sometimes it happens that we are in a hurry to claim that what we desire is really there. Altogether, this positive influence of our initiatives, it often isn't quite so simple. It passes both through the deep strata of the population and through the perception of our initiatives by right-thinking circles in the political elite of this or that Western state; it proceeds slowly, and sometimes it takes a zig-zag route. For this reason, we often cannot see such a straightforward positive process; but if, taken as a whole, if we put this kaleidoscopic picture together in a unified picture, then of course, taken as a whole, it is an undoubted influence. So, we can see indeed that, under the influence of the Soviet peace initiatives, the situation has improved....

[Shishlin; interrupting] Yes...

[Zhurkin, interrupting] As a whole, in the last 2 years.

[Levin] Today, the development of international relations is of course complicated, but indeed there always will be some kind of complication. Things are never simple. Returning to the point where we began and to the fact that our peace-loving policy was reaffirmed once again most vividly and convincingly in the decisions of the CPSU Central Committee Plenum, I think that we should also mention the International Democratic Federation of Women that has been under way this week in Moscow. After all, it showed vividly and convincingly that the forces of peace are developing their potential and that this potential is developing fully under the beneficial influence of the enterprising and constructive foreign policy of the Soviet Union. This is happening to a great extent under the influence of these initiatives. After all we have given impetus, if you like, to mankind's hopes that international problems will be resolved. Our policy provides the answer to fundamental questions.

Indeed, let us recall the deeds that have been carried out by the Soviet Union in the past 2 years. Silence reigned over Soviet nuclear test-ranges for 1 and 1/2 years, and it would have continued if the United States had joined in our moratorium. Indeed we opened the way to an accord on eliminating medium-range and operational and tactical missiles. They were our specific proposals, though they took account of the Western positions. We have done this with the sincere intention of getting the matter moving and beginning a real process. We have ceased the production of chemical weapons. We have already ceased their production, although there is still no accord on eliminating chemical weapons. The United States is responding to this with attempts to create binary weapons, that is to say, a circumvention maneuver. It is this initiating and concrete character of Soviet foreign policy that is winning hearts and minds. This is also incidentally a factor which is having a definite effect -- and cannot fail to have an effect, on the U.S. position and the position of other Western states. At a difficult and complex time all this provides us with definite hopes, and we look to the future with this hope.

[Shishlin] I think that we can even say, with greater hopes. I think that we are entitled to say that a certain amount has already been achieved.

The moral, psychological and political prerequisites have been created for a breakthrough to major agreements and a real restructuring of international relations on the basis of common sense and goodwill. I think indeed that we have already started the new political thinking and made a very confident start, and that acting within and relying upon the framework of the new political thinking we can proceed along the road that we have chosen -- the road to a nuclear-free and nonviolent world.

[Levin] This is our principled proposal and it will remain in force. We are struggling for this and we shall continue to do so.

The time for our program has now elapsed. Thank you, esteemed listeners, for your attention. All the best to you!

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CSO: 5200/1558

## INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

TASS REPORTS WHITE HOUSE BRIEFING ON CONVERTING PERSHING-II'S

LD010809 Moscow TASS in English 0640 GMT 1 Jul 87

[Text] Washington July 1 TASS -- A TASS correspondent, at a briefing at the White House Tuesday, asked Marlin Fitzwater, assistant to the President for press relations, to explain the stand of the White House with regard to a statement made by Maynard Glittman, a member of the U.S. delegation at the Geneva Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear weapons in Europe.

Glittman said that the administration was considering conversion of the U.S. Pershing 2 medium-range missiles in Western Europe, which are to be eliminated in case the Soviet Union and the United States reach agreement, into Pershing 1B theatre missiles and their possible transfer to West Germany.

On Monday, referring to the possibility of reaching agreement on the elimination of missiles in Europe, President Reagan suggested that he saw the light at the end of the tunnel. But if the Pershing 2's are really converted and transferred to West Germany, what remains to be done for the Soviet Union? Also convert its SS-20's and transfer them to some of its allies? What kind of a "zero option" can one speak about, then?

The White House spokesman evaded the question. He only referred to Glittman's statement and a rather vague statement on the issue made by a State Department spokesman last Thursday.

The reporters who attended the briefing booed Fitzwater's answer.

/9738

CSO: 5200/1558

## INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR: NATO MILITARY PLANNING SESSION ON INF, DETERRENCE

### Weinberger Speech

LD260830 Moscow TASS in English 0749 GMT 26 May 87

[Text] Brussels, 26 May (TASS)--U.S. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, who arrived in Brussels to attend NATO's military planning committee session opening here today, made a speech about NATO's future strategy at Royal Defence College Monday night.

The keynote of his remarks was that nuclear weapons had been and would remain the key element of the military strategy of NATO and that Washington did not intend to give up NATO's policy of "nuclear deterrence."

He said Western Europe should not be afraid of the elimination of nuclear weapons in the event of the conclusion of a Soviet-U.S. agreement on medium-range missiles since "the vast majority of NATO nuclear [word indistinct] would remain unaffected by an INF deal", and that fears of "denuclearization" were exaggerated.

"With some 4,000 nuclear weapons consisting of those carried on nuclear-armed aircraft and submarines and ground- and sea-based tactical nuclear weapons, Europe would hardly be denuclearized", the Pentagon chief assured the allies.

Having thus reassured the allies, the U.S. secretary of defense immediately demanded that they make new 'financial efforts' for the conventional arms race, as a pretext he put forward a thesis about the 'need to modernize' this type of weapons.

In order to justify his demand, Weinberger again resorted to the hackneyed myth about a "Soviet threat."

### 'Erroneously Equates Security, Deterrence'

Moscow APN DAILY REVIEW in English 29 May 87 pp 1-4

[Article by APN political analyst Enver Mamedov: "How To Avert the Nuclear Threat? To Approaches"]

[Text] This question is of equal concern to the Warsaw Treaty and NATO countries. It also directly affects the vital interests of the people in all continents. An explosion of the European powder keg or, more precisely, the world's largest stockpile of the most sophisticated types of weaponry will be perilous for the entire planet.

But how is war threat to be averted? How are we to safeguard peace and security? There are two different approaches. One bets on a nuclear and conventional arms race, erroneously equating security and deterrence, primarily with the aid of nuclear weapons capable of destroying all humanity. This is the position of the NATO leaders. Fundamentally different is the approach of the Warsaw Treaty countries--security for all through advancement to a nuclear-free and non-violent world.

A two-day session of the influential NATO military planning committee has just ended in Brussels. Its primary and major agenda item was an energetic buildup of conventional arms. The committee's chairman, West German General Wolfgang Altenburg declared that the NATO war ministers "have agreed to expanding efforts in this direction." Military spending for these purposes will increase sharply. The explanation is absolutely groundless: they refer to a possible elimination of a part of the nuclear armouries in Europe and the far-fetched thesis that NATO "still has not achieved the required level in conventional arms."

The West German general at the same time stressed that NATO is not going to give up the strategy of "nuclear containment" and that he does not rule out "an early use of nuclear weapons should an armed conflict break out."

What is the meaning of all this? Reluctantly the NATO statesmen accepted the Soviet proposed cardinal decision to scrap Soviet and American medium-range missiles in Europe. But as soon as they did so, they began to put forward a stream of reservations and far-fetched objections. What about Soviet shorter range missiles, a class of weapons of which the USA has none in Europe, they asked? The USSR made a concession by agreeing to scrap this category of arms too. Then the West started doubting the need for each side's still keeping 100 warheads on medium-range missiles each, in the Asian part of the USSR and in the USA. The Soviet side replied that the issue can also be settled. So what? The NATO leaders are still dragging their feet on this point and creating artificial barriers in the way of a solution which they themselves have actually suggested.

The USSR is legitimately asking whether it is not time to stop fooling Western public opinion and sign a treaty to abolish medium-range missiles already this year. No, the NATO leaders can in no way reconcile themselves to the thought of embarking on a concrete process of the elimination of nuclear weapons, first in Europe and then in other regions as well. It is to be recalled that all these decisions so far do not affect British and French nuclear weapons. Plainly speaking, this is one more step towards the West.

And what about conventional arms? In Brussels the NATO military leaders decided to increase the "conventional arms" of NATO. This is an act unprecedented in the history of East-West relations. For even a year ago, considering the feigned or perhaps sincere concern of the NATO strategists over the Warsaw Treaty superiority in armed forces and conventional arms, and anxious to reduce to a minimum all the types of weaponry, the Warsaw Treaty countries submitted to NATO a detailed plan for cuts in the troops and conventional arms in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. And, something scandalous happens. Without starting discussion of this plan, without making any counterproposals or amendments, that is, without beginning negotiations on the question which NATO reckons to be vital, the NATO military leaders, having not even examined seriously the proposals of the Warsaw Treaty countries on a drastic cut in conventional arms (and this, to judge by NATO statements, is one of the main stumbling blocks on the road to a nuclear disarmament of Europe) take in Brussels a decision to strengthen and build-up the conventional arms in every way and to make them approximately as deadly as nuclear weapons.

Some NATO members agree to start negotiating on tactical nuclear weapons. In their majority, these are "dual-purpose" weapons. For example, NATO's large-caliber howitzers can fire both nuclear and conventional shells. What is to be done here? Once again the Soviet Union is willing to make a step forward and include these weapons into the discussion of the conventional arms package.

But the Warsaw Treaty peace initiatives are not limited to this. They include the proposal by Romania and Bulgaria on nonstationing nuclear and chemical weapons in the Balkans. A few days ago Poland brought forward a coherent and practical plan for arms cuts and confidence building in Central Europe. Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic propose that a nuclear-free corridor should be set up in Central Europe.

Yet NATO continues to be unresponsive. Not to a single peace initiative of the other side has NATO given a constructive reply yet.

But this does not dismay the USSR and other socialist states.

We would like to believe, said Mikhail Gorbachev on the eve of the Warsaw Treaty States' Political Consultative Committee meeting in Berlin, that at this very crucial moment NATO in adopting final decisions will guide itself, at last, by the principles of good will and political realism. The coming days and weeks will once again show who is for a nuclear and who is for a nuclear-free world. On the top of the agenda, naturally, is the question of liquidating medium-range missiles in Europe.

(ANP, May 28. In full.)

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CSO: 5200/1545



## INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

SOVIET COLONEL: NATO SEEKING 'WAYS AROUND' EUROMISSILE ACCORD

PM150909 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Jun 87 First Edition p 3

[Lieutenant Colonel Yu. Soldatenko article under the rubric "International Notes": "Looking For 'Loopholes'"]

[Text] The USSR's proposals to eliminate several classes of Soviet and American nuclear missiles in Europe are meeting with a growing response and increasing support with every passing day. This is natural. Let us remind ourselves that if these proposals are accepted the European continent could be rid of many hundreds of missiles and their nuclear charges in the near future. They would include 380 American medium-range missiles (108 Pershing-2 and 272 cruise missiles) and 355 Soviet medium-range missiles (243 SS-20's and 112 SS-4's), and also operational and tactical missiles. In other words, a considerable proportion of Soviet and American nuclear charges, the detonation of even the smallest of which would be comparable to approximately three Chernobyl tragedies in terms of strength of radiation, would be destroyed.

But the possibility of beginning the real process of demilitarizing Europe is not at all to the liking of some forces in the West. The paradox is that the ruling circles of a number of NATO countries are now stubbornly against "recognizing" their former proposals to remove Soviet SS-20 missiles and American Pershing-2 and cruise missiles from Europe. Because this would mean their public denial of the idea of "the threat from the USSR."

However, right-wing circles in the United States and other NATO countries are evidently working on the premise that they will not succeed in wrecking the conclusion of a Soviet-American agreement to eliminate medium-range missiles and operational and tactical missiles in Europe. Consequently, as one West European politician put it, there is no longer any point in "making difficulties and playing the fool." "Action" is needed, that is, attention must be concentrated on looking for "ways around" any future agreement between the USSR and the United States. That is why Washington, Bonn, and the capitals of a number of other NATO states are dragging their heels, so to speak. They keep referring to some "vitally important" need for various consultations within the North Atlantic alliance. Emissaries of various ranks are making "shuttle" visits from the United States to Western Europe and vice versa virtually every day--supposedly for this reason.

From information leaked to the Western press, it has become clear that the real mission of these envoys is very far from "coordinating a united stand between the allies on the elimination of USSR and U.S. nuclear missiles in Europe." In actual fact they are coordinating discussions on a secret American plan for the nuclear "arms upgrading" of Europe in the event of a Soviet-American agreement being concluded on medium-range missiles and operational and tactical missiles and looking for "legal" possibilities to replace American nuclear warheads in Europe by increasing the number of British and French warheads.

According to the plan drawn up on the other side of the ocean, the NATO states must immediately combine their efforts to improve the nuclear means left untouched by a Soviet-American accord on medium-range missiles and operational and tactical missiles. It is proposed in particular to step up cooperation between the United States and Britain and France in the modernization of their nuclear arms and reach an agreement within NATO on the joint production of some classes of nuclear missiles which could be stationed in Western Europe. It is intended in this respect that, with U.S. "assistance," Britain will develop the solid-propellant engine while the FRG and France will be responsible for the electronics. That is, the production of these missiles and consequently their "country of origin" will be West European, which will automatically place these nuclear means outside any possible agreement on medium-range missiles and operational and tactical missiles. And American warheads with a yield of 15-20 kilotons could be used as the nuclear charges for these missiles. It is therefore essential to "transfer" these warheads to depots in Britain and France as quickly as possible.

Moreover, according to the weekly DEFENSE NEWS, "the possibility of jointly developing and creating a long-range air-based nuclear cruise missile is being looked into" at defense minister level in Britain and France in order to "fill the gaps" in NATO's nuclear defense "in good time." NATO believes that this would be possible by "modernizing" the already existing British "Sea Eagle" antiship missile and equipping it with an autonomous computer system to ensure engagement of the targets by terrain contour matching [vykhod na tsel po profilyu mestnosti]. This innovation would make it possible for British "Tornado" fighter-bombers to strike targets directly in Soviet territory without entering the zone of operation of the Warsaw Pact countries' air defenses.

These and other such plans eloquently show how the "hawks" are earnestly inventing various "loopholes" to prevent a reduction in nuclear arms. They are seized with indescribable horror at the idea that the disarmament process which could begin in Europe would eventually lead to all continents being free of mass destruction weapons. That is why those in the capitals of some NATO countries are looking for "ways around" the situation, trying to prevent at all costs any change in the international climate and any strengthening of people's belief in the possibility of moving away from confrontation and toward cooperation.

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CSO: 5200/1558

## INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

TASS ON NATO COUNCIL DECISION ON INF, DETERRENCE

LD121725 Moscow TASS in English 1627 GMT 12 Jun 87

[Text] Moscow June 12 TASS — By TASS military writer Vladimir Chernyshev:

The North Atlantic Council at a session at the level of foreign ministers has decided to approve the acceptance of Soviet proposals for eliminating American and Soviet medium- and shorter-range missiles in Europe.

This decision seems to show that NATO has succeeded in overcoming the nervousness generated by the real prospect of achieving a first agreement on nuclear arms reduction, the possibility of a "precedent" undesirable for some. World public opinion expresses the hope that the Geneva talks on [words indistinct] now have a chance to advance to the finishing straight.

For the first time since the emergence of nuclear weapons an extremely important step can be made along the difficult but the only sensible [words indistinct] mankind can take towards a safe world.

The strategy of further (?steps) elaborated at the session is disquieting, however.

Confirmation of NATO's commitment to the policy of "nuclear deterrence", "limitation" of cuts in strategic offensive forces only to 50 per cent and reductions in nuclear systems with the range of less than 500 kilometres only down to "equal ceilings" attest to the aspiration to preserve nuclear arsenals.

All this also attests to the desire to hold on to the dangerous tool, the old position-of-strength policy and outdated stereotypes in East-West relations.

One is surprised to learn that documents adopted at the session totally ignore the relationship between strategic offensive and strategic defensive weapons.

Advancing as a long-term objective a 50-per cent reduction in the offensive forces, the NATO foreign ministers do not mention the Strategic Defence Initiative although it must be perfectly clear to them that without strengthening the ABM Treaty the long-term objective will remain merely a good intention.

NATO reiterated the need for eliminating the alleged disbalance (?of) conventional arms and armed forces in Europe despite the fact that the myth of the Warsaw Treaty's superiority has been repeatedly dispelled even in NATO countries at various levels.

The long-term programme worked out by the NATO ministers is, thus, largely unrealizable.

Despite all that, the first step -- with regard to medium-and shorter-range missiles -- would demonstrate (?the possibility) of attaining far-reaching agreements in the field of nuclear disarmament, providing there is political will.

That would be a truly historic change in the field of East-West relations, a major contribution by both sides to strengthening mutual trust, a significant achievement from the viewpoint of normalizing the military-political situation in Europe and the world at large.

What is particularly important, there would emerge the hope that a realistic approach would (?gradually) take over the capitals of NATO countries, while relapses of the outdated mode of thinking would [word indistinct] manifested ever rarely.

/9738

CSO: 5200/1545

## INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

### PRAVDA VIEWS U.S., NATO LINE ON EUROMISSILES

PM221450 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 21 Jun 87 Second Edition p 4

["International Review" by Yuriy Zhukov]

[Text] The past week was not marked by any major sensational events on the international scale. For hundreds of millions of people it was rather a week of reflections, hopes, and expectations aroused by the new features which have emerged in the world arena thanks to the tireless efforts of the USSR, the fraternal socialist countries, and all progressive forces in the struggle for arms reduction and the normalization of international relations.

The facts are clear.

The unceasing growth of international tension which was characteristic of the first half of the eighties has been stopped;

The socialist countries' initiatives aimed at ending the arms race are at the center of world politics -- they are being discussed animatedly everywhere, the political struggle over them is widening, and they are meeting with ever greater support from world social forces;

Real preconditions have been created for achieving accords on arms reduction.

In the course of the meeting between M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and J. Batmonh, general secretary of the MPRP Central Committee and chairman of the Mongolian People's Great Hural Presidium, last Monday, emphasis was placed on the importance of further stepping up the efforts of the socialist countries and of all states -- big and small -- to strengthen peace and the peoples' security. [paragraph continues]

The official friendly visits by our Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze to Bulgaria, Hungary, and Yugoslavia were also devoted to this goal.

The GDR and Czechoslovakia this week renewed their efforts in the struggle for the creation of a nuclear-free corridor which would, so to speak, divide the armed forces of the NATO countries and the Warsaw Pact which confront each other in Europe. Bulgaria and Romania are stepping up the struggle for the creation of a zone free from nuclear and chemical weapons in that part of Europe. Great significance is attached to Poland's comprehensive plan for arms reduction and confidence building in central Europe.

All the same, it would be highly imprudent to count on everything now proceeding smoothly. The only people who can think that are those who have a poor knowledge of our partners in the talks, who are always chopping and changing, so to speak. Great and complex work still lies ahead. After all, there has yet to be a genuine breakthrough in international relations. So we need a further increase in dynamism and initiative and a concentration of the actions of the socialist countries and all peace-loving forces so that the preconditions secured with such effort for achieving accords on arms reduction and the normalization of international relations can be put into practice.

#### The News From Geneva [subhead]

Last Monday the U.S. delegation at the Soviet-U.S. talks in Geneva set forth the U.S. position, coordinated last week with the NATO allies and then formulated by President R. Reagan in a television speech. Let me remind you that at the NATO Council session in Reykjavik the Soviet proposals on the "double zero option" on medium-range and operational and tactical missiles were at last taken into account as a whole.

As is known, as long ago as 28 February the USSR, seeking the speediest attainment of an accord, called for the resolution of the question of eliminating medium-range missiles in Europe separately from the resolution of the whole package of questions on the elimination of nuclear weapons and the prevention of the militarization of space. On 14 April this plan of action was supplemented by the proposal on the total elimination of operational and tactical missiles.

The United States and its allies for a long time refused the "double zero option." Now they seem to have given it the "green light." But it must be seen that our partners accompany their present consent to the Soviet proposals with very substantial reservations.

PRAVDA has already written of how, in effect, they support the FRG's demand "not to touch" the U.S. warheads intended for use on the 72 Pershing-1A operational and tactical missiles belonging to the Bundeswehr. U.S. spokesmen state that the resolution of the question of "third countries" arms cannot be part of a Soviet-U.S. agreement. But can U.S. nuclear warheads really be regarded as the property of a "third country," that is, the FRG?

Is not this proposition in flagrant contradiction to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, whereby the FRG pledged not to receive these weapons from anyone and the United States pledged not to transfer them to anyone, including the FRG?

Is it not clear that the attempt to keep 72 U.S. nuclear warheads on FRG territory goes against the basic idea of eliminating all Soviet and U.S. medium-range and operational and tactical missiles in Europe?

Add to this the fact that, as the Western press testifies, the U.S. side has yet to lift its absurd demand that the U.S. Pershing-2 medium-range missiles not be eliminated, but... be converted to Pershing-1B operational and tactical missiles -- to this end, it would be sufficient to remove one stage from them. But it would be just as easy to restore that stage to the missile and turn it into a Pershing-2!

Lastly, the United States has still not renounced its equally unacceptable claim for the cruise missiles sited in the FRG, Britain, Italy, and Belgium also not to be dismantled, but only to be relocated from the land onto warships.

I have reminded you of these details, which readers sometimes lose sight of, to show how much work still has to be done by the participants in the Geneva talks in order finally to agree on the text of a treaty on the elimination of medium-range and operational and tactical missiles, although back in April U.S. Secretary of State Shultz said that "agreement is an arm's length away."

The Soviet public wholeheartedly wishes success to the talks, the progress of which is being watched with growing impatience by the whole world. After all, the fate of the entire process of the struggle for disarmament, which has been going on for decades, is basically being decided there, in Geneva. In my view the question can be put point-blank:

Either it will be possible at last, taking the unique opportunity that has become available, to bring the talks to a successful conclusion, and then, for the first time in all the postwar years, a real reduction in nuclear arms will be carried out, which will lead to a kind of chain reaction -- the disarmament process will be accelerated;

Or an agreement will not be reached, and then there will be no arms reduction, and the entire process of talks will be frozen for a long time. Moreover the gates will be opened for a new round of the arms race. Incidentally, the Pentagon makes no secret of the fact that this prospect appeals to it -- more and more new, ever more lethal types of arms are already being publicized in the Western press....

Sensible people -- regardless of what political camp or military bloc they belong to -- reject this second alternative. Here, for instance, is what Italian Foreign Minister Andreotti said, welcoming the NATO Council decision to give its consent to the "double zero option" proposed by the Soviet Union: "We are returning to our senses." He continued, touching on the polemics within the NATO bloc on this question, that these are disagreements between those who believe that nuclear deterrence is gradually disappearing (although matters have not yet gone as far as the elimination of nuclear systems), and those who, "having oriented their entire military doctrine toward a preponderance of nuclear systems are, to put it mildly, unenthusiastic about the fact that this process is moving forward."

The Italian minister apparently had a crystal ball: Hardly had he put forward this assessment, when U.S. General Rogers, the outgoing commander of the NATO allied armed forces, enraged at the possibility of an agreement, sharply criticized the U.S. Administration for its "readiness to sign an agreement with the Soviet Union on medium-range missiles in Europe." He called on the allies to "stop" and "reject" (!) all further proposals concerning the reduction of other types of nuclear weapons in Europe (I am quoting the report in the 18 June THE WASHINGTON POST). It is curious that the day before yesterday a White House spokesman stated that President Reagan is "not angry" with Gen Rogers because of his statement.

Other Pentagon "hawks," as well as some of their colleagues in Western Europe, are now speaking out in the same spirit as Rogers.

#### Two Doctrines [subhead]

The reader may well ask: Why is the stubborn reluctance to part with nuclear weapons still making itself felt so strongly in the capitals of the United States and the NATO member countries? "What are you afraid of?" This question, put to G. Shultz in Moscow, has remained unanswered. People reasonably say: There are competent politicians in Washington too, who cannot but know what a nuclear war would mean for the United States itself!

People there are hardly likely to be reassured by the "more precise" calculations published in the United States the other day by the Federal Emergency Management Agency, according to which, in the event of nuclear war, the number of immediate deaths in the United States would be "only" 112 million, and not 156 million, as calculated in 1957.

The U.S. President is fond of repeating that nuclear weapons cannot be used, and nuclear war should not be waged. But in that case what are they for, these weapons? Why did the U.S. President's faithful ally, British Prime Minister Thatcher, state the other day that nuclear weapons must be retained at least until the end of the century?

I will permit myself to answer these legitimate questions thus: It is because the Western leaders cannot renounce the doctrine of "nuclear deterrence" invented by their predecessors 40 years ago and representing yesterday's way of thinking. Yet it is high time to realize that the notorious "nuclear deterrence" is the perpetuation of international tension, unpredictability in politics, brinkmanship, and a fragile, unreliable, ersatz peace subject to the destructive influence of fear arising from mutual distrust. It must be added that relying on "nuclear deterrence" means giving yourself up to blind chance and becoming reconciled to the risk of nuclear catastrophe, which could occur not even through ill intentions, but as a result of a technical error.

Nonetheless in Reykjavik the NATO Council Session at ministerial level has just reaffirmed its fidelity to the doctrine of "nuclear deterrence." Let me quote their communique. "We reaffirm that, as we see it, there is no alternative to the concept of the (Atlantic) alliance on the prevention of war -- the strategy of deterrence, based on a suitable combination of sufficient and effective nuclear and conventional forces, each element of which is necessary."

It must be noted that the numbing influence of this immoral doctrine, which has long been in contradiction not only to the political, but also to the military-technical development of the modern world, affects literally all the disarmament talks which have gone on at the most diverse forums over the past week.

That is what happened, for instance, at the Disarmament Conference in Geneva, where the delegations of the USSR and the fraternal socialist countries put forward a joint document, "Basic Provisions of a Treaty on a Complete and General Ban on Nuclear Weapon Tests." The Western powers' representatives immediately gave it a hostile reception. But the representatives of the neutral and developing countries, as a counterweight, supported this new initiative.

They took a close look, so to speak, at the NATO position and saw behind it the same old doctrine of "nuclear deterrence." Argentine President Alfonsin stated resolutely that the theory of "deterrence through strength" is dangerous and that it was and is the main cause of the arms race in the world and one of the chief sources of distrust.

Quite naturally people are looking with increasing interest at the diametrically opposed doctrine of the Warsaw Pact countries, which is based on renunciation of the first nuclear strike, and, moreover, renunciation of the use of force for resolving political differences. The USSR and the fraternal socialist countries proceed on the basis that international relations between states should be regulated not through the methods of military deterrence, but by powerful politico-legal mechanisms and international organizations, as well as by means of bilateral and multilateral talks.



Despite the continuing anti-Soviet propaganda in the West, the peoples can see that Soviet foreign policy strictly pursues this course. The USSR combines firmness in upholding our principles and positions with readiness for mutually acceptable compromises, dialogue, and mutual understanding. This policy opens up the path to a fundamentally new phase in the development of international relations, where mankind will be able to concentrate solely on resolving creative tasks.

Under the influence of this policy, the coalition of reason is growing stronger. More and more people are finding a common language, meeting at antiwar demonstrations and various forums and conferences to discuss vital questions of the struggle for a nuclear-free, nonviolent world. Here is the chronicle of recent days:

On Thursday, a Soviet-U.S. march, its participants demanding disarmament, set off from Leningrad for Moscow.

In Bonn, a 100,000-strong antiwar demonstration took place.

In Paris, many tens of thousands of people, linking hands, formed a living chain 25 km long, symbolically barring the path to the arms race.

In Washington, demonstrations were held in front of the White House and were cruelly suppressed by police.

In West Berlin, there were mighty protest demonstrations against the bellicose speech pronounced by the U.S. President at the Brandenburg Gate.

In Geneva, scientists from 12 countries, including all 5 nuclear powers, held a fruitful discussion of burning problems of the struggle for a nuclear-free world.

In Tokyo, these same problems were discussed by the participants in a symposium for the prevention of nuclear war, representing supporters of peace and the national liberation movement from 29 countries and 38 communist and workers' parties.

In Moscow, final preparations for the World Congress of Women were completed. The congress' slogan -- "To the year 2000 -- without nuclear weapons!"

Will Washington heed these mighty voices of people who are tired of the arms race and imperiously demand that the unique opportunity offered by the USSR and its allies -- to begin the elimination of nuclear weapons -- be taken? The coming summer weeks will give the answer.

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CSO: 5200/1545

## INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

PRAVDA: NATO EUROGROUP SEEKS 'COMPENSATION' FOR ZERO OPTION

PM251522 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 25 Jun 87 Second Edition p 5

[Vladislav Drobkov "Commentator's Column": "What a Lever..."]

[Text] A session of the so-called European programming group has taken place in Seville.

Let me remind you that this group, which includes the defense ministers of 13 NATO countries, was originally set up as a kind of lever designed to boost military production in Western Europe and lessen its dependence on arms deliveries from the United States. This idea won the eager support of the West European weapons manufacturers, who are under pressure from competitors across the ocean. However, experience shows that even now American monopolies confidently lead the Atlantic market for arms and combat hardware.

Does this mean that the group has not justified the hopes pinned on it? The answer to this question will depend on what hopes you are talking about. If you are talking about the West Europeans' attempt to lessen their armies' dependence on American arms, the group has nothing particular to boast about. But when it comes to stepping up militarist preparations in Europe, the NATO programmers have done very well. It is clear from the Seville session documents that some 30 major programs are now being implemented for the joint development and production of new planes, helicopters, missiles, and other combat hardware. True, work under these programs proceeds at different speeds and is sometimes hampered by arguments, ambition, and most of all greed on the part of the competitors from various countries. But overall they are already making a weighty and sinister contribution to the buildup of the stockpiles of lethal weapons heaped up by the NATO on European soil.

One dangerous trend emerged clearly in Seville -- namely, the desire which is gaining ground in the bloc on the part of certain circles, alarmed at the prospect of the elimination of medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe, to win a kind of compensation. They want to "compensate" for the possible reduction in nuclear arms by whipping up the race for conventional arms and strengthening military ties and cooperation in Europe. It is no accident that it was in Seville that the French and West German military ministers discussed the details of knocking together a joint combat subunit. It was there that appeals were heard for a strengthening of "NATO's European bulwark," and even for the bloc to be supplemented by some kind of new "European defense" system. And the document "For a Stronger Europe," approved by the ministers, outlines concrete prospects for the utilization of sophisticated technology to create ever more destructive arms and stimulate military industry.

The results of the Seville session once again testified to NATO's intention, despite the favorable prerequisites which now exist for lowering the levels of military confrontation in Europe, to continue to follow the old militarist course. Using the programming group as a lever, the Atlanticists seek not only to hamper the process of curbing the military race, but to raise it to a new, even higher level.

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CSO: 5200/1558

## INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

### USSR: CONTINUED DISCUSSION OF FRG PERSHING-1A ISSUE

#### Carlucci Rebutted

LD121115 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1505 GMT 11 Jun 87

[By TASS Military Affairs Observer Vladimir Bogachev]

[Text] Moscow, 11 Jun (TASS)--One forms the impression that the U.S. Administration is artificially creating additional difficulties at the Euro-missile talks, attributing to the Soviet Union, without any grounds whatsoever, a demand for the destruction of the West German Pershing-1A missiles.

Trying to force a door which is already open, Frank Carlucci, the U.S. President's National Security aide, significantly repeated at a press conference in Venice that the West German missiles "cannot be the subject of talks", although no one is insisting upon this. Mimicking polemics with the Soviet Union, the representative of the U.S. Administration resolutely proclaimed: "If the Soviet side is really striving for an agreement on scrapping medium-range missiles in Europe it should renounce its demand that these missiles (Pershing-1A's) be dismantled."

So, here we have Carlucci himself inventing a "demand by the USSR" and himself speaking out against it. Such manipulations are in no way the result of the President's aide being poorly informed about the essence of the Soviet proposals.

As is known, the Federal Republic has at its disposal 72 operational and tactical U.S.-manufactured Pershing-1A missiles. These missiles belong to the dual-purpose class. Their tactical-technical data permit both nuclear and conventional warheads to be used. However, the FRG now has at its disposal only conventional, non-nuclear warheads for these missiles.

Hitherto the United States has stored nuclear warheads for Pershing-1A missiles in Western Europe. The Pentagon now wants at all costs to preserve this nuclear ammunition even after the agreement now being prepared is reached, evidently counting upon using them when the opportunity presents itself on the delivery means of its loyal NATO partner.

With this in mind the U.S. side is now artificially tying the issue of its nuclear ammunition, which is really the subject of the talks, into one "package" with the West German Pershing delivery means, which are not being discussed in Geneva.

U.S. officials are giving the impression that in the Soviet proposals there exists a matter of the weapons of a "third party." Such a claim could only be correct in the event of the U.S. nuclear ammunition for the Pershings being handed over for the disposal of the FRG.

Bonn's active support for the U.S. interpretation of the USSR's proposal makes one think. Can it mean that the present FRG Government is hoping to use the Soviet-U.S. talks on Euromissiles to gain control of nuclear weapons, contrary to a whole series of international agreements?

#### Obukhov Comments

LD262029 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1430 GMT 26 Jun 87

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] The eighth round of the Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space armaments has been at work in Geneva for 2 months.

[Correspondent V. Dmitriyev, identified by screen caption] This latest round was marked by an important event even in the initial stage. The Soviet delegation tabled a draft treaty on eliminating U.S. and USSR medium-range missiles in Europe. It is a compromise document that takes account of the U.S. draft on this issue. In other words, it provides the conditions for the drafting of a joint treaty. As you know, the Soviet side has also agreed to the elimination of operational and tactical missiles. Intensive work is now underway on a joint draft treaty, and real possibilities have opened up for the achievement of an accord as early as this fall. The TRIBUNE DE GENEVA has emphasized that the talks have entered the home straight. However, there are difficulties along this home straight.

[Begin recording] [A.A. Obukhov, deputy head of Soviet delegation, identified by screen caption] What is now being proposed by the United States? It would seem that the United States is agreeing to the elimination of Soviet and U.S. operational and tactical missiles in Europe. However, while agreeing verbally to this decision, it would like to preserve its warheads on the 72 Pershing-1A missiles belonging to the FRG. Thus it turns out that a zero solution for operational and tactical missiles in Europe is being envisaged for the Soviet Union, while the solution for the United States is plainly not a zero one. This, I repeat, is hampering progress and is really threatening to wreck the scheduled timetable for completing work on a draft treaty on medium-range missiles. This is happening through the fault of the Western side. [end recording]

[Dmitriyev] The Soviet delegation is convinced that these difficulties are surmountable. It is necessary for Washington to adhere to the principle of equivalent security to confirm in real deeds its words and utterances about being ready to embark on nuclear disarmament in Europe.

## West Seeking 'Loophole'

LD282222 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1400 GMT 28 Jun 87

[From the "International Panorama" program, presented by Boris Kalyagin]

[Text] Hello, Comrades! The world is waiting for an agreement to be reached between the Soviet Union and the United States on medium-range missiles and operational and tactical missiles. After numerous delays and consultations, the NATO countries, through their foreign affairs ministers, seemed to have given a positive reply to our proposals. It appeared possible to sit down and prepare a joint draft treaty. That is why the interest in the meeting within the framework of the Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space weapons that took place at the beginning of this week in Geneva was so great. In the talks that took place, progress was noted in the harmonization of the draft treaty provisions.

From the U.S. side, however, new attempts were made to deviate from what was agreed between Washington and Moscow at a political level. Demands which are at variance with the principle of equal security are again being presented to us. This explains the U.S. striving to keep its 72 nuclear warheads for the Pershing-1A missiles with which the West German Bundeswehr is armed, and attempts to place this weapon outside the scope of the Soviet-U.S. treaty.

FRG Chancellor Helmut Kohl has come out with such a demand and the United States is supporting him. The logic of both Washington and Bonn is as follows: The missiles belong to the FRG while the arms of third parties are not the subject of the Soviet-U.S. talks in Geneva. But such arguments are beneath criticism. The U.S. nuclear warheads can in no way be regarded as FRG property. According to Article 1 of the Treaty on NonProliferation of nuclear arms, the United States pledged to abstain from transferring nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices to anybody, directly or indirectly. In its turn, Bonn, according to Article 2 of the same treaty, pledged itself not to accept such weapons from anybody. Consequently, the nuclear warheads for Pershing-1A missiles cannot in any way be regarded as military facilities of third countries.

Moreover, if one agrees to the variant suggested by the United States, the Pentagon will get a loophole for building up in Western Europe its nuclear warheads for missiles belonging to other NATO countries. The U.S. State Department has already announced that the U.S. is not going to liquidate the Pershing-2 medium-range missiles deployed in the FRG but intends only to convert them into Pershing-1B operational and tactical missiles and to send them to arm the same FRG, so that they are not covered by the Soviet-U.S. agreement that is being prepared. But this is an obvious violation of the thrust of the agreement on the complete liquidation of Euromissiles.

Certain Western leaders have undergone a peculiar metamorphosis, or, rather, they have shown their true faces. They used to claim they wished to start the process of disarmament yet complained that the Americans were holding it up. Now it seems to be the other way around: the Washington Administration seems to have nothing against signing the treaty on Euromissiles but keeps referring to its Western partners who are coming out with various reservations which, are supposedly, to be taken into account. Changing places, however, does not change the end result.

The West is still trying to gain concessions from our country to obtain unilateral advantages or to postpone the whole matter indefinitely. But time does not wait. Western observers themselves write that it is time to hurry up with the agreement. It would answer the national interests of all countries, including the FRG. The West German leaders have stated more than once that they are in favor of developing relations with our country along the lines of detente. At the same time, the fact that the FRG government is playing the role of instigator in building up military preparations, while also being very reluctant about reducing armaments -- which has been shown in the case with the Pershing-1 missiles -- cannot but cause alarm. As you see, security issues remain crucial in relations between our countries.

#### Oakley Statement Hit

LD270520 Moscow TASS in English 0305 GMT 27 Jun 87

[Text] Washington June 26 TASS -- The U.S. is not going to eliminate the Pershing-1A intermediate-range nuclear missiles deployed in West Germany. Instead of it is going to turn them into Pershing-1B shorter-range missiles which are to be adopted later by the West Germany Army. These plans of Washington which run counter to the initial draft treaty on intermediate-range missiles providing for the elimination of Pershing-2 missiles were set forth at a briefing for journalists here by Phyllis Oakley, representative of the U.S. Department of State.

She said that if an agreement was concluded on setting a "global zero" for shorter-range missiles, the U.S. would have no right to deploy by itself Pershing-1B missiles in Europe.

The U.S. intends to turn Pershing-2 into Pershing-1B missiles through a simple removal of one of the states in intermediate-range missiles. The stage can be easily put back, which would permit the U.S. to quickly restore its potential of intermediate-range missiles in Europe at any time.

Many of the journalists who were present at the briefing regarded Oakley's statement as evidence to the effect that Washington was putting up new obstacles on the way to reaching final agreements on intermediate-range missiles. One of the journalists asked Oakley if he understood her statement in a correct way. He believe that the point at issue is the intention of the U.S. to remove the weapon system that are covered by the agreement and to turn them into those that are not included in it, although by their range of action they should be covered by the agreement.

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CSO: 5200/1558

## INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR ON POTENTIAL PROBLEMS: FRG PERSHINGs, VERIFICATION

LD160904 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0730 GMT 16 Jun 87

["On the Problem of Working Out an Agreement on Medium-Range Missiles"]

[Text] Moscow, 16 Jun (TASS)--A joint draft [market] of a treaty fixing the positions of the USSR and United States on medium-range missiles has been drawn up by the group at the Geneva talks. The delegations have started detailed discussions of this plan. A number of obstacles arising from the unfounded demands of the U.S. side must be overcome to work out an agreed text, says an article published in the Military Bulletin of the NOVOSTI PRESS AGENCY [APN].

The United States is still trying to get only Soviet medium-range missiles cut at the first stage. It is not giving up its intention to deploy [razmestit] 100 Pershing-2s with nuclear warheads within range of USSR territory. The United States is trying not to eliminate Pershing-2 and land-based cruise missiles in Europe, but in fact to reequip them as operational and tactical Pershing-1Bs and sea-based cruise missiles with conventional warheads.

At present it is difficult to describe the ultimate meaning of this position, the article goes on to say. Washington is hardly inviting the USSR to engage, for its own part, in refitting SS-20 missiles with other types of armaments. It is unlikely because they are demanding that the USSR destroy ground-based cruise missiles for example. At the same time, having violated the SALT II Treaty and having physically exceeded the maximum ceilings for strategic armaments outlined in it, the Americans are in principle untying the hands of the Soviet side even if we do not make use of the invitation to get even, in regard to long term considerations. But unilateral restraint understandably has its limits.

As for re-equipping Pershing-2s, apart from anything else, that would mean a substantial increase in the threat to the USSR allies in the Warsaw Pact and would contradict the basic aim -- reducing the level of military confrontation in all fields.



No less significant is the question of U.S. weapons [boyezaryad] on Pershing-1A missiles deployed in the FRG and belonging to the Bundeswehr. This creates a precedent -- it is enough to put a weapon [boezaryad] which is de jure controlled by the United States on a launcher belonging to another state for this weapon to be excluded from the Soviet-U.S. balance. It is as if mixed nuclear forces are coming into being which are outside the Nonproliferation Treaty and other existing ones as well as possible agreements. If the United States is heading for that option then they will have to reveal their cards so that everyone knows just what relative "zero" it is that attracts them. In theory it is possible to suppose that the USSR allies in the Warsaw Pact, let's say the GDR and the CZSSR, for their part ask the USSR to let them have SS-12 operational and tactical missile launchers, retaining the responsibility for servicing the nuclear ammunitions. While other Soviet allies might prefer SS-23 launchers....

Questions of verification [kontrol] become particularly complex in the set of problems on medium-range missiles. The USSR has explained on more than one occasion that it is in favor of the severest, most far-reaching verification, including obligatory onsite inspection; naturally, U.S. military bases on the territories of third countries are liable to verification. It would be quite logical within the context of the idea of inspection on suspicion of undeclared objectives to put forward demands for the inclusion not just of enterprises which are directly linked with the production of medium-range missiles under contract but also of firms where it is possible to organize such production in secret.

The "basic provisions of a treaty for a complete and universal ban on nuclear weapons tests" provide evidence of how far the Soviet side is willing to go in questions of verification. In particular these envisage an obligation to provide unconditional access to a place designated in the inquiry of the inspecting side and the establishment of an institute of international inspectors.

/9738

CSO: 5200/1545

## INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR: FURTHER COMMENTS ON FRG DEBATES OVER POSSIBLE ACCORD

### Ruling Parties Divided

PM260835 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 18 May 87 Second Edition p 6

["Our Commentary" by Yuliy Yakhantov: "Debate on the Rhine"]

[Text] Bonn--For several weeks now the FRG has been debating its attitude to the Soviet initiatives for nuclear disarmament in Europe.

The Bonn Government has still not given an intelligible answer to the question of how it rates the proposals concerning operational and tactical missiles. Chancellor H. Kohl justifies the delay over answering with references to the fact that the government "does not want to be pressured by deadlines."

But, of course, deadlines are not the chief point. There is no unity in the government. The coalition partner of the Christian Democratic Union [CDU] and the Christian Social Union [CSU]--the Free Democratic Party [FDP]--believes that there are no grounds for objecting to the whole package of Soviet initiatives, to what people here call the "double zero solution," that is, with regard to medium-range missiles and operational and tactical missiles.

Nor is there a unanimous opinion in the circles of the CDU-CSU bloc. Its leadership, despite the U.S. Administration's positive attitude to the "double zero solution," is making attempts to impose its own version of "comprehensive proposals." Its essence consists in achieving the arms upgrading of NATO as regards operational and tactical nuclear missiles, while drowning in provisos the Soviet plan for the elimination of this class of weapon.

The impression is willy-nilly created that Bonn, by pleading the notorious "German security interests," wants to obtain sanction, above all, for its own arms upgrading in the sphere of missiles. I will remind you that in the conventional arms sphere this process is already taking place here in accordance with the adopted Bundeswehr rearmament plan.

Two of the most active champions of missile upgrading and opponents of nuclear disarmament--A. Dregger, chairman of the CDU-CSU [parliamentary] faction, and V. Ruehe, his deputy--visited Paris and London last week in search of like-minded people. Certain newspapers hint that they were, in point of fact,

fulfilling a mission for the generals here who openly demand that the removal of medium-range missiles from Europe be "compensated for" without fail by new operational and tactical missiles. FRG Defense Minister M. Woerner also tried to bring his NATO colleagues round to this view at the NATO Nuclear Planning Group session which has just ended in Stavanger (Norway).

Such efforts by right-wing circles elicit sharp criticism in the FRG. Prominent FDP figures H. Haussmann, G. Baum, and O. Feldmann categorically declare that the FDP will not support arms upgrading plans. E. Bahr, the Social Democratic Party's expert on disarmament issues, believes that such plans will encounter "very tough resistance" and that this will lead to serious disagreements within the coalition and will call the H. Kohl Government's existence into question.

At the same time, Bonn is certain flattered that it is at the center of attention and that the allies are expectantly looking in its direction now. But this certainly does not mean that all West Europeans look with approval on the maneuvers of the FRG Government, which is delaying resolving such a vital problem. For the times themselves are making them hurry up in order not to miss a historic chance and overcome the deadlock in the matter of nuclear disarmament in Europe.

#### Free Democratic Chairman Cited

LD182008 Moscow TASS in English 1600 GMT 18 May 87

[Text] Bonn, 18 May (TASS)--Martin Bangemann, chairman of the Party of Free Democrats, included in the Bonn ruling coalition, declared for the elimination of medium-range and shorter-range nuclear missiles from the European continent. Speaking before reporters here today he urged the partners in the coalition to give up a biased attitude to the "double zero option" on Euro-missiles. Bangemann is of the opinion that West European countries should work out a joint stand in order to promote progress at the Soviet-American talks in Geneva.

#### 'Keen Struggle'

PM261127 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 21 May 87 Second Edition p 5

[Yevgeniy Grigoryev article under the rubric "International Notes": "Bonn Carousel"]

[Text] A special statement by Federal Chancellor H. Kohl was published in the FRG capital at the end of last week. Brief, to the point--just nine paragraphs. But an important statement nevertheless, because it is on the Geneva talks and the fate of nuclear arms on our continent.

People are paying particular heed to everything said and done by the FRG Government concerning this issue. It has considerable potential to influence one way or another the "negotiating" strategy and tactics of the Americans and

the stand taken by the NATO bloc. But the attitude of Bonn itself to the complex of nuclear disarmament issues (at least officially) is still unclear. A keen struggle has developed over this in the country and within the ruling circles themselves.

The Free Democratic Party (FDP) in the person of M. Bangemann, its chairman and minister of economics, and H.D. Genscher, vice chancellor and minister of foreign affairs, is in favor of the idea of nuclear disarmament in Europe. M. Bangemann has spoken, in particular, in favor of eliminating medium-range missiles and operational and tactical missiles. He has urged the coalition partners--the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Christian Social Union (CSU)--to give up their prejudices regarding the "double zero option." It is a well known fact that it does not suit Chancellor H. Kohl's faction in the party, which is very strong. In the CDU the opposition is led by its parliamentary leader A. Dregger, F.J. Strauss, chairman of the CSU, also confirmed the day before yesterday in Munich that he is against the elimination of operational and tactical missiles and short-range missiles. With regard to medium-range missiles, they can be eliminated "without any problem," according to him.

The unexpected statement by the head of government was obviously intended to blur this situation to a certain extent. On the other hand, it appears to be an attempt to calm its own public and the rest of the European public, which is following Bonn's conduct with great puzzlement, if not alarm.

It goes without saying that the Rhine flows on and some things change on its banks. The agitated reaction to Reykjavik, or to be more precise, to the accord agreed in principle but not realized--to eliminate Soviet and American medium-range missiles in Europe--has long since calmed down. Now, unlike last autumn, the head of the FRG Government seems to be in favor of the "zero option" in this class of arms. In this sense the line taken by Bonn has undergone a positive change, in my view. Moreover, now not only the work in Geneva to reach an agreement on medium-range missiles but also the fact that the question of eliminating operational and tactical missiles has been placed on the agenda is treated in the chancellor's statement as a success of his government's policy.

We will not argue. But it also transpires that a settlement involving "only" operational and tactical missiles together with medium-range missiles is not to Bonn's liking. According to the chancellor, such a settlement must be bolder and "take into account arms of any range between 0 and 1,000 kilometers in order to reach an effective agreement."

We cannot believe our eyes and ears. Can Chancellor Kohl really be in favor of eliminating all nuclear missiles in Europe? One could only welcome such an intention. But on whom, one asks, does its realization depend? The Soviet Union, as is well known, actually initiated the plan to cleanse our continent of all nuclear arms. And so the matter rests with the NATO allies. There are still highly influential political and military circles in the FRG itself which

are by no means burning with the desire to "go so far" and cannot imagine a nuclear-free Europe. Only recently a communique by the NATO Nuclear Planning Group, of which the FRG defense minister is a co-author, stated that its members will "keep and improve their nuclear forces." What then remains of the chancellor's statement? Clearly it is not without its contradictions. Moreover, it is obvious to everyone that piling up more and more new linkages and "prescriptions" is a tried and tested means of blocking any decision. This is exactly how the chancellor's statement was received in the Western press. The London DAILY TELEGRAPH describes it as a "veto on any possible decision by the North Atlantic alliance to accept the 'double zero option' involving medium-range missiles and operational and tactical missiles."

"Within this context" (we use the actual words of the statement) we should discuss the hackneyed references it makes to the "Warsaw Pact's superiority in conventional armed forces and in the chemical weapons sphere, which poses the greatest threat of all to our country (the FRG)." As if it were not NATO but some other body which is dragging its heels with regard to implementing the socialist countries' well known proposals to cardinally reduce and eliminate the aforementioned arms. As if the FRG itself did not have enormous depots of American chemical ammunition. Some people obviously find it difficult to take an honest, unbiased approach to responsible matters. Although the time for this kind of approach has long since come.

And here is a summary. Point eight of the statement says in particular: "A decision of such importance--we are talking about security on our continent into the next century--cannot be made hastily, as if we had little time left."

We are short of time, unfortunately. Any delay is tantamount to continuing the dangerous arms race. Although Europe now has a real opportunity to reverse this arms race and eliminate a considerable proportion of its nuclear arsenals. Spain recently spoke in favor of the "double zero option." [first edition replaces previous three sentences with the following: "Not without reason, many countries allied with the FRG have already made their position clear. For example, Spain has spoken in favor of simultaneously eliminating all medium-range nuclear missiles and operational and tactical missiles deployed on our continent, that is, it is in favor of the 'double zero option.'"] Even London has stated its possible consent to such a decision under certain conditions. But Bonn appears to be in no hurry. It would seem that this has nothing at all to do with a super-careful approach to a really very important problem. No one intends to make a decision in the heat of the moment or without giving the matter careful thought, without considering the balance of security interests of all who live in our European home.

Consequently, Bonn's provisions are leading to sober reflection. In the FRG itself, FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU has written: "So, strictly speaking, Bonn still needs time to think.... A treaty on the 'zero option' or the 'double zero option' would be a historic signal whose significance would go far beyond the limits of its content. In these conditions the FRG Government is appearing before the rest of the world as an obstacle in the way of concluding these treaties."

And there is more. Commenting on the failure of Mr Kohl's party at last Sunday's elections to the land parliaments of Hamburg and particularly Rheinland-pfalz, the newspaper STUTTGARTER ZEITUNG observed: "The main damage to the CDU was caused by its stand on disarmament issues. Many voters could not understand how the 'zero option,' which had earlier been presented as the ideal, should suddenly cease to be the aim of FRG Government policy. It is precisely in Rheinland-pfalz, where there are eight NATO air bases, missile launch installations, and chemical weapons depots, that even conservatively minded voters have shown an interest in greater decisiveness by the government in disarmament matters."

Meanwhile, a press conference was given by the federal chancellor on Monday. According to the press, now he says that "his government will not allow any doubts it may entertain with regard to the Soviet proposals on short-range missiles to stand in the way of an accord." If this is so, it means that even Bonn is not averse to heeding decisive moods and trends among the European public and in European politics. As far as the rest is concerned we will wait and see. It has been said that at the beginning of June the chancellor will issue a new statement. [first edition omits last sentence] Will the Bonn carousel come to rest? But the main question is: Will political realism gain the upper hand and will responsible FRG circles lend practical assistance to ensuring that this chance is not lost?

/9738

CSO: 5200/1545

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

TASS: KOHL SEES GOOD CHANCE FOR MISSILE ACCORD

LD191929 Moscow TASS in English 1853 GMT 19 Jun 87

[Text] Bonn June 19 TASS -- The West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl has stated that the present development of East-West relations opens up the possibility of progress in disarmament.

Speaking at a press conference here today he said that a good chance now existed for concluding an agreement on eliminating medium-range missiles. It was not clear however whether the FRG Government intended to include in the possible accord on medium-range and theatre missiles in Europe and the West German Pershing-1A missiles with American nuclear warheads. As is known, the refusal to do this is one of the main obstacles on the road to agreement.

Helmut Kohl stated "unconditional support" for Ronald Reagan's recent remarks in West Berlin. The American President made in that city a provocative speech clearly directed at encouraging revanchist forces in the FRG and sustaining tension in Europe.

/9738

CSO: 5200/1545

## INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

### TASS ASSAILS FRENCH DEFENSE SECRETARY'S REMARKS ON ARMS TALKS

LD021722 Moscow TASS in English 1646 GMT 2 Jun 87

[Text] Paris, 2 Jun (TASS)--TASS correspondent Yuriy Lopatin reports:

Casting a glance at a news stand I saw frontpaged on the Parisian FRANCE SOIR the following caption in bold letters: "Soviet Menace on Our Doorstep". I could not believe my eyes. I took a closer look. My eyes have not deceived me. How could things come to that?

It is not in itself news that FRANCE SOIR, a press body in the newspaper empire of notorious Robert Hersant, the newspaper that is inclined on causing sensations, holds such a stand. But in this case the newspaper has nothing to do with this. It published today a lengthy interview by French Defence Secretary Andre Giraud and in the caption in bold lines it simply summed up his pronouncements. And contrary to what is typical of the media here, it has not distorted them in the slightest.

Reading the minister's answers one might think that Soviet tanks are about to break into Paris and rumble over the cobblestones of Champs Elysee. "Soviet menace is on our doorstep, and it will increase if disarmament is implemented at haphazard," Andre Giraud asserts. What does "at haphazard" mean? Apparently, it means disarmament implemented not on the terms of Paris whose military doctrine is based on the concept of "nuclear deterrence" and which has now assumed in Western Europe an unenviable role of the pacesetter of the nuclear arms race and lands in increasing isolation even among its allies.

The minister declares for the unrestrained stepping up of military expenditures. He said the efforts in this area are a vehicle for the development of industry, technology, scientific research and personnel training. French economic experts will hardly agree with him: In accordance with France's military program endorsed by the rightwing majority of parliament, France's defence budget now reached a record level, while its industrial output is not growing, and France is obviously losing its economic positions.

Former Prime Minister Raymond Barre who is, undeniably, an expert on such matters, said in an interview to "Europe-1" radiostation today that while seven years ago France rated second in Western Europe for the level of economic development after the FRG, and was about to gain on it, it now dropped to the fourth place, with Britain and Italy getting ahead of it.



"It seems to me you are most of all concerned over the fact that the talks on disarmament are now in the order of the day", a FRANCE SOIR correspondent thus summed up his impressions from the conversation with the minister. "That the idea of disarmament is in the order of the day is a good thing, provided it does not become a bad thing," Andre Giraud said cryptically. "Disarmament must not become a pretext for creating a dangerous imbalance in some areas of the world, namely in the centre of Europe," he said. And once again the minister made a reference to "massive preponderance" of the Warsaw Treaty organization in the sphere of conventional armaments. But it is precisely for discussing questions related to substantial cuts in armaments in every area without exception that the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Treaty countries propose the holding of serious and undelayed talks to the West. And Andre Giraud pretends that these proposals do not exist. In any case these proposals are not even mentioned in that lengthy interview which took up over half a newspaper page.

/9738

CSO: 5200/1545

## INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

### FRENCH CP LEADER DECRIES NUCLEAR FORCES' CHANGED ROLE

PM291421 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 23 Jun 87 First Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Georges Marchais Speech"]

[Text] Paris, 22 Jun — The European states, like all other countries in the world today, need peace, friendship, and cooperation among the peoples rather than a continuation of the arms race, Georges Marchais, secretary general of the French Communist Party (PCF), stated during a broadcast on the M6 TV channel. French Communists consider, he said, that a situation has now come about in the world that opens up the possibility of finally beginning disarmament and concluding a USSR-U.S. treaty eliminating medium-range and operational and tactical missiles in Europe. This treaty would be of exceptionally great importance for all mankind.

The PCF secretary general demanded of the government that France end nuclear tests and play an active role in the disarmament process. He stressed that the French nuclear forces have now been turned into offensive forces. Moreover, they are undergoing constant modernization, as evidenced by the tests on Mururoa Atoll. Whereas they were previously intended solely for the defense of national territory, the situation is now changing as a result of the plans to create a so-called "European defense."

Regarding the transformations under way in the Soviet Union, the PCF secretary general expressed his conviction that the goals will be met.

/9738

CSO: 5200/1558

## INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

### TASS ON SPANISH SUPPORT FOR ZERO OPTION

#### Gonzalez Backs Double-Zero

LD301324 Moscow TASS in English 1019 GMT 30 May 87

[Text] Madrid, 30 May (TASS)--Felipe Gonzalez, chairman of the Spanish Government, has sent messages to Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), and to President Ronald Reagan of the United States, reaffirming that Spain considers it very important that an agreement on medium-range nuclear systems be signed between the United States and the Soviet Union this year.

This was announced by Javier Solana, an official spokesman for the government, at a press conference following a government meeting.

The spokesman said that in the messages Felipe Gonzalez had reaffirmed Spain's support for the "double zero option" concerning the elimination of missiles in Europe.

In the opinion of the head of the Spanish Government, the signing of an agreement on medium-range missile systems this year will be of benefit to the security of the allies and will serve as a specific fact in the cause of consolidating the process of detente.

Felipe Gonzalez recalls in the messages that "We are faced with a historic opportunity which should be used. As far as strategic weapons are concerned, Spain expresses interest in a continuation of the talks in Geneva on reducing the systems by 50 percent as well as in a continuation of efforts on the part of the United States and the Soviet Union to reach agreement on defensive strategic arms."

#### Defense Minister Cited

PM180957 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 Jun 87 First Edition p 3

[TASS report: "Spanish Defense Minister Favors 'Zero Option'"]

[Text] Madrid, 15 Jun -- Spanish Defense Minister Narcis Serra i Serra has expressed himself in favor of achieving the "zero option" in the field of nuclear missiles in Europe which, according to him, "will open up a new prospect -- from lack of understanding to detente."

In an article published in the newspaper YA he notes that it is a case of eliminating for the first time in history a whole class of nuclear weapons systems. Europeans, N. Serra i Serra notes, must resolutely support this idea. Europe cannot be a hostage to its own fear -- in the prevailing situation it is urgently necessary, by means of dialogue and compromise, to take a number of political measures which will lower the level of the nuclear threat and help to create a safer and stabler world. Europe now has the political potential for achieving this. Opportunities for disarmament do not present themselves frequently and when the situation is favorable these opportunities must be used, the Spanish defense minister emphasizes.

/9738

CSO: 5200/1545

## INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

### FRG SPOKESMAN COMMENTS ON MISSILE AGREEMENT

LD131024 Hamburg DPA in German 0920 GMT 13 Jun 87

[Text] Bonn (DPA) — The Federal Government has received the agreement of the NATO countries to the double zero option for the removal of U.S. and Soviet intermediate-range missiles in Europe "with great satisfaction." Government spokesman Friedhelm Ost said in Bonn today that the result of the foreign ministers of the 16 NATO countries at their spring meeting in Reykjavik the previous day showed that "the European and U.S. alliance partners stand shoulder to shoulder." Bonn's aim of achieving progress in the disarmament and arms control process on a broad front has been fully and wholly confirmed.

The result accords with the ideas of the Federal Government which understands the aim of a zero option in intermediate-range missiles as part of a coherent overall concept. This includes "the reduction of strategic offensive weapons, the global removal of chemical weapons, the establishment of conventional stability, and the clear and verifiable reduction of U.S. and Soviet ground-based shorter range nuclear missile systems,"

Ost stressed that the Federal Government paid particular tribute to the readiness of the allies to take full account of the "particular concerns" of the FRG. Thereby the "cohesion of the alliance and solidarity among all alliance partners" has again shown its worth. Thus the NATO foreign ministers have on German insistence spoken in favor of possible further "clear and verifiable reductions" in missiles with a range of less than 500 km. They have instructed the NATO ambassadors to formulate a "comprehensive disarmament concept."

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CSO: 5200/2562

## INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

### FRG SPOKESMAN COMMENTS ON PERSHING ISSUE

LD151659 Hamburg DPA in German 1455 GMT 15 Jun 87

[Text] Bonn (DPA) — Government spokesman Friedhelm Ost has contradicted the Soviet assertion that the United States has agreed in the Geneva disarmament negotiations to the destruction of the atomic warheads in its possession for the German Pershing-1A missiles. Ost is thus contradicting an article by the Soviet chief negotiator Viktor Karpov in the Hamburg news magazine *Der Spiegel*. In it he had stated that it recognized in the American draft of a treaty on intermediate-range missiles that these warheads are for operational tactical missiles and therefore must be destroyed.

Ost said today in Bonn, that Karpov's assertion is "incorrect." Both the American and the Soviet draft treaties spoke only of the elimination of missiles and launching installations. The government spokesman is astonished that the Soviet Union is now bringing this issue into prominence. During the entire duration of the intermediate-range negotiations the Soviet side did not mention the German Pershing-1A missiles. The Soviets did not even address this matter during the latest talks with U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz in Moscow.

Ost pointed to statements by Chancellor Helmut Kohl and the recent NATO foreign ministers conference that the Pershing-1A missiles cannot be included in a USSR-U.S. zero option. The fact that the atomic warheads are in the possession of the U.S. does not in any way alter the fact that the Pershing-1A missiles are not up for negotiation in Geneva.

/8309

CSO: 5200/2562

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

SENATOR LUGAR DISCUSSES DISARMAMENT WITH FRG'S KOHL

LD291550 Hamburg DPA in German 1418 GMT 29 Jun 87

[Excerpts] Bonn (DPA)— U.S. Senator Richard G. Lugar stated today in Bonn that the complete removal of all missiles with ranges of between 500-1,000 km will be achieved. Lugar, a member of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, who came to Bonn from briefings with the disarmament negotiators of both superpowers in Geneva, strongly denied all accusations of a so-called disengagement of the united states from Europe.

However, he did not want to exclude economic pressure for a reduction in the U.S. presence in Europe if the U.S. budget deficit continues to worsen. The senator thought that the 72 old Pershing missiles belonging to the FRG Air Force will remain untouched despite a complete zero option in the ranges 500-1,000 km as Bonn desires.

The Republican politician conferred with Chancellor Kohl for over 1 hour on disarmament matters. Afterward, Lugar said in an interview with journalists that the disputed matter of a missile conversion was of course discussed. Kohl also expressed his concern over the U.S. deficit. [passage omitted]

The Federal Press Office did not want to reveal details of the talks.

Senator Lugar supported a Soviet-American summit which could perhaps take place in the last quarter of 1987. However, the coming about of the summit should in no way be tied to the completion of the agreement on the double zero option on intermediate-range missiles. It is much more important to achieve a good agreement rather than a timely one, Lugar said. [passage omitted]

/8309

CSO: 5200/2563

## INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

### BELGIAN PRIME MINISTER MARTENS DISCUSSES ZERO SOLUTION

DW221035 Bonn DIE WELT in German 22 Jun 87 p 7

[Interview with Prime Minister Wilfried Martens by correspondent Helmut Hetzel;  
date and place not given]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] *Welt*: Let us discuss security policy. It has been proven by the discussion on a double zero solution that it is still difficult for the Europeans to speak with one voice in disarmament matters. What is the Belgian position regarding a double zero option?

Martens: We said on 8 May: We support the simple INF zero option (1,000-5,000 km range), and we demand simultaneously an agreement on a global, that is worldwide, zero option. In other words: removal of the 100 U.S. missiles in Alaska and those of the USSR in Asia.

*Welt*: So you are in favor of global intermediate-range missiles disarmament?

Martens: Yes, this was also supported by NATO in Reykjavik. Second, we want to extend zero option to include short-range missiles...

*Welt*: With a zero to 500 km range?

Martens: No, with a 500-1,000 km range, provided this double zero option does not include the French and British nuclear weapons arsenals and the German Pershing 1-A missiles. It was our condition: double zero option without the inclusion of the German Pershing 1-A's. I think we succeeded in making this clear to the Americans that agreement on the part of the Europeans on this matter is important.

*Welt*: We have the impression that during your 6 May visit to Bonn that you voiced more reservations about the double zero option. The remaining missiles (zero to 500 km) can fall only on German territory. Some people in Bonn are under the impression that we have been left standing in the rain.



**Martens:** I have said it clearly to Chancellor Kohl that we want to support something that expresses the consensus of all Europeans. All three Benelux countries follow that line. The Italians also agreed at that time. The chancellor knew it. I do not know what has been agreed between Bonn and Paris. However, the fact that we said to Bonn that consensus is necessary, indicates that we will not abandon Bonn. Consensus was then achieved on the basis of the 72 German Pershing 1-A missiles.

**Welt:** A good compromise?

**Martens:** Yes, I think so. The condition is that these Pershing-1A missiles can be equipped with U.S. warheads. [passage omitted]

**Welt:** Will you go as far as saying that the other 32 Belgian intermediate-range missiles, to be deployed in the course of NATO counterarmament, are superfluous?

**Martens:** We decided on 14 March 1985 to deploy the other 32 intermediate-range missiles in late 1987 if no disarmament agreement were achieved. If an agreement were to be achieved, the already deployed 16 intermediate-range missiles are to be withdrawn. If no agreement is achieved and if the disarmament negotiations are still going on, we are in favor of a 6-month moratorium. During that period the other 32 missiles will not be deployed. [passage omitted]

**Welt:** Is Moscow's final disarmament strategy goal neutralization of the FRG?

**Martens:** Not only of the FRG. Complete denuclearization of Europe could lead to a neutrality mentality. It is, therefore, important that the alliance leaves no doubt that it will use nuclear weapons if it were absolutely necessary. As long as the Soviet Union knows that we are that steadfast, the danger of war will be very small — I say this intentionally in an exaggerated way.

**Welt:** You maintain that Soviet strategy is aimed at neutralizing all of Western Europe, perhaps even linked to reunification? Do you consider Gorbachev capable of making such an offer?

**Martens:** I cannot judge that. However, all of Western Europe is facing the question whether we are prepared to handle our defense strategy in the future.

**Welt:** You do not want to comment on the reunification debate. Can people in Belgium understand that why such a discussion is being held now?

**Martens:** We understand that this is a significant issue for the Germans. However, it is essential to continue to work for Europe and for a European strategy. [passage omitted]

## INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

### SPAIN'S DEFENSE MINISTER VIEWS EUROPEAN DISARMAMENT

PM231545 Madrid YA in Spanish 14 Jun 87 p 16

[Article by Defense Minister Narciso Serra: "Europe and Nuclear Disarmament"]

[Text] The attempts to achieve a disarmament agreement in Europe date back to the end of the last century, when The Hague Conference, which produced three declarations which were not turned into agreements nor had the desired effectiveness, was held in 1899 on the initiative of Czar Nicholas II's Russia.

The current situation bears some relation to all that, since today, too, Moscow, by attempting to reduce the effort necessary to renew its military system, is taking up again an initiative which originated in the West European countries.

The aim of The Hague Conference currently regains topicality since almost a century later arms control and reduction is a debate in which it is very difficult to make progress.

World War II ended with the emergence of nuclear weapons, whose possession would become indissolubly linked to the ability to project power and exert influence. At first they were concentrated in only one system — bombs carried aboard aircraft — but the progress of research soon made it possible to move from the mechanics of aircraft to the technology of missiles. With this the immunity conferred by distance was broken and rear guards disappeared.

The subsequent development of military technology and strategic doctrines gave rise to the deployment of nuclear missiles and weapons in Europe, whose defense was linked to the U.S. guarantee and which, within a strategy of deterrence, has made it possible to preserve peace.

Despite the disarmament agreements of the seventies (SALT I, SALT II, the ABM Treaty...), which sought to set maximum ceilings for arsenals, all this collapsed at the beginning of the present decade and with the invasion of Afghanistan by way of a prologue. It was another missed opportunity, which gave way to a time which we could describe as one of escalation of the threat. What is planned as deterrence by one side is assessed by the other as a hostile manifestation, and vice versa. The threat feeds on the very systems designed to counter it.

Where is the limit to be set which would make it possible to say that the appropriate level of security has been reached? The situation has become so complicated that there is a danger of turning the means designed for security into creators of insecurity.

Faced with this situation, the wisest thing is to undertake resolutely a set of political measures which through dialogue and agreement would reduce the level of the threat and help create a more secure and stable world.

Europe now has the political opportunity to achieve this. Its former formula — its zero option, a European formula articulated in Reykjavik between the two extra-European powers — makes it possible to design a new prospect, descending from lack of communication to detente.

What is at stake is no less than the disappearance, for the first time in history, of a whole class of nuclear weapon systems whose target is the theater of our continent.

We Europeans should respond resolutely to this effect. Europe must not be a hostage to its own fear. Opportunities for disarmament do not always arise, and when the atmosphere is favorable they should be taken. Only in this way will Europe and the world be able to regain, 100 years later, an opportunity which they lost at that time and which they should never do so again.

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CSO: 5200/2560

## INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR: EAST EUROPEANS SPEAK ON SOVIET PROPOSALS

CSSR's Bilak

PM241001 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 23 Jun 87 First Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Urgent Task: Vasil Bilak on Problems of International Politics"]

[Text] Prague, 22 Jun — The achievement of an agreement on eliminating American and Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe is an urgent task. It would be the first step along the path of ridding the European Continent of nuclear weapons, Vasil Bilak, member of the Presidium and secretary of the CPCZ Central Committee, stated. Speaking yesterday at an antiwar demonstration in Brno, he noted that, although the NATO countries had agreed to eliminate medium-range missiles, they have put forward a whole series of reservations which are complicating the solution of this important question.

The leaders of the Warsaw Pact states at the Political Consultative Committee conference in Berlin again insistently urged all countries to make joint efforts in the interests of ending the arms race, averting a nuclear catastrophe, and security a lasting peace. The socialist countries' proposals are creating good conditions for our European home to be built on a solid foundation of mutual understanding and cooperation rather than on arsenals of weapons.

But while our efforts are directed toward strengthening peace, the speaker pointed out, the West is trying to reverse the wheel of history and impose its system and way of life on us. It is a pity the new approach to international affairs has still not found expression among the representatives of the ruling circles of certain Western countries. They still proclaim a position-of-strength policy and propagate a doctrine of nuclear intimidation. That was graphically illustrated in Ronald Reagan's recent speech in West Berlin. The U.S. President threatened and cursed socialism while "counseling" the socialist countries on how to behave. The West accuses us of fearing the very word "reform." That is not so, however. We favor reform, we favor everything that strengthens socialism, enhances its appeal, and promotes a better life for the people. But we are opposed to spurious reform, which would weaken socialism, the unity of the party and the people, and our friendship with the Soviet Union, V. Bilak stressed.

## SED Plenum

PM231341 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 23 Jun 87 Second Edition p 4

["Own Information" report: "SED Central Committee Plenum"]

[Text] An SED Central Committee Plenum held in the GDR capital has rated highly the results of the recent Warsaw Pact states' Political Consultative Committee conference and the measures it outlined for further deepening and improving cooperation among the fraternal parties and states. The SED Central Committee Politburo report, delivered by H. Dohlius, member of the Politburo and secretary of the SED Central Committee, points out that the conclusion of an agreement on the removal of U.S. and Soviet medium-range missiles from Europe would lay a good foundation for nuclear disarmament.

The Soviet Union's principled policy and its new initiatives, GDR Foreign Minister O. Fischer noted in his speech, are now helping to launch questions of arms limitation and disarmament the main subject of present-day world politics. The USSR's proposals take account of the interests of all mankind and point to constructive ways of eliminating the danger threatening the world.

The plenum noted that the GDR is following with great interest the CPSU's efforts to implement the course formulated at the 27th CPSU Congress aimed at improving Soviet people's living conditions, strengthening socialism, and enhancing its prestige in the international arena. The GDR will celebrate the 70th anniversary of the Great October Revolution in the company of the Soviet Union and the world's progressive forces.

The plenum paid great attention to the work being initiated in the GDR to implement the 11th SED Congress' decisions.

## Bulgarian Commission Backs USSR

PM211033 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 19 Apr 87 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Removing Artificial Barriers"]

[Text] Sofia, 18 Apr--The Bulgarian National Assembly Foreign Affairs Commission has approved a statement expressing total support for the USSR proposal to eliminate American and Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe and also to reduce and subsequently totally eliminate operational and tactical missiles stationed on the European continent.

These timely steps, the statement points out, have been taken by the USSR at a time when the growing nuclear arms race is pushing the world toward the abyss and causing increasing concern among peoples, particularly in Europe--the continent and most saturated with nuclear and other weapons. The lack of tangible progress at disarmament talks increases this alarm still further. At the same time, the Soviet-American meeting in Reykjavik showed that nuclear disarmament is a reality.

The Soviet Union's constructive proposals open up the possibility of reaching an agreement which would have great political, military, and psychological significance. It would make it possible to free Europe of a considerable proportion of its deadly nuclear burden and would be conducive to our making progress toward a future without nuclear weapons--the dream of all people the world over.

The Foreign Affairs Commission voiced the hope that the new Soviet initiatives will meet with understanding and support among parliamentary circles in the countries concerned. Now, when practical progress is taking shape in the task of nuclear disarmament, artificial barriers must not be put in the way of drawing up an agreement to free Europe from nuclear weapons, the statement says.

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CSO: 5200/1545

## INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

### BILAK ADDRESSES BRNO PEACE RALLY

AU241731 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 22 Jun 87 pp 1, 2

["Excerpts" from a speech by Vasil Bilak, member of the Presidium and secretary of the CPCZ Central Committee, at a rally at peace and CSSR-USSR friendship in Brno-Lisen on 21 June]

[Text] The rally was addressed by Comrade Vasil Bilak.

All our endeavors are closely connected with the questions of war and peace. Socialism and peace are the head and tail of the same coin. Without socialism there can be no lasting peace, and without peace it is impossible to build socialism. Socialism is a historical objective law. We are building socialism, but we do not foist it upon anyone. Capitalism does not want to reconcile itself to that. It systematically strives to reverse the historic development, to foist upon us its order and way of life. And this even at the price of unleashing of world war. Under the pretext of improving socialism, they are passing off their ideas as wishes, something which President Reagan recently affirmed in his speech in West Berlin, when he threatened and damned socialism, and at the same time gave advice about what the socialist countries should or should not do.

In recent years, Comrade Vasil Bilak continued, militarism, as a grouping of the most militant and most reactionary forces of imperialism, has become such a monstrous and uncontrollable force when asserting its plans for conquest that it even puts the vital interests of bourgeois society at stake. A possible war would be equally suicidal for both capitalism and socialism.

We know well that capitalism will never voluntarily renounce militarism. In order to thwart its objectives, one has to have economic and political strength -- the socialist states, above all; one has to elicit broad resistance among the social strata of the whole world.

A great deal will depend on how mankind succeeds in dealing with militarism. In essence everything will depend on it -- the fate of our generation, the future of coming generations, the prospects of preserving human civilization, and perhaps even the existence of our planet.

The nature of the most destructive modern weapons does not give a single state the chance to defend itself with military-technical means alone. In the present day nuclear-space age, the security of the individual states can be built only with political means, by negotiations, by the development of cooperation and dialogue, strengthening peaceful coexistence and, above all, by reducing the level of military confrontation. The sum of the socialist countries' proposals aimed at constructing a comprehensive system of international peace and security provides such a concept of security, the genuine path toward a world of peace and cooperation.

The present-day world, as Comrade Gorbachev said in Prague, is so interdependent that all nations are like a group of mountaineers tied onto one rope on a mountain face. They can either go up together, or fall into an abyss together.

The new thinking in international relations is beginning to meet with a favorable response in the world. This is also beginning to show in the fact that various political and social forces are increasingly demanding their share when it comes to shaping the official policy of the capitalist states. These multifaceted social forces, regardless of their ideological or political convictions, are active proponents of averting war, of a civilized and mutually useful development of international relations on the principles of peaceful coexistence.

The concepts of the USSR and its allies are clear in this respect. Their main objective is averting nuclear war, reducing the level of military confrontation, developing international relations in the spirit of peaceful coexistence, cooperation, and detente.

The Soviet Union — by its realistic proposals which, to a maximal extent, are also taking into consideration the interests of the United States and other interested parties, and by its patient and constructive approach in negotiations — shows that the notion of nuclear disarmament and the ways and prospects of resolving this issue are beginning to acquire concrete form.

The most urgent and, at the same time, the most future-oriented task is the conclusion of an agreement on the elimination of U.S. and Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe, a matter which should be the first step in the process of ridding our continent of nuclear weapons. We are glad that certain positive steps can be registered in that respect, but one will still have to overcome more than one obstacle which the opponents of disarmament continue to put in the way. Even though NATO expressed its consent to the elimination of medium-range missiles, we still come across various conditions which make the solution of this issue preposterously difficult.

At the recent session of the Political Consultative Committee in Berlin, the leading representatives of the Warsaw Pact member-states appealed with renewed urgency to all states for a joint effort toward halting the arms race, averting a nuclear catastrophe, and ensuring lasting peace.

One of the main results of the Berlin session is the proclamation of the military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact member-states. This is a historically significant document, which affirms that the military doctrine of the socialist allied states has none other than a defensive character, and that it proceeds from the necessity to preserve the equilibrium of military potentials on a level adequate to the needs of defense.

Czechoslovakia is located in the geographical center of Europe. We are very sensitive about the atmosphere which prevails on the old continent. The happy, as well as tragic, fates of European civilizations have always affected us to the full extent. Therefore, it is in our vital interest that an atmosphere of goodneighborliness, trust and cooperation among all states, regardless of their social system, prevail in this part of the world.

In World War II the nations of Europe made far too many sacrifices to cast doubt on the postwar arrangement and resolve ideological conflicts by war. In the current nuclear age, humankind's duty to avert a nuclear catastrophe must dominate the social endeavor of all governments of the European states.

Our idea of a common European home, in the construction of which every state should make as dignified a contribution as possible, is not at all helped by the various speeches resounding behind the western border of our state; on the contrary, they are poisoning the atmosphere of good-neighborly relations. In particular I mean the phenomena of revanchism, which so ominously resounded at the recent rally of the so-called Sudeten Germans in Nuremberg. We must also be alarmed by the fact that FRG Government officials lend themselves to defending revanchist claims, and this does not serve good-neighborly relations well.

The socialist states' proposals create good conditions for building the European home on solid foundations of understanding and cooperation, and not on arsenals of various weapons. We want peace and clear skies overhead.

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CSO: 5200/3012



## INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

ROMANIA: PRESS CONFERENCE AT USSR EMBASSY ON ARMS PROPOSALS

AU271427 Bucharest SCINTEIA in Romania 25 Apr 87 p 5

[Text] On Friday, 24 April, a press conference was held at the USSR Embassy in Bucharest which was attended by representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, of the central press, and of the Romanian Press Agency AGERPRES, and by reporters of foreign press accredited to our country.

On this occasion some aspects of socioeconomic development in the Soviet Union, in keeping with the objectives established by the 27th CPSU Congress as well as the current directions in the USSR foreign policy were presented. Also reiterated were the new proposals advanced by the USSR and by Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee on reaching an agreement on the issue of intermediate-range nuclear missiles, on the withdrawal and elimination of all these weapons from Europe, and on total elimination of operative-tactical missiles from Europe.

Within this framework, the initiatives of Romania and of Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu, RCP secretary general and president of the SR of Romania, on achieving disarmament and establishing peace throughout the world were highly valued.

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CSO: 5200/1545

## INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR: JAPANESE FACTOR IN U.S. NUCLEAR STRATEGY VIEWED

PM050925 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 May 87 First Edition p 3

[Colonel D. Belskiy article: "Assimilation..."]

[Text] The impression has lately been created that the Pentagon is not only stubbornly bent on giving Japan the status of an "unsinkable aircraft carrier" but is also working toward assigning it one of the most important roles in the United States' nuclear strategy in the Far East.

It is no secret that Japanese territory has long since been a U.S. military bridgehead. There are more than 120 U.S. military bases and installations in Japan. The largest of them are the naval bases at Yokosuka and Sasebo, the air force bases at Yokota, Misawa, and Kadena, and also the marine air base at Iwakuni. Basically, they are all elements of the American nuclear infrastructure in the Asian and Pacific region. W. Arkin, director of the nuclear arms research program at the American Policy Studies Institute, believes, for example that "virtually all Pentagon installations in Japan are geared toward preparation for a global conflict or regional conflicts involving the use of mass destruction weapons."

The press has more than once reported about depots built in Japan for the purpose of storing nuclear ammunition at the air bases of Iwakuni, Misawa (Honshu Island), Kadena, and Futenma (Okinawa Island) and also at the Sasebo naval base. It is also a well known fact that the American troops in Japan and the 7th Fleet whose ships are based in Japanese ports have special subunits for servicing nuclear weapons.

The accord on bringing in American nuclear weapons, which is recorded in a special "working memorandum" disclosed in the Japanese press by A. Barber, former U.S. assistant defense secretary, is in violation of Japan's well known "nonnuclear principles." According to this document, U.S. Navy ships with nuclear weapons on board have the right to enter Japanese ports "freely and without hindrance." And so they do. Since last August alone, American submarines carrying nuclear weapons have been in Japanese ports more than 40 times.

And now the United States' use of Japanese territory in the interests of its nuclear strategy is developing on an increasingly broad and consequently increasingly dangerous scale. This is evidenced by the Japanese Government's consent to open its air corridors if need be to strategic bombers with nuclear weapons on board. What this actually means is that the Pentagon now has the right to unrestricted flights over the country's territory without consulting with the Japanese authorities. In any case, it is a well known fact that B-52 aircraft have already landed at the Kadena Air Force Base on more than one occasion.

A new feature of the American military presence in Japan connected with U.S. nuclear strategy is to create the corresponding infrastructure in Japanese territory for the control of nuclear forces and weapons.

A major command center for the control of the U.S. Pacific fleet in nuclear war conditions has been set up at the Yokosuka base. A space communications station, the headquarters of the 7th Fleet, and forward-based centers for the control of the submarines with ballistic missiles which constantly patrol the northwest Pacific are housed at this center in bunkers and buildings above ground level which are protected against the effects of radiation and thermal radiation.

Underground command centers for the control of U.S. armed forces in the Pacific zone in the event of a nuclear conflict were built at Misawa at the same time as F-16 fighter bombers, which carry nuclear weapons, were deployed. Also at Misawa is a regional U.S. Air Force command, as well as the largest radio interception and electronic surveillance center in the Far East, whose main task is to gather intelligence on the Soviet Union and determine the targets for a nuclear attack.

Modernization of the U.S. Navy communications center at Yokohama began in January 1987 as part of the plan to develop the U.S. nuclear strategy infrastructure in the Far East. Basically, they are building a new operations center for the control of the 7th Fleet. According to the plans of Pentagon strategists, it is to play a key role in the control of American warships in the west Pacific in the context of a "postnuclear situation." Yes, what we are talking about here is efforts to ensure that means of communication and "normal" conditions for the vital activity of the command and service personnel are preserved at the center even after a nuclear war.

In the interests of this nuclear strategy there are plans to build an over-the-horizon radar station on Iwo Jima Island. The Pentagon also intends to use the ultra long-range radar stations which it is planned to build on the island of Kakaiga Shima and at Ebina and which are formally intended for the Japanese "self-defense forces," as well as radio stations operating on VLF [sverkhdlinnyye volny], in the interests of the U.S. Armed Forces.

Not without reason, the Japanese public is noting with alarm that all these actions by the Pentagon considerably increase the danger of Japan becoming a target for a counter strike in the event of the United States unleashing a nuclear conflict.

It must also be stressed that the possibility of Japanese territory being used in the interests of U.S. nuclear strategy in the Far East and on a global scale runs contrary to Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, which expresses the sincere desire of the Japanese people for international peace based on justice and order and their refusal to use or threaten to use armed force as a means of resolving international disputes.

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CSO: 5200/1558

## INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

### TASS CRITICIZES NAKASONE ON U.S. MISSILE DEPLOYMENT

LD230716 Moscow TASS in English 0640 GMT 23 Jun 87

["Who Is Nakasone Playing Up To? -- TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow June 23 TASS -- Commentator Askold Biryukov writes:

Memories still linger of the speech made by the Japanese Premier Nakasone in Williamsburg where he called for the deployment of nuclear Pershings and cruise missiles in Western Europe. Now, at the regular meeting of the "seven" in Venice, he supported the deployment of nuclear medium-range missiles in another part of the world, on the territory of Alaska, in the United States, from where these missiles could reach the territory of the Soviet Union.

The head of the Japanese Government obviously wants the country of Hiroshima and Nagasaki to become firmly established in the role of a centre of resistance to nuclear disarmament not only in Europe but also in other parts of the world.

It is known that to solve the problem of eliminating medium-range missiles in Europe the USSR agreed with the United States in Reykjavik for each side to retain 100 warheads on such missiles -- the USSR in Asia and the United States on its national territory, but not in Alaska because Soviet missiles cannot reach American territory and vice versa. It is known that Washington would like to retain in the Asia-Pacific region its nuclear missiles that are deployed against the USSR and this compels the Soviet Union to search for an answer to this threat and to sustain the necessary balance.

At the same time the USSR is prepared to solve the problem of medium-range missiles on a global scale as well. All this requires is that the threat emanating from the United States nuclear arms deployed in Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, on board aircraft carriers and other American naval ships be withdrawn.

But the Nakasone government, while paying lip service to a "global zero option on medium-range missiles," does not strive in any way, and this follows from its statements, for an elimination of this class of nuclear weapons. Rather quite the contrary. It continues to add grist to the mill of those circles which resist in every way real steps in the field of nuclear disarmament. The Japanese newspaper MAINICHI noted in this connection that Premier Nakasone's position boils down to the following -- "the deployment of American missiles in Alaska will turn into a mighty card in the hands of the United States at talks with the USSR."

This approach by the government was firmly condemned, including in Japan, where it is criticised not only by the opposition parties but also by certain quarters in the ruling party. The prime minister's statement, MAINICHI continues, "became the ultimate manifestation of his position displayed in Williamsburg." The paper says this implies "the drawing of Japan into the nuclear strategy of the West."

Incidentally, the joining of the American "Star Wars" programme announced by the Nakasone government should be understood in the same context because, as it was rightly noted by the paper, SDI "is an embodiment of the present nuclear strategy of the United States."

By calling for the deployment of new nuclear weapons the Japanese premier not only insults the feelings of his own people, the first victim of the use of nuclear arms. He displays total disregard for the feelings and will of other peoples which have tired of confrontation and demand immediate and concrete efforts to speed up the process of disarmament and remove all the artificial obstacles standing in the way to freeing mankind of the burden of nuclear arms.

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CSO: 5200/1558

## INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

### PRC ENVOY CALLS FOR REMOVAL OF ASIAN MISSILES

OW260641 Beijing XINHUA Domestic Service in Chinese 1334 GMT 25 Jun 87

[Text] Geneva, 25 Jun (XINHUA) — China's disarmament Ambassador Fan Guoxiang emphatically pointed out at the summer session of the Geneva disarmament conference today: The medium-range missiles deployed by the Soviet Union and the United States in Europe and Asia should be reduced according to the same principle, simultaneously, and in a synchronized and balanced manner until their total destruction; they should practice the "zero option" in both Europe and Asia.

Fan Guoxiang said: Whether the Soviet Union and the United States will remove all their medium-range missiles from Europe and Asia and how they will do so have a direct bearing on the security of European and Asian countries. The demands of these countries should be given full respect and serious consideration. He pointed out: "The security of Europe is important, but equally important is the security of Asia. Then, why will 100 medium-range missiles remain in Asia while all will be removed from Europe? Such a move constitutes a military threat to the security of Asian nations as well as political unfairness; and it will not ease the minds of European countries either. Therefore, in the end it will not necessarily benefit the United States or the Soviet Union."

Fan Guoxiang said: For some time, the trend of Soviet-U.S. disarmament talks has attracted wide, international attention. The talks held between them recently over the medium-range missile issue and the various proposals put forward by them are even more spectacular. It is natural for the world's people to be concerned about the actions being taken by the countries that possess over 10,000 nuclear warheads. The Chinese delegation holds that dialogue between the United States and the Soviet Union is better than confrontation, and relaxation is better than tension in East-West relations and in the relations between the two opposing military blocs. The principle of settling disputes peacefully contained in the UN charter should be supported by all UN member nations. We hope that the U.S.-Soviet talks will soon reach disarmament agreements that will be conducive to the relaxation of international tensions and will not harm the interests of other countries.

He said: It is possible for the two major nuclear powers to reach temporary and partial agreements in their disarmament talks because of the strong demands of the world people and because of their own needs. The Geneva disarmament conference and the international community should urge them to firmly take the first step toward nuclear disarmament at an early date and to take action to eliminate all medium-range weapons in Europe and Asia, including missiles, launchers, and nuclear warheads. We should also note that the two major nuclear powers have not changed their basic strategies nor have they made any substantive progress in their talks on strategic nuclear weapons and space arms. The people of the world should watch out for their continues arms race in various forms. For the sake of true relaxation of the international situation, we are completely justified to demand that the two major nuclear powers eliminate all their medium-range missiles, drastically reduce their other nuclear weapons at home and abroad, and stop testing, producing, and deploying any nuclear weapons.

Ambassador Fan Guoxiang pointed out: Complete and thorough nuclear disarmament cannot be made overnight. As a practical measure to prevent nuclear war, China has always advocated that all nuclear countries should commit themselves not to be the first to use nuclear weapons under any circumstances and not to use nor threaten to use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear countries and nuclear-free zones. On the very first day China possessed nuclear weapons, the Chinese Government solemnly declared that at no time and under no circumstances will China be the first to use nuclear weapons. China has repeatedly declared that it unconditionally commits itself not to use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear countries and nuclear-free zones, and it favors the conclusion, through negotiations, of an international convention on nonuse of nuclear weapons and not threatening to use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear nations.

He said: China respects and supports the countries concerned in establishing nuclear weapons-free zones in the light of the actual situation of their respective regions and on the basis of consultations among the countries themselves. We believe that countries with nuclear weapons should respect their demands and propositions, consider the positions of nuclear-free zones, and undertake related commitments. China supports the proposals to establish nuclear-free zones in Latin America, the South Pacific, Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, and on the Korean peninsula and has signed protocols related to the treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America and the treaty for the South Pacific nuclear-free zone.

Fan Gouxiang said in conclusion: As early as 16 October 1964 when China first had an atomic bomb, the Chinese Government issued a statement advocating the complete prohibition and thorough destruction on nuclear weapons. The statement said solemnly: "We wholeheartedly hope that a nuclear war will never occur, and we firmly believe that a nuclear war can be avoided as long as all peace-loving countries and peoples in the world make joint efforts and struggle persistently for this end."

This year's summer session of the Geneva disarmament conference began on 9 June. Attending the conference are representatives from 40 countries, including the 5 permanent members of the UN Security Council. Main items on the agenda are questions on preventing the arms race in outer space, halting the arms race, nuclear disarmament, prohibition of chemical weapons, prohibition of nuclear tests, preventing nuclear wars, and comprehensive disarmament plans.

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CSO: 5200/4012



## INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

PEOPLE'S DAILY ON 'BRIGHTER PROSPECTS' FOR INF AGREEMENT

HK290829 Beijing RENMIN RIBAO in Chinese 26 Jun 87 p 6

[Commentary by correspondent Zhang Liang (1728 0081): "Prospects for a U.S.-Soviet Agreement on Medium-Range Missiles"]

[Text] On the 15th of this month, on the basis of a consensus with its NATO allies, the United States officially announced that it accepted the Soviet Union's "double-zero proposal" regarding the talks on guided missiles in Europe, and called for the "removal, on a global scale, of all U.S. and Soviet medium-range missile systems." The prospects for a U.S.-Soviet agreement on medium-range missile in the near future have thus become brighter.

The "double-zero proposal" was introduced in April this year. Since Soviet leader Gorbachev proposed the removal of all U.S. and Soviet medium-range missiles deployed in Europe, Western countries have taken for granted that the Soviet Union has accepted NATO's "zero proposal." However, on the other hand, they also worry that the removal of medium-range missiles may give the Soviet Union an edge in short-range guided missiles. Thus, in mid-April, when U.S. Secretary of State Shultz was visiting the Soviet Union, Soviet leader Gorbachev proposed the removal of all tactical guided missiles with a range of between 500 and 1,000 km (that is, medium-short-range guided missiles) in addition to confirming his proposal for the removal of all U.S. and Soviet medium-range guided missiles (that is, guided missiles with a range of between 1,000 and 5,000 km) deployed in Europe. He also claimed that the Soviet Union was going to remove in the near future all such missiles it had deployed in Europe and that it would put this down in the agreement on medium-range missiles.

This Soviet proposal, which has since been referred to as the "double-zero proposal," has aroused excitement in the West. The United States welcomes this, thinking that this is one step closer to the demands of the Western countries, that it provides the United States and the Soviet Union with a golden opportunity to reach agreement on nuclear arms reduction, and that it is in line with U.S. intentions. However, it indicated that it could not respond to it immediately. Its excuse was that matters concerning United States and its Western allies' defense strategy must first be discussed within NATO before a decision can be made.

Eastern European countries have quickly indicated their positions on the "double-zero proposal." At a Warsaw Pact summit toward the end of May, they reiterated their support for a U.S.-Soviet agreement based on the proposal. However, there is disagreement within NATO and its members cannot make a decision. There is disagreement

even within the governments of several major West European countries, including West Germany. They have, in varying degrees, doubts and misgivings regarding the "double-zero proposal." They have no objections to taking some heat off the nuclear confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union in Europe. On the other hand, however, they are worried by the possibility that once the "double-zero proposal" is put into effect, the Soviet Union will have an edge in conventional arms and in guided missiles with a range of less than 500 km and the security of Western Europe will be seriously threatened.

Thus, there have been frequent bilateral negotiations between the United States and Western European countries, and frequent multi-lateral negotiations among the latter. NATO members have at last accepted the "double-zero proposal" in view of external pressure. They do not want to give people the impression that they are "a drag on U.S.-Soviet arms reduction." [paragraph continues]

However, a more important reason is that the United States has made some corresponding promises. In early June, at the Venice summit between seven western countries, President Reagan promised the United States' allies that the United States "will not alter its defense obligations to Europe." In addition, the United States has also indicated that it will conduct negotiations with the Soviet Union on rectifying the imbalance in conventional military strength in Europe.

Obviously, by endorsing the "double-zero proposal," NATO has paved the way for U.S.-Soviet talks on medium-range guided missiles. U.S. and Soviet representatives to the talks have produced a first draft of a joint proposal. However, according to various sources, many long-standing, difficult problems have yet to be resolved although both the United States and the Soviet Union have some idea as to the main contents and basic makeup of the agreement. It is not so easy to reach an agreement that is acceptable to both sides. For example, the United States has called for the removal, on a global scale, of all medium- and medium-short-range guided missiles. However, the Soviet Union has reservations on this. Although they would be allowed to keep 100 medium-range guided missiles each, they cannot agree on where to deploy them. In addition, there is also the problem of verification. The United States calls for comprehensive inspection in order to verify the exact number of missiles and to examine the missile systems that should be dismantled. It has also suggested that they both permanently station people in each other's countries to examine the missile systems, which the agreement allows them to retain and their facilities for producing, assembling, maintaining, and storing guided missiles. The Soviet Union also calls for strict inspection, including inspection at bases and private military production enterprises in countries other than the Soviet Union and the United States. Regarding this, the United States and the Soviet Union have their own intentions and have great differences between them. Regarding medium-short-range guided missiles, the problem of what to do with the 72 Pershing-1A guided missiles in West Germany remains a subject of dispute. The Soviet Union argues that since the range of Pershing-1A guided missiles is well over 500 km, they should be removed. However, the United States maintains that since these missiles are under FRG control, they are beyond what should be discussed at the U.S.-Soviet missile talks. In addition, each country has prepared its own timetable for removing their medium-range missiles in Europe. The Soviet Union has suggested that they be removed over 5 years in two stages. This means that they should remove 50 percent of their missiles in the first stage and remove the remaining 50 percent in the second. However, the United States thinks that the Soviet Union should first get rid of its numerical missile advantage over the United States before they

proceed to remove their missiles. These problems are difficult and complicated. As soon as specific talks begin, they will find these problems really knotty and there will apparently be endless haggling. Not long ago, U.S. Secretary of State Shultz also described the talks as "far from nearing the end."

Given the brighter prospects for an agreement on medium-range missiles, the United States and the Soviet Union are making renewed efforts to bring about another summit. Both sides desire another summit. It is reported that there will be another summit before the end of this year. However, much depends on the progress in the disarmament talks.

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CSO: 5200/4012

## INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

PRAVDA ON 'ORCHESTRATED BALLYHOO' OVER SS-20'S IN ASIA

PM301406 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 30 Jun 87 Second Edition p 6

[Vsevolod Ovchinnikov "Commentator's Column": "Who Is Against a Nuclear-Free Asia?"]

[Text] A carefully orchestrated ballyhoo about medium-range missiles in Asia has now been launched in the United States, Western Europe, and Japan.

They are trying to depict the Soviet Union as an opponent of the elimination of this class of weapons globally. They claim that "The USSR needs medium-range nuclear systems which would constitute a direct threat to China." This claim is groundless. Both the Soviet and the Chinese leadership emphasize the urgent need for peace to resolve the internal tasks of social renewal. The USSR and the PRC approach a number of key international problems from similar standpoints. The two neighboring socialist states have declared that they will never be the first to use nuclear weapons. They both oppose the militarization of space.

Other views are also being put forward in the West: For instance, that the formula "two zeros plus 100" jeopardizes Japan's security. There was a stormy reaction from the Japanese public to Prime Minister Nakasone's words that "if the USSR does not eliminate all its medium-range missiles in Asia, the United States should station American missiles of this class in Alaska" (that is, keep Soviet territory in its sights). This statement, as the newspaper MAINICHI rightly believes, symbolizes Japan's involvement in the U.S. nuclear strategy and could sharply exacerbate military tension in the northwestern Pacific.

Why did the Soviet Union agree in Reykjavik to keep 100 warheads each on the medium-range missiles of the USSR and the United States? This is a kind of compromise, due to the U.S. Administration's desire to keep nuclear systems in Asia, systems which are deployed against the Soviet Union. The United States has, after all, concentrated a mighty nuclear force in the Asian and Pacific region and is replenishing the nuclear arsenals on its ships and at its military bases on foreign country's territory. This forces the Soviet Union to maintain the balance of forces.

At the same time the USSR is prepared to resolve the problem of medium-range missiles globally. There would be no obstacles to this if the United States agreed to eliminate its nuclear systems in Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines, remove its aircraft carrier flotilla behind agreed borders, and, of course, have no medium-range missiles on its own territory. So the "global zero option" is hampered not by Moscow's objections, but by Washington's nuclear ambitions in the Asian and Pacific region.

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CSO: 5200/1558

## INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

### BRIEFS

BREMEN MAYOR TALKS WITH HONECKER--Berlin (DPA)--The mayor of Bremen, Klaus Wedemeier (SPD), stated after talks with GDR head of state and party Honecker that both the Soviet Union and the GDR see "no chance" of continuing the Soviet-American disarmament negotiations without the inclusion of the Pershing-1A missiles stationed in the FRG. After the hour-long talks, Wedemeier told journalists in East Berlin that Honecker had spoken of information from the Soviet leadership yesterday that the United States does not want to negotiate about these missiles because they are in the possession of the Federal Republic. According to Wedemeier, the continuation of the negotiations could be endangered by this. In the case of the 72 Pershing missiles the Bundeswehr is only in possession of the carrier rockets while the nuclear warheads for them are in the possession of the United States. The head of the Federal Republic's permanent mission in East Berlin added that according to his own information as a participant in the talks the carrier systems for the Pershing-1A's have so far not been a subject of the Soviet-American negotiations in Geneva. [Excerpt] [Hamburg DPA in German 1227 GMT 1 Jul 87] /8309

CSO: 5200/2563

CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

USSR: U.S. CULTIVATING 'DEADLY' VIRUSES FOR MILITARY USE

PM261709 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 Jun 87 Second Edition p 3

[Lieutenant Colonel V. Markushin "Rejoinder": "Why Are They Cultivating Viruses?"]

[Text] The mass media have again drawn the attention of the world public to facts which illustrate that the Pentagon is stepping up its efforts in the sphere of biological weapons. America's CBS-TV in particular has reported the projected construction of a special chamber at the Dagway military range for testing "viruses of the most deadly diseases on earth."

As is well known, the AIDS epidemic is snowballing in the United States. And nevertheless, almost as if cocking a snook at this "20th century plague," the military department intends to cultivate new viruses capable of destroying masses of people. While concentrating their efforts on fighting one evil, at the same time they are artificially creating a new one, and allocating tens of millions of dollars to it. Since 1981 expenditure on biological research for military purposes has increased six times over -- from 14 to 90 million dollars. And this, as they say, is only the beginning.

Not only troops and the population can be the targets of biological weapons, according to the specialists. Using pathogenic organisms it is possible to infect animals and plants on the very broadest scale -- that is, in this way appreciable losses can be inflicted on agriculture and on the opposing side's economy as a whole. Thus it is a means of biological sabotage without even entering into military conflict. In this sense the means on which the U.S. military laboratories are working are dreadful, insidious weapons.

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